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THE CLEVELAND HOUSING PAPERS

wherein Ernie, Doug &
John examine the whole
stinking mess that is
'the housing problem'
and lay out feasible
approaches to a solution.

"BEST DAMNED ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM IN THE NATION!"
Norm
"THEY ARE ALL NICE BOYS"
Virginia
"YOU MAY NOT LIKE WHAT THEY SAY, BUT YOU GOTTA ADMIT
THEY USED A HELL ©F A LOT OF PAPER SAYING IT!"
Fred

C O N T E N T S

PREFACE

A PROPOSAL FOR HOUSING SUPPLEMENTS TO THE POOR

HOUSING FOR LOW- AND MODERATE-INCOME FAMILIES

HOUSING ABANDONMENT IN CLEVELAND

POVERTY AND SUBSTANDARD HOUSING: AN ANALYSIS OF
RESIDENTIAL DETERIORATION IN CLEVELAND

EVALUATION OF THE SECTION 236 HOUSING PROGRAM

EVALUATION OF THE LOW RENT PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM

EVALUATION OF THE RENT SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF HOUSING PROGRAMS

A HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM FOR CLEVELAND: ISSUES
AND IMPLICATIONS

PREFACE
In August of 1970, the City Planning Commission published
an analysis of the Family Assistance Plan proposed as a welfare reform
measure by the Nixon Administration, Included in that analysis was
a brief discussion of a proposed housing supplements program (Housing
Allowances) for low and moderate income families. Since that time,
the Family Assistance Plan has encountered both legislative and
political obstacles, while the housing allowance idea has gained increased prominence and is presently approaching legislative form.
In the three years since the Planning Commission's initial
consideration of a housing allowance program, the commission staff
completed a series of papers examining the nature of the housing
problem and analyzing alternative responses on the part of both
Federal and local governments. While the analysis is often complex
and several crucial questions remain only partially answered, the
conclusions reached provide strong support for the institution of a
program of housing subsidies which go directly to households based
on income and family size. Additionally, the analyses show that
unless other Federal and local housing programs and policies are
altered, the serious housing deterioration experienced in Cleveland
and other cities will continue unabated.
Various officials in HUD and numerous members of Congress
have called for change both in the definition of the "housing
problem" and in the Federal response to that problem. The efforts
underway at this time to re-evaluate existing programs and to
design new programs are encouraging. Hopefully, the housing
analysis completed by the Cleveland Planning Commission will
provide useful information regarding the basic nature of the
housing problem and the implications of alternative programmatic
responses.
A word about the publication of these papers may interest
the reader.
No attempt has been made to remove redundancies in the
papers or to edit from the text what might appear to be contrasting or even conflicting conclusions and proposals. For
instance, as you read through the papers you should note a definite shift in policy emphasis. The initial papers focus almost
exclusively upon the need for a housing allowance program. In
later papers, you will find increasing recognition of the need
for a more balanced approach to Cleveland's housing problems —
a program including some continued supply-side subsidies as well
as a strong housing allowance component. As our work proceeded,
a constant effort was made to summarize and refine the analyses
presented in earlier work. It was necessary to constantly reevaluate the policy implications of our analyses in light of our
growing understanding 6f Cleveland's housing problems. It is our

M

intention to share this process with the reader as well as to
present the final results of our research in the area of housing.
In all important respects - in the conception, analysis and
writing - these papers are the work of Douglas Wright and John Linner
of the City Planning Commission staff. I consider their work unique
among published planning agency documents. Others assisted in various ways - Rosetta Boyd, Ora Thomas, Helen Jordan, Sandra Wilson,
and Nadine Lane accomplished the typing and reproductions; Himanshu
Patel provided computer work. Norman Krumholz, Planning Commission
Director, is due considerable credit for creating a work environment
within which sound and critical analysis can proceed.

Ernest R. Bonner, Chief Planner
Comprehensive Planning and
Research

I ,"l,

INTRODUCTION;
Throughout this nation's history, large numbers of urban
families have occupied overcrowded, unsanitary, dilapidated
dwellings. Although this basic problem persists, several characteristics of the problem have changed considerably over time.
As recently as twenty years ago, most larger cities were characterized by a scarcity of vacant housing units and a strong
demand for low income housing. Today, in those same cities,
many neighborhoods have been deserted, and the abandonment of
residential properties continues at a rapid rate.
The startling pace of this deterioration in Cleveland, and
the apparent ineffectiveness of public efforts to slow it,
prompted the City Planning Commission staff to undertake a research effort aimed at answering three basic questions: 1) what
is the nature of the housing problem? 2) what has been the nature
and effectiveness of the public response to the problem? 3) what
changes in public programs and policies are needed to achieve a
more effective response to the problem?
An examination of the nature of the housing problem is provided in Poverty and Substandard Housing and Housing Abandonment
in Cleveland.
Three separate papers dealing with public housing,
rent supplements, and section 2 36, examine the public response to
the problem. Comparative Analysis of Housing programs provides
a comparative evaluation of the same three programs and of an
alternative housing program - housing allowances. The housing
allowance program is explained in Housing for Low and Moderate
Income Families and further examined in, A Housing Allowance Program
For Cleveland; Issues and Implications.
The analyses argue forcefully that the nature of the housing
problem has changed dramatically in Cleveland. No longer is there
a scarcity of low income housing units. A surplus of low income
units - many of them substandard - has been created. The analyses
conclude that primary emphasis should
be placed upon preserving and maintaining the existing housing stock. A new federal
program of subsidies paid directly to families - housing allowances appears to serve this need most effectively. It is concluded that deterioration can be halted only through the introduction of a program which improves the low income household's
capacity to pay rent". Such a program, when used in conjunction
with programs of housing supply, would restore balance in the
housing market. Moreover, such a program would provide the opportunity to obtain a standard dwelling to those low income households
who presently have no such opportunity.
In broader terms, this effort has reaffirmed the staff's
conviction that any attempt to deal with major urban problems

must start with an examination of the dilemmas facing the least
advantaged residents of our cities, it also points to the need
for planners to question established ideas regarding urban
problems and the ways in which to remedy them.
For example, many of the planner's traditional tools can do
little to solve the housing problem in Cleveland. No amount of
rezoning, land use planning, or code enforcement can alter the
fact that a significant proportion of the city's population
simply cannot afford a standard dwelling unit. Thus, it is important that planners recognize this professional dilemma, and
that they re-define their roles and responsibilities in order to
more effectively respond to urban problems.

A PROPOSAL IN HOUSING SUPPLEMENTS TO THE POOR

Excerpt from:
THE PROPOSED FEDERAL FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN!
A CRITIQUE, SOME SUGGESTED MODIFICATIONS
AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE CITY OF CLEVELAND

AUGUST, 1970

GENERAL PLAN REPORT NO. 2

Decent housing for low income families continues to be a pressing need in our central cities. An income subsidy to families on
the condition that they occupy standard housing may help create
those necessary new housing units. This subsidy could be administratively linked with the unrestricted income subsidy of an income
maintenance program.

Clearly, this subsidy, restricted to the

purchase or rental of standard housing will diminish work incentives ,
in the way outlined above.

Still, it appears important to serve the

purpose of creating more standard housing units for the very poor of
Cleveland, even though our work incentive purposes are served less
well as a result.
A proposal in housing supplements to the poor •— All low-income
families^/ will receive a housing supplement.

This supplement would

vary with money income of the family, starting at $1,000 per year for
a family of fouri?/ with annual money income of $1,600 and declining
systematically to $0 at an annual money income of $7,200.

The supple-

ment will be paid to the family in monthly checks on the condition ,
that the housing unit in which they live is "standard".—/
1.

If the family is now renting a standard unit, the supplement

will be paid.
rent.

The owner of the unit may then decide to increase the

in fact, preliminary results from a study by CDIP show that

many owners in the City are now operating at a very low profit.

This

implies that the typical response of owners would be to raise rents,

—/Excepting tenants of public housing who are presumably receiving
a supplement now.
—/This supplement will vary with urban-rural residence.
3/
—' "Standard" for these purposes means that an annual inspection has
been made of the unit and certificate of occupancy has been issued
by the local governing body.

41

2.
insuring a more adequate return of their investment.

This would,

in general, make investment in standard housing in the City a more
rational use of private capital —

a definite improvement in investor

attitudes with respect to the City.
How much will rent for standard housing increase?

It is possible,

under certain conditions, that the rent for some standard units may
be increased more that the housing supplement received by the tenant, ;
thereby leaving the present tenant worse off than previously,

But

it would appear more in the owner's interest not to increase rents
more than the increase in a tenant family's housing supplement and
there would even be some justification to increase rents less than
the amount of the housing supplement, thereby leaving both tenant and
owner better off than before. What, in fact, will occur in this important housing market is a matter of conjecture.

In this environ-

ment of uncertainty, faith prevails, and I choose to believe that
owners and tenants would (in the main) reach some agreement whereby
both are better off.
2.

if the family now owns a standard housing unit, the housing

supplement is a windfall gain, and could be directed to other household purposes.

This could be viewed as a social dividend to those

who have, under the most burdensome of circumstances, made an investment of resources in the past.

For many of these families, however,

the supplement will permit that maintenance and improvement of their
home which will be required to sustain it as an asset to both themselves and their community.
3.

If the family now rents a sub-standard unit, the housing

supplement they would have been paid while in a standard unit will be

3.
placed in trust in the family's name. Accumulation of these supplements, with interest earned, will be available to the family for the
purchase of a standard home, or as a pre-paid rent in a standard
rental unit.

it is recognized that this amounts to explicit social

sanction of family residence in sub-standard housing units. While
this may be difficult for us to accept openly, it is no less true
because we do not explicitly sanction it now.

To be gained from

such open acceptance is an opportunity for capital accumulation by
the poor, and their eventual ownership of a standard home —

pur-

poses held high in connection with other Federal housing programs.
If the accumulation is used to pre-pay rent in a standard unit,
typically spent for rent, money will be released to other, probably
related, purposes —

household appliance, for instance, or furniture.

In either case, an investment in their housing unit is made which
would not otherwise be feasible in the absence of a housing supplement.
4.

If the family owns a sub-standard housing unit, no housing

supplement would be paid.

The promise of this supplement, however,

is an incentive to the owner to bring his home into conformance with
local codes.
5.

A crucial question is posed by this proposal. Will an in-

crease in the demand for standard housing finally result in some
increase in the supply of units or will the increase in demand simply
drive up the price of standard units with no significant increase in
the stock.
ment.

Much, of course, depends upon the amount of the supple-

A housing supplement of $40 per month would support a $4,700

rehabilitation program.—'

In other words, if an owner were assured

4/
—'Assumes 8% interest rate and 20-year mortgage.

4,
an increase of $40 monthly in rent, he could legitimately afford to
invest $4,700 in a rehabilitation of the unit. Many families, under
the proposal above, would be able to pay $40 additional monthly rent
and have some of their supplement left to direct to other purposes.
But, would $4,700 be adequate to rehabilitate a unit from sub-standard to standard?
not.

In some cases, probably.

In other cases, probably

In the University-Euclid Urban Renewal area, many units were

rehabilitated for a cost of $5,000 or less.

Based on this limited

evidence, it appears that some additions to the stock of standard
housing through rehabilitation would occur under the provisions of
the housing supplement proposal above.
New housing additions are less clearly in prospect as a result
of this proposal, though renters of sub-standard units now may accumulate enough of a down-payment over a period of years to purchase a
home at relatively low monthly payments. This would be an entirely
new market for new housing builders and we can expect that some
builders will respond to it.
6.

In summary, the proposed housing supplement should increase

the stock of standard units through rehabilitation, maintain the
standard units now existing through funds for maintenance, and possibly, provide some additions to the stock of new, standard housing.
7.

It should be noted that one important problem under present

public housing programs would be alleviated with the proposal above.
The standard units bought or rented by low-income families need not
be restricted by law, in number of space.

Low-income families may

use their supplement to bargain with owners in any area of the City
or metropolitan area. Neither will the number of families receiving

the subsidy be restricted to some legislatively-determined level as
is now the case. The proposed supplement goes to families, not
buildings, and in such a way that the concentration as well as public
visibility of low-income families will be discouraged.

There is also

the real possibility of getting more housing benefit for our housing
dollar,

in this respect, CDIP calculations (with reasonable assump-

tions in my opinion) suggest we are now paying ;$250 a month for
public housing which provides benefits of about $90 per month,

,
in

their words, "an income grant of $100 per month is cheaper and better."
Other words on the subject suggest that the private sector can provide more standard housing than the Public Housing Authority .•§/

—'Eugene Smolensky, "Public Housing or Income Supplements - The
Economics of Housing for the Poor." AIP Journal, March, 1968,

HOUSING FOR LOW- AND MODERATEINCOME FAMILIES

Analysis of the problem
The Failure of Present Programs
A Proposed New Approach
and the Issues it Raises

January 1972

City Planning Commission
City of Cleveland

PREFACE

Promoting choices in housing — particularly for those low-income
families which suffer from few, if any, choices — is a major goal
of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. After more than two
decades of experience with federal legislation, it is clear to all
careful observers that failure in serving this goal is almost complete and that fundamental changes in our housing strategy must be
accomplished. This effort is dedicated to that change in strategy using an analysis of our past failures to point the direction of
change, then proposing a new form of federal housing assistance to
low and moderate-income families.
We have not tried to answer all the questions that arise from an
introduction on a national scale of the program proposed, but we
have tried to ask all the. questions, u< i invite criticism and comment on all aspects of the program proposal, not only to inform
further analysis on our part but to contribute to the design of the
best possible program for congressional consideration.
Contributions to this paper came from a myriad of persons and
agencies. Chief among these, however, must be the Housing and
Economics Analysis staff of the Community Development Improvement
Program of the City of Cleveland, headed (until recently) by
Andrew J. Gold, whose personal contributions were substantial. Additionally, the published work of Ira S. Lowry of the New York City
Rand Institute and the advice of Professor Eugene Smolensky of the
Department of Economics at the University of Wisconsin were responsible for several ideas found in the proposal. Members of
CDIP who contributed much to the housing market analysis were:
Robert Dykes, Scott Mills, Jan Karlak, Sid Vander Ploeg, Wole
Adetunji and Elaine Clawson. From the City Planning Commission
James Mittlestadt and Mark Boron assisted with parts of the
analysis. Typing was the responsibility of Helen Jordan and
Ora D. Thomas. And, of course, Norman Krumholz, Director of Planning and Ernest Bonner, Chief of Comprehensive Planning and Research, provided the guidance and environment without which this
effort would be less than it is.

Douglas Wright,
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning & Research

INTRODUCTION

Significant deterioration in the housing stock of the City
of Cleveland occurred during the decade of the 60's.
Much of this deterioration is only the natural outcome of ineffective demand among a growing number of Cleveland residents for
housing units of standard quality.
The lack of effective demand follows, essentially, from a lack of
income among Cleveland residents.
Those households with low incomes must, in order to obtain standard
housing, be willing to pay an inordinately large proportion of
their income for housing. This they cannot often choose to do,
given other demands on their limited income.
In short, poor households cannot afford standard housing.
Government programs have never seriously confronted the dilemma of
housing for the poor and, as a result, have been too little in
terms of funding, too late to save large areas of our central
cities, too costly to serve all the needy, and too insensitive to
the needs of the families involved.
New federal housing legislation is required — not only to reverse
(or at least stabilize) the obvious trends in deterioration of our
central city housing stock, but to offer maximum choice to all the
poor in satisfying their housing needs and to do this in the least
burdensome manner financially.
A new federal program of housing allowances to the poor appears best
directed to those ends. It is our intention in this paper to document the need for a program of this kind, present a specific housing allowance program proposal and examine the consequences of,
and issues raised by, such a program.

II.

THE COLLAPSE OF DEMAND FOR STANDARD HOUSING IN CLEVELAND

Since as early as 1950 in some areas of Cleveland, and since 1960
in others, there has been a serious deterioration of the housing
stock. Responsibility for this clear challenge to the City's
future has been variously assigned -- to slum landlords, to irresponsible tenants, to public officials. There are a number of
indications which suggest, however, that this growing deterioration
results mainly from a lack of demand for housing of standard quality.
Indications of this lack of demand are found in overcrowding, housing
stock and housing price trends in Cleveland over the past two decades.
These indications will be discussed, in turn, in the following sections .
Overcrowding
Overcrowding occurs (by Census definition) when more than 1.01
persons per room occupy a dwelling unit. Between 1960 and 1970 the
TABLE I

CROWDING IN HOUSING - CITY OF CLEVELAND
1950 b

Number of overcrowded dwelling units a

' 1960

1970

26,645

2 7,686

18,294

Median persons per dwelling unit

3.1

3.0

2.4

Median rooms per dwelling unit

N.A.

5.2

4.9

a

Dwelling units which have more than 1.01 persons per room.
The 1950 Census differed from later censuses in its definition of
dwelling unit, resulting in a comparative under-counting of dwelling
units.
Source: U. S. Census

b

number of overcrowded units in the City of Cleveland dropped from
27,686 to 18,294 — a 34% decline. Further, the number of persons
per unit declined more than the number of rooms per unit. Both of
these measures indicate more room for the average household in 1970
than in 1960.1/
1/ The hypothesis stated here is not the only explanation of the crowding figures examined. Alternative explanations are discussed in
Appendix A.
— 2 —

Trends in the Housing Stock and the Population
Table II shows that total population of the City of Cleveland declined in both of the past decades and that total households and
total housing units declined during the last decade.—/
TABLE II

CHANGES IN POPULATION AND HOUSING - CLEVELAND

Year

Total
Population

1950
1960
1970

914,808
876,050
750,907

Total Occupied
Housing Units
(Households)
265,973 a
269,891
248,280

Total
Housing Units
270,943 a
282,914
264,100

a

See Footnote (b) Table I
Source: U. S. Census

But while all three indicators declined during the 1960-1970 decade
the rate of housing unit decline (6.7%) was less than either households (8%) or total population (14.2%). This indicates a greater
supply of housing in Cleveland relative to the population in 1970
than in 1960.
Second, the number of unoccupied units in Cleveland's housing market
increased, both in real numbers and relative to the total stock,
during the 1960-1970 period.2/
Both the relative increase in the housing supply and the increase in
unoccupied units indicate a "loosening" of the housing market in
which the supply of housing likely exceeded the demand for housing,
i.e., the City lost households faster than it lost housing units.

2/ While 1950 Census of Housing figures cannot be adjusted so they are
consistent and completely comparable with 1960 and 1970 figures, it
is believed that were they corrected, they would reveal very minimal
changes in total units and occupied units between 1950 and 1960.
It is important to note that according to Census definition, Total
Occupied Housing Units is equivalent to a count of total households .
_3/ This increase in unoccupied units could result from an increase
in vacancies or, to some extent, abandonment. It is important to
note, however, that this apparent surplus in the supply of houseing did not come about as a result of excessive new housing
starts (See Table A-II).
- 3 -

Trends in Housing Prices and Income
An examination of price changes over time must be undertaken due to
the essential relationship which price has with demand. The demand
for housing is dependent on the relative price of housing to some
degree because other goods and services are in competition for
current income expenditures. The supply of housing is dependent on
relative prices since consumer expenditure is simultaneously producer
revenue.
Table III provides indices of several items relevant to the housing
market for selected years in the Cleveland SMSA.iL/
It is immediately clear from this table that all prices and income
have increased, over the past 30 years, and on closer inspection it
is clear that some indices have increased at a greater rate than
others. Table IV makes these comparisons of change more direct. There
the change in rent is compared to the change in other prices and income, and it is clear from this table that, since 1960, the price of
housing and all other items has risen much more rapidly than rent.
When the change in rent is compared to the change in income, the lag
in rent increases is even more pronounced and began in 1955.
The Story of Two Decades
During the period, 1950-60, several things occurred which set the
stage for the more significant housing market changes of the following decade. Cleveland lost population, probably much of it to the
surrounding suburbs. However, this loss was nearly offset by an^
apparent in-migration of comparatively poor households, which while
resulting in only a slight net loss of population, produced a substantial increase in the demand for low-rent housing. This demand
was not fully met and overcrowding increased. But demand for standard units was still strong in much of the City, as indicated by the

— / The use of SMSA data to examine Cleveland housing market activities
may be questioned by some. See Appendix B for discussion.
Definition of terms in Tables III and IV: Housing is a conglomerate
index of rent, home ownership, hotel and motel rates, fuel and
utilities, household furnishing, and operation; Rent is defined as
contract, including bonuses, fees, and repairs paid for by the
tenant; Home Ownership is home purchase, mortgage interest, taxes,
insurance, and maintenance and repairs.
In both Table III and Table IV, the base period for all indices is
1957-1959, i.e., 1957-59 = 100. This means that each item is
assigned a value of 100 according to its market price in 1957-59,
and then is adjusted according to price changes relative to that
1957-59 base of 100.
- 4 -

TABLE III

PRICE INDICES - CLEVELAND SMSA

Year

Rent
Index

Housing
Index

1940
1950
1955
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970

52.5
67.5
90.7
101.3
101.7
101.4
101.3
101.1
101.0
101.7
102.5
104.5
106.9
110.5

N. A.
80.8
94.4
101.2
101.1
101.1
102.1
102.2
103.2
104.7
108.5
115.7
121.8
130.7

Income
Index
N. A.
60.9
81.5
114.6
116.9
119.2
121.6
124.0
127.4
135.0
143.1
151.7
160.8
170.5

All Items
Index

Building
Materials
Index*

47.8
82.5
93.1
102.3
103.2
103.5
104.7
105.2
106.9
109.7
112.8
119.7
126.3
134.8

N. A.
N. A.
N. A.
100.0
104.0
107.
110.
N. A.
110.
111.
115.
130.
132.
N. A.

Base Year: 1957-59 = 100
Source: Consumer Price Index, *Engineering News Record

TABLE IV

Year

Rent
vs.
Housing

1950
1955
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970

83.5
96.1
100.1
100.3
98.9
97.1
90.3
84.5

RELATIVE INDEX CHANGES^/
Housing
vs.
All
Items

Rent
vs.
All
Items

Rent
vs.
Income

81.8
97.4
99.0
98.0
96.1
92.6
87-3
82.0

110.8
111.3
88.4
85.1
81.5
75.3
68.9
64.8

N.A.
N.A.
98.9
97.7
97.6
95.4
96.6
97.0

HomeOwnership
vs.
All Items

Rent
vs .
HomeOwnership

N. A.
N. A.
97.5
96.9
96.0
94.3
99.2
102.1

N. A .
N. A.
101.6
101.1
100.0
98.2
88.0
80.3

Base Year: 1957-59 = 100
Source: Consumer Price Index
— A decrease in an index over time indicates that the price of the
commodity under consideration has declined relative to the price of
the commodity of comparison, even though both may have increased in
real dollar price.
- 5 -

increasing rent indices, and further supported by substantial new
construction of single-family units. Thus, it appears that during
this period (1950-60), there was a significant shortage of low-income
housing and some shortage of housing for higher income groups. As
will be shown, the situation changed drastically during the following
decade.
In the period, 1960-70, the Cleveland housing market underwent major
changes in response to several strong forces. The population in
Cleveland declined by over 125,000 persons (21,000 households) and
the total housing stock fell by over 18,000 units. This assisted in
producing a substantial uncrowding of units, as previously indicated
(Table I ) .
At the same time, a great proportion of the demand for standard
housing was felt outside the City. Dominant demand within Cleveland
was exerted by low-income households and this, in most cases, took
the practical form of demand for inexpensive, poor quality (substandard) housing. Landlords, facing a decline in demand for high
quality housing, recognized the only viable alternative — supplying
the demand for low-income households. This decline in demand, and
subsequent response, resulted in diminishing new construction
(particularly, single-family homes) in Cleveland (see Table A-II),
conversions (in many cases, a form of poorer quality housing),—' and
under-maintenance of existing units. As the population in Cleveland
fell, a surplus of units came into being, probably at most price
levels but not at all locations. The resulting over-supply of
units forced rents further downward and while housing thus became
relatively less expensive to tenants, the landlords were confronted
with a profit squeeze. Additionally, prices of building materials
rose faster than rents (Table III), thus further squeezing the landlords since these materials are needed for housing repairs and improvements .
In short, the evidence is consistent with the speculation that certain areas of the housing market in Cleveland collapsed between 1960
and 1970. While a number of market changes contributed to this collapse,
the primary reason was an increasingly ineffective demand for
standard housing. In other words, low-income households were unable
or unwilling, to pay rents which were great enough to generate the
level of revenue required by landlords to maintain units in standard

—Conversions here refer to upward conversions in which an existing
dwelling unit is structurally altered to accommodate additional
households. This action may/, or may not, be legal depending on
compliance with local codes and zoning ordinances.
- 6 -

condition. Thus, landlords were confronted, on one side, by a
demand for housing at prices which could not support standard housing, and on the other side, by increasing costs of housing materials
and services.
It has been hypothesized elsewhere that the strongest reason for
substandard housing is the low-income of its residents, resulting in
a lack of effective demand.—' The foregoing evidence supports this
case in Cleveland. Relative decreases in household income in Cleveland, together with relative increases in housing supply, have led
to substantial relative decreases in rent which has, in turn, placed
many landlords in an untenable financial position. Continuing
deterioration, and eventually abandonment, is the expected outcome
of this situation.
In summary, since as early as 1950 in some areas of Cleveland, and
since 1960 in others, there has been a serious deterioration of
housing units. A greater supply of housing relative to the population, the age of the housing stock, increased price of housing
materials, and other difficulties have compounded the problem, but
the basis reason for the deterioration is a lack of effective demand
for standard housing. Landlords, unable to secure a level of rent
adequate to cover the costs of operating a standard unit have permitted units to deteriorate. The source of this problem of ineffective demand is the low-income level of a relatively increasing
number of Cleveland households.
There is no indication given present public policies, that the
problem of ineffective demand will be diminished in the foreseeable
future. All indicators examined show that this trend, which gained
strength throughout the last decade, will continue and that the key
condition in this trend, the low incomes of many Cleveland households, will not alter unless there is a significant change in public
programs. In fact, Table V shows that Cleveland households became
poorer in comparison with households in surrounding communities
during the 1950-60 decade. There is no reason to believe this trend
was reversed during the 1960-70 decade.

6>/ For example, Richard F. Muth, "Urban Residential Land and Housing
Markets", Issues in Urban Economics, ed. Harvey S. Perloff and
Lowden Wingo, Jr. (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins Press, 1968),
p. 312.
- 7 -

TABLE V

REAL INCOME CHANGES —

Cleveland
SMSA
Source:

CLEVELAND AND CLEVELAND SMSA

Median Family Income
1950
1960
% change, 1950-60
$3,153
$5,039
59.8
3,457
6,108
76.7
U. S. Census

It is apparent that the housing market in Cleveland is in serious
difficulty. The "gap" between prices of standard housing and the
amount which low-income families are able to pay appears very real.
Moreover, the trends examined in the housing market indicate increasing difficulties both for those trying to supply standard
housing to moderate- and low-income households and for the households, themselves, who are trying to secure standard housing. The
need for public intervention in the housing market is clear. Thus,
based on the analysis completed, it can be concluded that there
exists in Cleveland, a crucial need for a public program of housing
assistance aimed at increasing the effective demand for standard
housing.

Ill

THE HOUSING PROBLEM - AN ANALYSIS

The Problem Defined
In some minds, the housing problem is defined as a concern with the
physical condition of a given dwelling unit. Thus, dwelling units
are said to be substandard if their physical condition does not
measure up to some established criteria. In other minds, mention
of the housing problem conjures up broader images, in which neighborhoods which are in a deteriorated condition are a measure of the
housing problem. Within this definition, it is quite likely that
a so-called standard unit located in a deteriorated neighborhood
would be considered part of the housing problem since the general
living conditions could be said to be substandard. Generally, a
substandard dwelling unit is one which affords less than some
arbitrarily designated level or quantity of housing service to the
occupant.Jy
The level of this housing service afforded is presum-

1

/
~~ This definition refers to a distinction between the physical unit,
or component of housing, and a broader definition of housing service. For a more complete discussion of this concept, see, Ed
Olsen, "A Competitive Theory of the Housing Market", American
Economic Review, September, 1969.

ably related to the market price for which the dwelling unit can
be obtained.^/
This price relationship has clear implications for those seeking
housing as it means that a household must, in order to obtain
standard housing, be able or willing to expend a certain amount
of its budget for housing. More important for purposes of this
discussion, it means that the housing problem must be viewed in
broader terms than simply the presence of dwelling units in substandard condition. For example, a low-income family living in
a "standard" unit, but paying 30 percent of its income for rent
and, consequently, not eating well, is just as much a part of the
problem as the poor family living in a substandard unit and unable
to spend any more on housing. Thus, the housing problem will be
viewed in broader terms than simply the physical condition of a
unit or neighborhood.
As discussed in a previous Planning Commission paper, the problem
of housing should be considered in the context of choices.Z/
Given this context, the housing problem is one confronting all
those households who have little or no choice in housing or who,
by exercising a choice in housing, reduce their choices in other
essential commodities to a minimal, or comparably "substandard"
level. Hence, the concern here is not merely with those households residing in substandard housing, but with all households
who have little or no choice regarding the cost, location, condition, type, and other characteristics of their dwelling unit.
Choices in housing are closely associated with the income of the
household. With increases in household income, the ability of
the household to spend more on housing is increased. Figure I
shows changes in household income and changes in percentage of
income spent on rent for households who rent in the City of
Cleveland.
As Figure I reveals, increases in household income correspond to
decreases in the percentage of income spent on rent. This means
that low-income households, while in many cases not spending as
many dollars on rent, are paying a substantially greater percentage
on their total budget for housing. Thus, the poor pay more for
housing, relative to their income, than the more affluent.
JB/ Consequently, while the most apparent indication of the housing
problem is the presence of substandard dwelling units, the designation of this substandard characteristic is one arbitrarily
established by various codes and standards, and two, a reflection
of some market deficiency concerning the price of the dwelling
unit. When viewed in this manner (see Footnote # 7 ) , dwelling
units priced below a certain level would represent the amount of
substandard housing present in a given area.
_9/ "Toward a Work Program for an Advocate Planning Agency", Cleveland
City Planning Commission, October, 1971.
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Given that the poor pay more for housing, what do they receive for
this expenditure? Figure II shows the relationship between household income and standard dwelling unit condition for both households
who rent and households who own homes in Cleveland. The graph displays a steady increase in the percentage of dwelling units in
standard condition with increases in household income.
Thus, for example, of households with an income of approximately
$3,250, 55 percent reside in dwelling units which are in standard
condition, while among those households with an approximate income
of $12,500, over 76 percent are able to obtain units in standard
condition.iQ/ Figures I and II make it clear. Poor families generally spend more for housing, in terms of their income and generally
receive less, in terms of housing quality for that expenditure.
The dilemma poses few real housing choices. In order to secure a
standard unit, the low-income household must pay a high percentage
of its income for housing. If this is not possible, as is often
the case for larger family sizes, the family is only able to afford
substandard housing.
This lack of choice for poor households, of course, is not new.
What has been the response of the public sector in the past as well
as at present?

IV

THE PUBLIC RESPONSE

In 1949, Congress established a national housing goal — to provide
a"decent home in a suitable environment" for all Americans — and
initiated a myriad of programs directed at the problem of housing.
Still, over two decades later, the housing problem persists, particularly among low-income families and increasingly in the central
cities.
It has frequently been stated that the primary reason for the
country's failure to provide a decent home to every American family
is that there has never existed the willingness to spend the money
necessary. This is obvious. A true commitment to the abatement of
poor housing and the provision of decent dwellings for millions of
American families, particularly those who are poor, has never existed
But the futility and frustration which has enveloped many of the
housing programs reflects a more serious difficulty than merely
inadequate funding. Many of the programs have simply not attained
10/ The relationship shown in Figures I and II varies in some interesting ways by location and by population groups. A description
and analysis of these variations is now underway and a later
report will be published.
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the anticipated results or have produced new, unexpected problems.
Moreover, the returns, or number of housing units produced, for
many programs have fallen far short of what was anticipated.
While the questions posed by these failures are many and the answers
lengthy and involved, several important conclusions are clear.
Most notably, the bulk of Federal housing programs have not been directed toward the segment of the population having the worst housing
conditions, the poor. Many programs have been implemented in which
the recipients were stated to be both low- and moderate-income households. In practice, however, the benefits of the programs have
accrued mainly to the moderate-income level households since the
programs require housing expenditures on the part of the recipients
which are simply beyond the financial means of nearly all low-income
families. Two good examples of this are the 2 36 and 2 35 FHA insurance
programs presently in use. In fact, only two Federal programs have
been initiated which have been directed exclusively toward low-income
households, and only one has produced any significant results. Public
housing and rent supplements are the programs, and the latter has
had negligible impact due to its low funding ($21,500,000 in 1970).
Public housing, however, has, by comparison, received substantial
funding, but it is becoming more and more clear that public housing,
while providing a standard dwelling unit for thousands of families,
has not been as successful in various ways as many have hoped, and
is certainly not the solution to the urban housing problem.
Two basic aspects of public housing have limited its success. First,
public housing necessarily places certain constraints on the breadth
of housing choices of recipient households. Choices in location,
type of unit and duration of occupancy are narrowed within the public
housing program.
The public housing program also stipulates relatively expensive construction (of high standards) and suffers from high land costs -thus assuring relatively high unit costs. For example, in Cleveland,
per unit construction costs of public housing have averaged over
$20,000 in recent years, and the units produced are generally well
above minimum standards in terms of structural quality. consequently,
public funds are expended to provide higher quality housing to poor
households than that which is chosen, in many cases, by households
with higher incomes. Low funding levels then assure that public
housing units will not be available to all qualified households as
demonstrated by the waiting lists.
Public housing has supplied standard housing for thousands of lowincome Cleveland families, but it has not altered the economic plight
of those families. Consequently, public housing has not, and was not
designed to effect changes which will increase the effective demand
for standard housing.
Without this change, the financial problems
present in the private housing market will remain unresolved and
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Cleveland's housing stock will continue to deteriorate.-iA/
Unique among Federal housing programs are those directed at improving the ability of poor families to pay for housing. One
of these is the rent supplements program, in which the Federal
Government pays the difference between 25% of the recipient's income and the rental price of the unit. This program has never
received significant funding, but there are several other basic
problems with the program's structure. First, the rent supplements
are "tied" to location. This is accomplished by transferring the
supplement to the landlord of a unit occupied by eligible recipients
rather than directly to the recipients. To receive the benefits of
the program, eligible households are required to select housing
certified by the program. This assures less choice to the recipient
and, therefore, that low-income families will be visible and
concentrated.
There are also significant constraints imposed on the eligibility
of both the recipient households and the acceptable dwelling units.
The households must have incomes which meet the requirements for
the public housing program. While this limits the program to lowincome families, it also, like public housing, excludes families
with incomes slightly above the limits. The plight of these families
is such that while they are ineligible for rent supplements (or
public housing), they cannot meet the financial necessities of
other programs directed toward moderate-income households. This
is particularly true of larger families. Similarly, eligible
dwelling units are limited to new or rehabilitated units only, and
only where there are five or more units in the program.
Another restriction, and one of a serious nature as far as the
households are concerned, is the 25% payment required. Under this
requirement, the eligible household must pay 25% of its income for
the housing rent. This imposes considerable financial hardships
for families of larger sized..12/

A±/For a broader discussion of the market implications and production efficiency of public housing, see Ed Olsen, "A Competitive
Theory of the Housing Market", American Economic Review, September
1969. Also, Eugene Smolensky, "Public Housing or Income Supplements — The Economics of Housing for the Poor", Journal of the
American Institute of Planners, March 1968.
A~/For purposes of comparison, public housing does not require such
substantial payments. In Cleveland, for example, the greatest
percentage payment required for public housing is 23%, and that
is for a family of one. For larger family sizes, the percentage
payment required decreases.
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This brief review of Federal housing programs, when viewed in light
of the previous analysis of Cleveland's housing market, leads to
several basic conclusions regarding the public response to existing
housing problems. First, greater emphasis (funding) in Federal
housing programs must be placed on the problems facing low-income
households. Second, public housing and rent supplements, the only
Federal programs designed for low-income families, impose serious
and unnecessary constraints on recipient households. Third, the
costs involved in public housing are so great that expansion of the
program to the level necessary to provide standard housing to all
those in need would require public expenditures so excessive as to
be unacceptable to nearly all concerned.

V

STATEMENT OF A HOUSING
PROGRAM PROPOSAL

Program Objectives
Any proposed housing strategy must include certain fundamental
elements.
First, the program must provide for the widest possible choice on
the part of the recipient households. Choices should include at
least those in housing location, housing cost and housing type.
Second, analysis has shown that a housing program aimed, at least
in part, at assisting the housing needs of the central cities must
be directed toward improving the capacity of low-income households
to pay for standard housing.
Third, a housing program must assure assistance to a greater segment
of the low-income population than past programs.
Fourth, the program must be adequately funded to achieve its
objectives.
Fifth, the program should be designed in such a manner that the
dwelling units of recipient low- and moderate-income families are
not necessarily highly visible or concentrated.
Sixth, the program must actively involve the resources and abilities
of the private housing sector of the economy.
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Seventh, the program should be of such a nature that it strongly
supports, in addition to the development of new housing, efforts
of rehabilitation and preservation of the existing housing stock.
As determined in the analysis of housing in Cleveland, there is
actually a substantial quantity of existing housing which, if
rendered rehabilitation and maintenance assistance, could continue
to serve as a supply of standard units for years in the future.

A National Housing Allowance Proposal
It is proposed that a national housing allowance program be
established by the Federal Government for the purpose of assuring
that all families that might otherwise have difficulty securing a
dwelling unit of standard condition have the opportunity to do so.
Housing allowances would be given to all eligible families with
poorer families receiving larger allowances, and at any given income level, consideration be given to the increased housing costs
of larger family sizes.
The amount of the allowance would be equal to the difference between an established percent of the household's income and the
amount spent on housing by "moderate-income" families in any
specific region of the country as determined by a national income
and cost criteria. A sliding-scale would thereby be utilized
which recognizes regional differences in housing costs and living
standards.
Families would be able to choose housing units in any location,
in any jurisdiction, and would enjoy ordinary choices in the type
of housing they occupy. No particular dwelling unit would be set
apart as the residence of a low- or moderate-income household.
Families receiving the allowance would not be required to spend
any specified proportion of their income on housing to be eligible
for the program.
Families receiving the allowance would be required to spend the
full amount of the allowance on housing.
In order to receive the allowance, recipient families must reside
in standard housing.
Families eligible for allowance but not residing in standard housing will not receive the allowance. However, the allowance will
be withheld in a special trust account until the family secures
standard housing, at which time a certain portion of the withheld
allowance will be provided to the family.
- 15 -

The allowances would be distributed in the form of monthly certificates to eligible families who would endorse and deliver them
to the landlord along with the necessary cash to pay the rent.
The landlord, in turn, would endorse the certificate and return
it to the local administrating agency for cash reimbursement.
The local administrating agency would be responsible for distribution of the certificates, reimbursements to the landlords, and
certification of the standard condition of dwelling units.
The program would be financed through a national housing trust
fund, using funds "earmarked" for the housing program rather than
appropriated annually by Congress.
This enumeration of basic program characteristics provides of
brief summary of the proposal. In the section which follows, a
much more detailed discussion of these characteristics is presented.

VI

DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSAL - RECOMMENDATIONS

Crucial to the successful operation of any national housing program are several important considerations: 1) the mechanics of
its operation, including type of assistance, amounts of assistance,
restrictions on eligibility; 2) methods of providing assistance;
3) the funding of the program; 4) the impact of the program. Considerable attention has been given to all these areas with regard
to the National Housing Allowance proposal. It is the purpose here
to outline and explain the tentative recommendations in support of
the proposal. While it is not the contention that this thinking
is complete, or that the recommendations stated be final, it is
hoped that these ideas will be given attention and provide the
basis for additional research and discussion.

Program Mechanics
1.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics1 (BLS) Family Budget
Reports should provide the basis of the allowance payments schedules.
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A basis for determining and measuring the allowance payments must
be found. In view of the national scope of the program and the
specific quantification needs, the Bureau of Labor Statistics1
Family Budget Reports were selected as the basis.for the Program's
allowance schedules. The BLS determines family, or household,
budget "requirements" for three different standards of living:
Lower, Moderate and Higher. For example, the BLS figures relate
the budget costs necessary for a four-person family to live at a
moderate standard of living. The BLS provides a breakdown of major
budget costs, including such items as clothing, food, transportation, and of particular use here, housing. Furthermore, these
budgets are determined for different regions of the country, and
for all major metropolitan areas, thus reflecting the variations
in budget costs throughout the country.

2.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics' "moderate standard of
living" budget should be the basis of the allowance
schedule.

The moderate standard of living category was selected primarily
because of the assurance that at the budget levels dictated by
this standard of living, decent, or standard housing units could
be demanded (and are available in the private market) by program
recipients. It is clear, for example, on the basis of information
available for the Greater Cleveland housing market, that if all
families with incomes below the moderate standard (in Cleveland)
were able to spend the amount of money calculated as the housing
budget for the moderate standard (in Cleveland), they would be able
to demand a standard unit. A second reason for the selection of
the moderate level budget or, for that matter, any of the BLS
budgets, is that this information is available, and adjusted, for
the entire country. This facilitates greatly the planning and
administration of the Program.
The BLS moderate standard of living provides, in dollar amounts,
the expenditure necessary for housing. Two different housing
figures are given — a renter's budget and an owner's budget.
The renter's budget is chosen since this expenditure level is
more comparable to the proportion of total income which households
at lower income levels will have the ability to spend. Using this
housing cost figure and the total budget cost, the percent of total
income spent for housing is easily determined. For example, in
the Cleveland Metropolitan Area in 1969, the moderate standard of
living budget for a family of four was $10,453 and the moderate
housing budget cost was $1,662, or 15.8% of the total.
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Under the proposed program, the 15.8% housing expenditure would be
applied to all four-person families with total annual incomes below the moderate standard of living budget cost. The reasoning
is that if a family hopes to obtain a housing unit comparable to
that of moderate level households, they should be willing to spend
a similar proportion of their income for housing. While this would
seem to imply difficulties for lower income households, this should
not prove to be true in most cases as the percentages (of income)
used in determining the allowance are consistently below the percent of income requirements of existing Federal programs. (For
example, the rent supplement program requires a household expenditure of 25% of income).

3.

The amount of allowance should be adjusted according to
family size and income.

The method used in determining the amount of the allowance payment
is the same for all family sizes and incomes. For example, a
four-person family (in Cleveland)with an income of $5,000 would
receive an allowance based on the difference between 15.8% of
their income - $790, and the moderate standard of living housing
cost - $1,662, or the sum of $822 annually. All -families of four
persons would receive payments determined by applying 15.8% to
their income, thus resulting in a decrease in allowance amount as
total income increases. All four-person families with total incomes below $10,453 would be eligible for the program.
The same method is used for families of other sizes, but with
necessary changes made in the percent of household budget used
for housing, as shown by BLS figures.
To provide a better understanding of this, the table below showing
partial allowance payment information for the Cleveland area, is
given:
TABLE VI

ESTIMATED INCOME LIMITS

FAMILY SIZE

HOUSING BUDGET
PERCENTAGE

MAXIMUM
INCOME ELIGIBILITY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

20.1%
15.5%
15.6%
15.8%
17.2%
18.6%
20.0%
21.4%
22.8%

$ 5,075
7,355
8,460
10,450
12,070
13,450
14,640
15,560
16,370
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Of course, as noted earlier, these figures would vary with BLS
adjustments for different parts of the country. It should be
noted that at the present time, the BLS does not publish budget
guidelines for this full range of family sizes, a function which
would become necessary with the Program's implementation, and use
of BLS figures.

4.

The household should, under the Program, be able to
choose housing in any location.

This is a very important feature of the Program and means that the
household's choice of housing is not restricted to any certain
location, jurisdiction, or type of housing unit. In short, they
are free to choose housing (provided it is standard) wherever they
desire and wherever they feel they can afford it. This not only
maximizes the household's freedom of housing choice, but also
avoids designating or making otherwise conspicuous those housing
units of families in the Program, a situation which is desirable
in light of experiences in previous housing programs.

5.

Families are not required to spend any specified proportion of their income on housing to be eligible for the
Program.

The percentage of housing budget costs extracted from the moderate
standard of living total budget is used solely to determine the
amount of the allowance. There is no requirement that the household receiving the allowance spend that percentage, or any other
specified percentage of its income on housing. The household is
free to spend either a greater or lesser percentage of its income
on housing. In this way, the household is given flexibility in
bargaining for housing as well as a broader discretion in determining its budget expenditures. This feature of the proposal is
particularly important since it provides a strong incentive to the
household to barter for the lowest rent possible for any given
unit. Not only does this possibly provide additional income for
the household to apply to other expenses, it should also have an
over-all stabilizing affect on the housing market since the landlord will be unable to arbitrarily set rents at high levels.
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6.

Families receiving the allowance must spend the full
amount of the allowance for housing.

While families are not required to spend a specified proportion
or amount of their household income on housing, they are required
to apply the entire amount of the allowance towards housing. While
this does mean that the household may substitute within their budget up to the amount of the allowance, the important feature is
that the allowance provides the household with the opportunity to
demand standard housing in the market.

7.

In order to receive the allowance, the recipient household must reside in standard housing.

8.

Families eligible for the Program but not residing in
standard housing will not receive the allowance. The
allowance will be withheld, deposited in a special trust
account, and provided, in part, to the household only
at such time that the household moves into a standard unit.

There are several considerations embodied in these two recommendations. First, households will not be extended the allowances for
use in maintaining residence in a substandard housing unit. One
of the fundamental objectives of the Program is to provide the opportunity of standard housing. This objective infers the possibility that some eligible households may prefer to remain in substandard housing. Since this is a real possibility, it would seem
logical that those households so choosing should not be extended
allowance payments which are made for the purpose of securing standard housing. Therefore, recipients must reside in standard housing, as certified by local authorities, if they are to receive
the payments.
While the restriction just discussed guards against use of the
Program funds by those wishing to live in substandard housing, what
about those households which are unable to live in standard housing?
It is quite likely that there will be instances in which a household is unable to secure standard housing which is satisfactory to
their needs. In addition, there will likely be periods during
which there is a real shortage of standard housing on the market,
particularly in certain size and rent ranges. An obvious period
during which this would likely occur would be immediately following
the implementation of the Program in any given area. In any event,
it is important that the Program not provide assistance to those
households which do not want standard housing nor, at the same
time, penalize those households which desire standard housing but
are unable to find it.
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It is the purpose of the trust account recommendation to safeguard against these problems. Under this proposal, all allowance
payments would be withheld from households in substandard units
and placed in trust accounts for the households. When at such
time the household moves into a standard unit, the withheld allowance would be returned, but not in total. It is recommended that
a schedule of payment release be provided that returns a declining
portion of the withheld allowance. This declining rate of return
would be adjusted to time in such a manner that the longer a household remains in substandard housing, the less the amount of the
rate of payment return. For example, if a family which receives
an annual payment of $600 moves into standard housing after one
year, they might receive a return of only $300 from the first
year's total of withheld payments. If it is two years before they
reside in standard housing, they would receive a return of $150
from the first year, and $300 from the second year, or a total of
$450. While a 50% declining balance such as this would be simple,
there are likely many return schemes which would be satisfactory.
There are several purposes to the trust account and declining
payment return recommendations. First, as mentioned above, this
approach serves the dual purpose of not subsidizing substandard
residence nor penalizing households which, due primarily to market
circumstances, are unable to find a standard unit. Beyond these
facets of the recommendation, it is clear that a strong incentive
is given to households to acquire standard housing, and the sooner
they accomplish this, the greater the financial advantages.
In addition to this very visible incentive aspect, there is a
broader purpose to the withholding recommendation. One of the
major problems presently facing many low- and moderate-income
households is the difficulty or inability on their part to accumulate sufficient money for a down payment on a home, repairs to
their own home, deposit on a rental unit, et. al. The withholding
aspect of the Program provides at least a partial solution to
this problem. In this context, it can be viewed as an investment program in which the household and the Government both share
in the investment process.
While the Program clearly offers a strong incentive to households
to demand standard housing units, the Program also carries with
it an incentive to owners of rental units to both maintain their
units in standard condition and charge prices which tenants are
able to pay. Although both of these facets are discussed at
length in a later section, the general nature of the incentive is
that to be eligible to rent to Program recipients, the unit must
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be in standard condition. Therefore, it is clearly to the advantage of the owner to rehabilitate and maintain the unit in standard
condition.
Before concluding this discussion, the effect of the Program upon
two distinct groups should be noted. First is that segment of the
eligible households who own homes. It is proposed that these
households be granted the Program's benefits, provided that the
unit in which they live is standard. In short, they should receive
the allowances in the same manner as those who rent and meet the
same conditions of residency — a standard unit. The allowance provided to home-owners will, as with renters, have to be spent on
housing, either in the form of mortgage payments or in the costs
of maintaining the unit in standard condition. In addition, extension of the allowance to homeowners provides them with expanded
opportunities, such as improving their present dwelling unit or
even seeking a different unit which may more closely correspond to
their needs and desires.
The second group which is of particular interest is that segment
of the eligible households who, at the Program's outset, already
reside in standard rental units. This situation is similar to the
ownership case, just discussed, and the treatment is identical.
These households would also receive the allowance, have to spend
it on housing,and have, in effect, the same expansion of opportunity as was the case with homeowners residing in sub-standard
units.
Thus, the withholding recommendation opens up a number of housing
opportunities for recipient households. First and foremost, it
provides a strong incentive to acquire standard housing at the
earliest opportunity if the household is to take full advantage of
the maximum allowance payments available. This incentive is present
for both households which desire to rent and for those wishing to
own. Second, through the scheme's savings effect, even at a declining rate of repayment, the household is given the opportunity
to plan ahead for necessary housing capital expenditures. These
possibilities include rehabilitation costs, rent deposits, and
home down payments. This last use is particularly unique as it
should provide ownership capabilities to a substantial number of
families who never before were able to consider home ownership.
Finally, the households which choose standard rental units are
provided with additional housing payments for a period of time
after occupancy during which the household could make other expenditures.
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Program Administration
There are two separate levels of administration which will briefly
be considered here: 1) National, Regional, and Metropolitan organization and administration of the Program; and 2) administration
of the allowances to individual recipients. Instead of specific
recommendations regarding each of these administrative tasks, a
general discussion is presented, outlining broad considerations for
the purpose of providing a basis for further thought.
As recommended previously, a "yardstick", or housing budget criteria
is required for the determination of allowance amounts. The Bureau
of Labor Statistics budget indices were recommended since these
are available for regions and metropolitan areas, and are adjusted
according to the varying housing costs found in those locales.
It is entirely possible that an alternative index could be found,
or an entirely new budget measuring device created. However, the
essential needs of the Program's housing cost estimates are present
in the BLS budget index, and that is the reason why it was the preliminary choice for the standard. The essential needs include:
1) annual total budget costs for a moderate-income level family;
2) annual rental housing costs for a moderate-income level family;
3) the above costs adjusted for different family.sizes, e.g., 1-9
persons; 4) the above costs also adjusted for variances in housing
costs between regions and metropolitan areas of the country.
At present, the BLS budget indices are not available for a full
range of family sizes nor for all metropolitan areas. Thus, an
expansion of the BLS effort or the development of a similar measurement apparatus would be necessitated by the methodology outlined
here. Once these indices have been developed, the Program could
be administered at state or regional levels for large non-metropolitan areas, and at metropolitan levels for urban centers. This
type of administrative organization would enable the Program to
administer allowances differentiated according to the varying housing costs throughout the country and even within regional areas,
thus increasing the efficiency and proficiency of the Program.
Several general administrative problems exist at this level due
to the need for certification of standard housing prior to the
payment of allowance. First, housing codes (standards) vary from
municipality to municipality as well as between parts of the country.
In addition, some municipalities are without any type of housing
code. There are several Program implications of these problems.
Should a household be allowed to move into housing which is judged
standard by the municipality in which it is located, but which
would be substandard in the municipality from which the household
came? Can households under the Program move into communities in
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which housing codes do not exist? Who is responsible for certification of standard condition? These and other questions must be
answered through the administrative organization planned for the
Program.
Several apparent alternatives to these problems readily suggest
themselves. First, municipalities could be responsible for the
certification of standard units according to each municipality's
code, and municipalities with no codes could be excluded from the
Program. Another approach might be excluding municipalities which
define "standard" housing at a level less than some established
national "model" of standard. Another, more consistent technique
would be the development and application of metropolitan or regional
housing codes with the Program administrating agency responsible
for certification throughout the area. There are likely various
other administrative approaches. Particular attention should be
paid to the implications of any alternative with regard to both the
efficient operation of the Program and the possible constraints
placed on household choices.
In regard to the second level of administration -- the actual payment of the allowance to recipient households, the basic administrative concept which is favored at present is as follows .-=£/
Having developed a rent/allowance schedule for each income and
family size, the local administrative agency would prepare for an
eligible family a booklet of monthly allowance coupons covering,
for example, a year's period. Family income could be determined
annually from income tax records. With the allowance coupons in
hand, the family would then begin its search for private housing
suitable to its needs and preferences, in any location. As discussed previously, while the family must spend the allowance
coupons on housing, the amount of family budget expenditure would
vary above a certain level according to the amount which the family
wishes to spend on housing. This scheme provides an incentive to
the family to bargain with the landlord about the rental price, and
also provides a broad range of family choice. At this time, the
family should also secure evidence that the unit is in standard
condition. When occupancy begins, the tenant would present the
endorsed coupon (in addition to the necessary cash) for his monthly
rent to the landlord, who would then present it to the local
administrating agency for cash reimbursement. At this point, or
earlier if necessary, the local agency would check the dwelling
unit for its standard certification. If the unit is substandard
13/ Many of the administration proposals made here were suggested
by Ira Lowry in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Housing, Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress.
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(in violation of codes), the local administering agency will refuse to negotiate the rent coupon for the owner, and further allowances will be held in trust for the household, until such time
that the unit is brought up to standard or the family moves into
a standard unit. It is likely that these procedures or any similar
operations could be adapted to computer use at a metropolitan level
thus reducing both cost and time in record keeping, certification
of units, allowance payments, and other necessary tasks.
These procedures accomplish several things. They provide an
incentive to the tenant household to seek only standard housing.
They provide an incentive to the landlord to maintain his unit in
standard condition. They prohibit the use of Program funds in
assisting households to live in substandard units. Finally, to
the extent that families do not desire, or (in the short-run) cannot obtain standard housing, total Program costs are lowered.

Financing
1.

The National Housing Allowance Program should be funded
through a national housing trust fund.

The basic purpose of this recommendation is to steer the Program
clear of the necessity, now found with "similar" Federal housing
programs, of annual congressional approvals and appropriations.
It is, instead, recommended that the Program be financed through
a trust fund for which resources, once determined and established
as the source of funds, be permitted to sustain the Program's
financial needs without requiring congressional intervention. Put
another way, it is recommended that the funds for the Program be
obtained from previously "earmarked" sources. This arrangement
would be similar to the operation of the national highway trust
fund.
At this time, it is difficult to estimate total national annual cost
of the proposed Program. Current, 1970 census data for family size
and income are not yet available. Given their availability, reasonable estimates would remain difficult due to: 1) the variance in
budget costs throughout the country; 2) the tentative nature of
the rental requirements (on the part of the household) as outlined
earlier; 3) the number of families eligible for the Program but
not receiving the allowance due to their residence in substandard
housing; and 4) the total administrative costs of such Program.
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Rough estimates have nevertheless been made using 1960 census
data for national costs. Based on this information, an estimate
of $15 billion annually has been made. It is immediately apparent
that this is a substantial amount of money and represents a housing program expenditure far in excess of any past housing commitments. While this expenditure, as discussed at length earlier,
clearly requires a re-ordering of priorities, it also requires a
very practical examination of financial resources. In line with
this, a number of revenue sources have been considered and are here
recommended for further examination.
1.

Funds received through the discontinuation of existing
federal housing programs. At present, there are two
Federal programs directed solely at low^income housing public housing and rent supplements. Other existing
programs, such as 235 and 236 insurance, which are directed at both low - and moderate-income households,
could be continued and provide valuable assistance in
supplying additional housing. The discontinuance of
public housing and rent supplements would provide approximately $1 billion of annual revenue which could
be applied to the national allowance program.

2.

A 1% tax on real estate transactions. This would be a
taxing effort analagous to the Federal gasoline tax
from which revenues are directed solely to highway uses.
This tax would be imposed on all real estate transactions
and would produce approximately $5-8 billion each year in
new revenues. it is difficult without additional reSearch to estimate the retardation affect, if any, on
the housing market. Closer examination of this proposal
would be helpful in determining an appropriate tax rate.

3.

Revenues realized by reducing income tax deductions for
interest paid on home mortgages. This deduction has,
since its inception, provided advantages to those households buying homes to the neglect of those households
who rent. This provision has consequently not only
provided a strong incentive for home ownership, but has
also been one of a number of provisions which has had a
regressive impact upon the designed progressive Federal
income tax structure. Since home ownership is of far
greater prominence among middle-and upper-income households, the affect of the change would be negligible
among low-income households. The result of such a change
would be two-fold: 1) it would assist in adjusting the
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federal income tax structure so that it is more progressive in nature; and 2) it would provide an additional source of revenue for the allowance program.
A preliminary (to detailed analysis) estimate of $1.5
billion has been made as the amount of annual revenue
potentially available from this source.
4.

Revenue provided through the dedication of a certain
amount of the normal increase in Federal income taxes.
This would involve the stipulation that a certain
percentage of all future, normal increases in the income tax be "ear-marked" for the allowance program.
This is similar to the provision included in the Administration's general revenue sharing proposal. It is
estimated that this source could provide $.5 billion
annually.

5.

Revenues realized through the withdrawal of "subsidies"
now provided to large producers by the Federal Government. This would involve closing loopholes such as
those which presently exist with large farming operators,
oil producers, air lines, merchant marine, et. al. It
has been estimated that closing these loopholes would
result in annual additional revenues of $20-25 billion,
a portion of which could be directed to the allowance
program.

An attempt has been made in recommending these five possible sources
of revenue to satisfy two requirements of the allowance program's
funding structure: 1) that the Program finances be obtained from
a trust fund which derives its funding from designated sources not
dependent upon annual congressional action; and 2) that the funding
of the Program be provided through new revenue sources rather than
from the re-directing of existing revenue flows. The advantage of
the first requirement is the stability given to the administration
of the Program. The chief advantages of the second requirement:is
its non-disruptive effect on existing Federal programs and revenue
commitments <>
Impact of the Proposed Program on the City of Cleveland
Table VII provides an example of the proposed Program's impact on a
Cleveland family of four at selected household income levels. In this
example, the Nixon Administration's Family Assistance Program has been
included in the income determination at applicable levels (up to $4,000
income per year). Using BLS figures for Cleveland, the applicable
rent/income percentage for a family of four is 15.8%, which
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is used in determining the amount of allowance, while the information in Table VII is fairly straight-forward, several things should
be noted. First, the BLS Rental Index results in an "assumed" rent
figure which in the example is $138 per month ($1,662 per year).
Second, as total household income increases, the amount of allowance available decreases, but in relatively small increments.
Third, in the example (family of four), the household remains
eligible for the Program until their income exceeds $10,453 per
year. For larger families, this income maximum is greater.

TABLE VII - HOUSING ALLOWANCE - FAMILY OF FOUR - CLEVELAND
Income
Range
500- 1,000*

1, 500- 2,000
3, 000- 3,500
5, 000- 5,500
7, 000- 7,500
9, 500-10,000

+ Family
Asst.

Total
Income

15.8%
Income

$1,950
1,350
450
0
0
0

$2,700
3,100
3,700
5,250
7,250
9,750

$

427
490
585
830
1,146
1,541

BLS
Index

Annual
Allowance

Monthly
Allowance

$1,662
1,662
1,662
1,662
1,662
1,662

$1,253
1,172
1,077
832
516
121

$

104
98
90
69
43
10

*Mean of each range is used for application of 15.8%

Table VIII provides several estimates of total Program impact on
the City of Cleveland. The purpose of these estimates is to illustrate the magnitude and extent of the Program, both in terms
of dollars required and persons affected.

TABLE VIII - PROGRAM ESTIMATES - IMPACT ON CLEVELAND
$106,502,000

TOTAL ANNUAL COST:

Over 173,000 Families
(Over 471,000 Persons)

TOTAL NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS

AVERAGE ANNUAL ALLOWANCE PAYMENT:

$615

AVERAGE MONTHLY ALLOWANCE PAYMENT:

$53
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It is estimated that the rent necessary to "cover" a standard unit
in Cleveland is approximately $100 per month.AlAjnder the allowance program proposed here, potential rents would be adequate to
cover the cash flow needs of the average single family unit.—'
It is possible that this increase and stabilization in the demand
for rental housing could take the form of an acceleration in the
exodus to the suburbs as central city residents exercise their
freedom of choice. It is impossible to accurately predict the extent to which this will occur although evidence suggests that the
rate of movement will increase given the greater housing budgets.
There are indications, however, that at least in the long-run, the
rate of exodus would stabilize. First, housing rents in the suburbs of Cleveland are higher than in Cleveland. Rents in many
suburban areas would remain out of the reach of households in the
Program. Second, the areas where rents are within the range of
the Program could easily become saturated and produce rent increases beyond those resulting from any inflationary affects of
the Program (soon to be discussed). Third, many suburban households will also be Program recipients, resulting in increased demand
from within the suburbs. Fourth, when developable land is depleted
in the suburbs, new housing starts beyond present developed areas
may not be compatible with the preferences of central city residents. Finally, an important affect of the Program on central city
units may drastically alter the choices of Program recipients.
The Program is expected to have a moderate, but significant influence on rehabilitation efforts. At the present time, thousands
of units in Cleveland are in substandard condition, but a great
proportion are in such condition that a relatively small investment
could make them attractive, marketable units. However, in order
for these rehabilitation efforts to occur, landlords must receive
substantial increases in rental revenues. For purposes of illustration, the mean rehabilitation cost in an urban renewal project
in Cleveland was $4,593 for multi-units and $3,330 for single units.
A $5,000 investment lasting 20 years with no salvage value at 8%
interest requires a monthly income of $42.50. If the investment
reduced operating costs at all, this requirement would be reduced.
14/ This estimate embodies substantial economies of scales as it
includes larger units.
Over one-half of Cleveland's contract rent agreements are for
amounts less than $80 per month per unit. Over three-quarters
are for amounts less than $100 per month per unit. These
figures reveal the proportion of rental units in Cleveland
receiving inadequate or marginal support from rent receipts.
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The average allowance payment under the Program as determined for
Cleveland is $53. Even accepting the need of revenue increases to
cover operating expenses, it can be seen that moderate rehabilitation is feasible and quite likely. (Furthermore, these costs are
much less than those required to construct new housing as done
under many programs.) The affect of this process would be to increase the supply of standard housing in the central city while
not adding to the total stock and done in direct response to increased demand. The preferences of those households wishing to
remain in the central city would be fulfilled and to this extent
the rate of movement outward would be reduced.
One almost certain effect of the allowance program would be an
inflation of rental prices. While this would appear to be a detrimental aspect of the Program, it is, as previous discussion has
explained, a necessary result if central city housing markets are
to once again become healthy and viable. It must be remembered
that the only way central city landlords will experience a reasonable cash-flow situation is through an increase in rents. It is
the purpose of the Program to provide for that increase by increasing the effective demand of tenants. Thus, an inflation of rental
prices is an important quality of the Program and crucial to the
Program's success.
Aside from this need for inflation of housing prices within the
areas of the housing market suffering from inefficient demand, concern has been voiced regarding the possibility of excessive inflation of prices throughout the housing market. While this issue
cannot be completely resolved until actual experience with the
Program has been examined, some analysis of this consequence has
been completed and there are several characteristics of the Program
proposal which bear scrutiny with respect to this possible problem.
It is charged that since the allowance approach has only an indirect effect upon the supply of housing, the shortage of housing
present at the time of the Program's implementation would result
in almost immediately higher prices. Various economists examining
this issue have concluded that this would be a relatively short
term effect of the Program.AH/ These conclusions show a 90% return
to market equilibrium within six years.il/ In any event, this problem will be somewhat lessened by an element in the proposal
16/ Pages 620-621 Edgar Olsen, "A Competitive Theory of the Housing
Market," American Econ. Review, September, 1969.
17/ Pages 29-96, R.F. Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing," in
A.C. Harberger, Editor, The Demand for Durable Goods, Chicago
1960.
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which should soften the initial impact of the Program upon the
market. The trust account provision would provide recipient households with the opportunity to forestall their active demand for a
dwelling unit, if no units of acceptable characteristics are available, without a substantial loss of the subsidy amount and with a
good opportunity of securing the desired dwelling unit at a later
date at a comparatively lower cost (given market adjustments in
price over time as supply increases). The trust account element
should also lessen the initial demand since a proportion of the
recipient households will choose to permit the account to build up
for purposes of down payments and deposits.
Another issue about which concern has been expressed is that the
beneficiaries of the inflationary effect will be central city
"slumlords." While evidence (in Cleveland) shows that the prevalence of "slumlords" in central city housing markets may not be
nearly so great as previously believed, the Program will, in any
event, be detrimental to their market position. By creating a more
competitive market, the housing allowances will force all landlords
to either comply with "standards" of the Program, i.e., maintenance
of a standard unit, or face a substantial loss of revenue. This
will be particularly true in the long-run where dwelling units
which provide less housing service than that which can be obtained
with the housing allowances will be in very small demand. Thus,
the "slumlords" will be forced to compete within the market like
all other housing owners.

VII CONCLUSION
It was maintained at the outset that the housing problem is a
problem of lack of housing choice. This lack of choice was found
to have as its cause the lack of adequate income on the part of
many families. In turn, it was found that the housing problem is
identifiable by the presence of deteriorating substandard dwelling
units and that the principal and most important reason for this
condition is the low income and resultant ineffective demand of
many low- and moderate-income families. Finally, it was concluded
that existing public programs cannot, given realistic cost limitations, successfully respond to the housing problem.
The National Housing Allowance Program, as proposed in this paper,
has been developed in answer to the needs of those low- and
moderate-income families experiencing difficulties in securing
standard housing. The Program provides them with an opportunity
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to choose standard housing and attempts to broaden their choices
with respect to that housing. The Program also has been developed
in response to the needs of those who own and develop housing. The
Program provides them with an indirect flow of funds which should
alleviate many of the problems they have in supplying and maintaining standard housing to those at low- and moderate-income
levels.
The Program proposed is complicated and its discussion raises many
issues and questions. Obviously, not all of these issues and questions were dealt with in this writing. It is hoped that an everwidening discussion of an allowance proposal will take place, and
that this paper will be of some assistance.
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A P P E N D I X E S

APPENDIX A:

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR UNCROWDING

In order to better understand the meaning of the crowding figures
given in Table I, alternative (to the hypothesis stated in Section
I) causative explanations should be examined.
It is possible that the decline observed in median persons per
dwelling unit (Table I) is due to a general decrease in average
family size in Cleveland. Suppositions supporting this explanation include the declining birth rate evidenced during the last
decade, the probable exodus of many post-World War II "baby-boom"
children (now grown) from their parents' homes, the increasing
concentration in the central city of single, often elderly persons,
and various other reasons. To test this explanation, changes in
household size have been examined, and the appropriate information
appears in Table A-l.

TABLE A-I

Year
1950 a
1960
1970

a

Mean-Persons
per
Dwelling Unit
3.38
3.10
2.84

Change

+ .28
+ .26

Mean-Persons
per Household
3.29
3.17
2.97

Change

+ .12
+ .20

The apparent discrepancy in the 1950 figures is due to inconsistencies in census definitions (see footnote b, Table I)
Source: U. S. Census

As Table A-l shows, both persons per dwelling unit and persons per
household declined during the period, but persons per dwelling unit
declined at a faster rate.— This appears to negate, in spite of
the inconsistencies found in the 1950 figures, the explanation
that general reductions in family size greatly effected the uncrowding trend.
1/ In Table A-l and in this discussion, the following distinction
(U.S. Census) is made between dwelling units and households;
Dwelling Units refer to all housing units (occupied and unoccupied) in the City while Households is determined to be only
those occupied dwelling units.

- A-l -

A second explanation which could partially account for the uncrowding is a substantial alteration in terms of the type of housing
predominant in the city. For example, if there was a relative decline in the number of apartments, which generally have a "minimum"
number of rooms, and/or a relative increase in the number of singlefamily homes, which generally provide comparatively greater space
(rooms) relative to family size, this could have altered the crowding indicators in the manner observed. In order to examine this
possible explanation, Table A-II is provided, which shows net
changes in the housing stock by type of unit. The figures provide
the net change in single-family, two family, and multi-family units
when both new construction starts and demolition are considered.

TABLE A-II

HOUSING STOCK CHANGES-CLEVELAND

Year

Net
Total

Net
One-Family

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

2,056
2,452
1,680
2,775
2,000
1,632
2,081
1,134
1,492
159
351
567
588
1,972
1,762
470
(742)
(1,180)
(1,939)
154

1,562
2,268
1,305
2,083
1,473
1,235
1,397
652
291
152
353
452
190
167
58
( 1)
( 82)
(153)
(465)
(268)

Net
Two-Family
(104)
( 80)
2
( 12)
(162)
( 60)
( 32)
(260)
(226)
(282)
(372)
(648)
(310)
(282)
(454)
(462)
(678)
(592)
(1,174)
(592)

() - Net Loss
Source: Division of Building, City of Cleveland
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Net
Multi-Family
337
96
61
244
286
133
355
255
1,079
105
214
640
640
2,048
2,129
685
1
452
302
988

It is evident in examining these figures that the changes in
various types of housing in Cleveland cannot serve as an explanation for the increase in housing consumption, particularly during
the second decade of the period. In each year of the period, 19601970, addition of multi-family units to the stock was greater than
the net gain in single-family (or two-family) units, implying that
rooms per dwelling unit and persons per room generally might have
been expected to increase. (Particularly since many of these new
units were public housing units.) In fact, this was not the case
as both of these indices fell (Table I ) . It is possible that any
similar change in these indicators registered during the period,
1950-60, might have resulted from the net gain in single-family
homes, but it seems very unlikely that a substantial decrease in
persons per room and rooms per dwelling unit could be accounted
for by this explanation, even if accurate data for these indicators
were available (in 1950).
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APPENDIX B:

USE OF SMSA DATA

To a great extent, the housing market of an urban area does not
recognize municipal boundaries. In most cases, households seeking
housing do not confine their search, at least initially, to a
single municipality. Rather, they will consider the mix of housing
services present at a number of locations throughout the urban
area. Because of this, housing in the City of Cleveland cannot
be clearly isolated in a market sense, but must be considered in
light of the market forces operating throughout the Cleveland
metropolitan area. In short, the housing market in Cleveland is
not a closed system. Due to this fairly apparent consideration,
it is clear that certain housing market causal relationships,
while occurring in a manner consistent with the economics of demand
and supply when observed in the larger areawide market, may appear
in a fragmented, inconsistent form within the City of Cleveland.
The income and price indices which are examined in Section III are
for the Cleveland Metropolitan Statistical District (SMSA). The
Cleveland SMSA is composed of four counties - Cuyahoga (in which
Cleveland is located), Geauga, Medina and Lake. While Cleveland
is the dominant municipality in this SMSA (See Table B-I), it is
evident that the housing market in which Cleveland is located does
not extend throughout this large area. Unfortunately, however,
price indices are not readily available for a smaller area (e.g.,
Cuyahoga County, which, for purposes here, would be much more
ideal). Consequently, the indices will have to be carefully clarified.
Table B-I provides population and dwelling unit totals for 1960 and
1970 for the SMSA, each county in the SMSA, and the City of Cleveland. It can be seen that two counties included in the SMSA in
1970 were not included in 1960. Although this undoubtedly has
some influence on the indices, the effect cannot be too marked as
the total population in these counties in 1970 was only approximately 7% of the total SMSA, and the total dwelling units in these
two counties represented less than 5% of the total in the SMSA at
the same point in time. Therefore, any effect of this change in
the SMSA definition will be considered negligible.
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TABLE B-I

County

1960

Population
1970

Dwelling Units
1960
1970

Cuyahoga
Lake
Med ina
Geauga

1,647,895
148,700
*
*

1,721,300
197,200
82,717
62,977

518,682
43,770
*
*

577,618
57,485
24,058
17,878

Total SMSA

1,796,595

2,064,194

562,452

677,039

876,050

750,907

282,914

264,100

City of
Cleveland

*Not part of SMSA in 1960
Source: U. S. Census

Table B-I shows that the City of Cleveland represents a major portion
of the SMSA, both in terms of population and dwelling units, although its significance is diminishing due to the City's losses in
population and dwelling units mentioned previously, plus the observable increases in both categories throughout other areas of
the SMSA. In 1960, Cleveland's population consisted of nearly onehalf of the SMSA total and dwelling units in Cleveland represented
more than 50% of the SMSA total. In 1970, both of these figures
had fallen, to 36%, and 39%, respectively. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960-1970 period, as well as prior to 1960, housing market
fluctuations within Cleveland certainly represented a predominant
proportion of total SMSA housing market changes. Therefore, though
the "operating" housing market of which Cleveland is a part probably
does not extend too much beyond Cuyahoga County, the indices shown
for the SMSA must, of necessity, be heavily influenced, and thus
reflect price fluctuations within Cleveland. Given this clarification of the indices, it is clear that they cannot be given quite
as much significance as might otherwise be the case. Nevertheless,
it is felt that use of the indices to examine housing market changes
is valid, and that they do describe, to a great extent, price
fluctuations within the City of Cleveland.
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HOUSING ABANDONMENT IN CLEVELAND

Abandonment S u r v e y R e s u l t s
Analysis
of t h e Problem
Recommendations

October

1972

C i t y Planning Commission
Ciuy of Cleveland

The preparation of this document was financed in part
through a Comprehensive Planning Grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under the provisions of Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954, as
amended. Cleveland City Planning Commission, Room 501,
City Hall, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.

PREFACE

In May of this year, the City Planning Commission staff began
a survey of abandoned housing in Cleveland in order to obtain
information for use in an on-going program of housing research.
This preliminary report of the results of the survey is meant to
draw attention to two major problems facing those Cleveland residents and City officials who have shown a growing concern over
the abandonment problem:
1.

While we were engaged in this survey which indicates
over 2,000 abandoned dwelling units in the City of
Cleveland, the Federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development announced that federal funds for
demolition of those units would soon be terminated.

2.

The rate of abandonment, some 3 dwelling units per
day over the last 3 years, must be reduced.

No attempt has been made at this point to examine the administrative procedures employed by City agencies involved in the
demolition program; nor, in our opinion, would such an examination
be directed to the primary problem of removing abandoned structures
from the landscape.

The fundamental problem in demolition is

insufficient funding and that threatens to become even more serious
with the withdrawal of federal assistance.

Further, it is not an objective of this report to present a
detailed explanation of the process of housing deterioration and
abandonment.

While a brief discussion concerning the nature of the
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abaidonment problem is presented here, a more complete technical
discussion will appear in a subsequent Planning Commission paper.

Roy Williams, William Goodson, Sherman Nelson, Walter Howard,
Mamie Johnson and Warsella Thompson accomplished the survey and data
tabulations as well as the supervision of Summer Neighborhood Youth
Corps employees assigned to assist in the survey.

Charles Sheboy,

Commissioner of Housing, and William Kennedy, Administrator of the
Bureau of Demolition provided information and perspective from
their experience.

Ernest Bonner, Chief of the Comprehensive Planning

and Research section, provided overall supervision of the project.
Typing was completed by Nadine F. Lane.

Douglas Wright
Comprehensive Planning and Research
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ABANDONED HOUSING IN THE CITY OF CLEVELAND
(Purvey of Abandoned Neighborhoods (p. 5) with highest propensity
for abandonment)

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
1.

Over 2,200 dwelling units now standing in the City of
Cleveland have been abandoned by tenant and owner alike
by conservative estimate, (p.7)

2.

In the three years since 1969, approximately three
dwelling units were abandoned each day, for a total
of 3,475 abandonments in the three years.

3.

If the same rate of abandonment takes place in 1972-1975
as characterized the 1969-1972 period, approximately
3,500 additional dwelling units in 1,400 structures
will be abandoned.

4.

If abandonment and demolition take place between 1972
and 1975 as took place from 1969-1972, there will be
about 5,000 abandoned dwelling units standing in Cleveland in 1975. (p. 11)

5.

Abandoned units have not only become more numerous, but
more widespread geographically.

6.

The major barrier to removal of these abandoned structures
'is lack of funds for demolition. The Federal government,
which provided substantial demolition funds in the past,
has recently announced termination of future funding.
This action must be reversed if at all possible.

7.

The rate of abandonment is high and is probably increasing,
Preventing units from being abandoned is a more serious
•challenge than demolishing those already abandoned.
Reducing the rate of abandonment, however, will await
fundamental alterations in our public programs of housing
assistance to low and middle-income families i.e. implementation of a Housing Allowance Program. Without this
abandonment will probably continue to increase and become
more widespread.
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8.

Demolition of all existing abandoned structures in
Cleveland will cost approximately $2 million. We
recommend that 3/4 of that amount ($1.5 million) be
set aside for that purpose from 1st year general
revenue sharing funds, with the balance of $500,000
provided from the general fund and private subscription, (p. 14) Beyond this 1st year effort, $500,000
per year should be set aside from Community Development
Special Bloc Grants for demolition.

9.

In addition, the City's "revolving demolition fund" must
be made to revolve. Since 1965, Cleveland has incurred
$1,344,300 in demolition costs (p. 16). In 1970 and 1971
only $128,000 was returned by the County to the City as
repayment of demolition liens. Council must exert every
effort to recover the remaining estimated $1.2 million,
now apparently tied up in the 15-step legal process
outlined on p. 17-19.
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SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES

The housing abandonment survey undertaken by the City Planning
Commission (CPC) in June and July of 1972, had two immediate
objectives:

(1)

to determine the number and location of abandoned

housing units; (2) to determine the rate of housing abandonment in
the City, and in various neighborhoods of the City.

The first

objective was achieved with the completion of the survey.

To accom-

plish the second objective, it was necessary to have available
information from two abandonment surveys, taken at two distinct
points in time.

Real Property Inventory (RPI) annually counts dwelling units
in the City.

This enumeration is accomplished by census tract.

The survey also makes a count of dwelling units which are vacant,
and provides a reason for the vacancy.

Of the eight reasons for

vacancy listed by RPI, one was of particular interest with regard
to the .Planning Commission's abandonment survey.

This reason, or

definition, defined the vacant units as "to be demolished."

This

definition was assumed to denote uninhabitable, abandoned dwelling-^
units and, consequently, with the use of the 1969 RPI, became the
base for measuring the change in abandonment during the three-year
period, 1969-1972.

In addition, this RPI category was useful in determining the
extent of the survey conducted by the Planning Commission.

Due to'
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time and manpower constraints, it was decided that the entire
City would not be surveyed in 1972, but only those neighborhoods
which, on the basis of the 1969 RPI data, exhibited a propensity
for abandonment.

Thus, in terms of the City Planning Commission's

statistical areas, the following areas (neighborhoods) were surveyed (see Map I ) :
Statistical Area
26
31
6
"5
4
8
9
11
12
13
14

Neighborhood Designation
Near West Side
Tremont
Norwood
Glenville
Forest Hills
West Hough
East Hough
East Central
West Central
Kinsman
East End

The statistical areas, or neighborhoods, were surveyed by
census tract.

Two tasks were performed through the survey.

First,

all addresses of residential structures given the "to be demolished"
designation in 1969 were examined and their 1972 status recorded.
Second, survey teams recorded the addresses (and number of dwelling
units) of all residential structures which were "obviously abandoned."
This means structures were recorded as abandoned only if they presented some visible characteristic of abandonment in addition to
being vacant, including, for example, the absence of doors and windows,
v/indows ui.J. doors boarded ov closed, par'^i'

fire damage, and apparent

1ST2

ABANDONMENT

STATISTICAL

AREAS

SURVEY

SURVEYED
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vandalism.

Due to this procedure, it is possible that a number of

structures which were in fact abandoned, but not displaying any of
the mentioned characteristics, were not counted as such.

In addition,

not all of the City was covered in the survey as noted above.

Thus,

our count of abandoned structures is conservative.

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

Table I presents the 1969 RPI and 1972 Planning Commission
abandonment information according to statistical areas of the
City.

Table II presents the same information by political wards.

The counts of abandoned units are clear from the table —
1969, 2,215 in 1972.

598 in

The rate of abandonment over the three years,

however, is less clear.

THE RATE OF ABANDONMENT

The total number of units abandoned between July 1969 and July
1972 is derived from the following calculation:
Total units found abandoned
in July of 1972
less: units found abandoned in
July 1969 and still
abandoned in July 1972

2,215

90

Net units abandoned since July 1969
and still standing July 1972

2,12 5

plus: units abandoned since July 1969
and demolished before July 1972

1,350

Units al:v-?.ncloned bet./cp\ July 1969
and July lcrrz

3,475
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TABLE I
ABANDONED £STRUCTURES AND DWELLING UNITS - BY YEAR AND STATISTICAL AREA

STATISTICAL
AREA

NEIGHBORHOOD

4

Forest Hills

5

1972 PLANNING
1969 RPI SURVEY
COMMISSION SURVEY
NO. OF
NO. OF
DWELLING
NO. OF
DWELLING
NO. OF
UNITS STRUCTURES
UNITS
ISTRUCTURES
13

20

30

60

Glenville

4

12

69

197

6

Norwood

4

8

26

93

8

West Hough

25

68

220

728

9

East Hough

52

209

91

285

11

East Central

46

110

177

340

12.

West Central

41

94

132

281

13

Kinsman

14

35

89

130

14

East End

6

8

7

9

26

Near West Side

6

11

48

49

31

Tremont

14

23

22

43

225

598

911

2,215

TOTALS

Note:

RPI figures for 1969 represent only those structures and
dwelling units which were defined as "to be demolished" in
1969., Of the 225 structures defined as abandoned in 1969,
122, or 54%, had been demolished or in some way removed by
1972. An additional 43 were still standing, but were found
to be abandoned in 1972. Another 24 of the 2 25 structures
had been rehabilitated during the three-year period. The
remaining 36 structures, or 16% of ft 3 totul, were found to
be occupied in 1972.
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TABLE II
ABANDONED DWELLING UNITS - BY YEAR AND WARD
1969 RPI

1972 CPC

SURVEY

SURVEY

3

11

18

5

13 ,

8

3

11

91

654

12

86

294

15

0

8

12

116

140

260

18

144

287

19

5

6

20

11

72

23

5

129

24

20

89

25

6

72

27

16

21

28

4

42

31
598

111
2,215

WARD

16
17

31
Note:

.
•

TOTALS

6
•

30

The ward figures are the product of a straight-forward
percentage translation of census tract data into wards, and
consequently represent a reasonable, but less than exact ward
count. For example, if 25% of thi total dwelling units in a
tract aie in Ward X and 75% are in Ward Y, this same breakdown
was assumed with regard to tract a'., iiidonment data. The tractv/?rd percentage relationships were determined previously using
1970 Census data and curient ward 'boundaries.
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Thus, in addition to the units abandoned since 1969, the
number abandoned since 1969 and demolished before the 1972 survey
must be included to get a realistic rate of abandonment.

Between

December 1969 and March 1972, the City of Cleveland was responsible
for the demolition of approximately 1,3 50 dwelling units (590
structures), the addresses of which did not appear on the 1969 RPI
count of abandonments.

This means that these dwelling units,

presumably abandoned prior to demolition,—' did not appear in either
2/
the 1969 RPI count nor, of course, in the 1972 survey.

Clearly, the number of abandoned units in the City is increasing.

Further, the rate of abandonment (3,475 units in 3 years) is

high and probably also on the increase.

Further abandonment is becoming more widespread within the
City.

While abandonment continues to be greatest in the Hough and

Central areas (statistical areas 8, 9, 11, 12), the 1972 survey

.1/ These demolitions were accomplished under a federal demolition
grant program which has the objective of demolishing condemned,
vacant, vandalized and abandoned units.
••=/ There were additional problems in attempting to determine an
abandonment rate: (1) information regarding demolitions accomplished without City assistance by property owners was not
available; (2) it was impossible to relate the City's demolition
progress to an abandonment rate due to the discontinuity of the
demolition effort (CJ.*. to lapses in the federal allocations of
demolition funds to the City); (3) any field survey has an indetsr::. • nvbla degree of or"or and sub jectv./eness, and moreover, the
tw: :;..rveys used were i_aken autonoiuour "y of one another.
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re norded significant numbers of abandoned units in the Glenville,
Kinsman, and Norwood areas.

AN INCREASE IN THE RATE OF ABANDONMENT?
Forecasts are always tenuous.' In this case, the job is even
more difficult due to deficiencies in information.

However, if

the same rate of abandonment takes place during the period, 19721975, as was experienced during the period examined, approximately
3,500 additional dwelling units (about 1,400 structures) will be
abandoned during the next 3 years.

If, during the next 3 years,

the same amount of demolition is accomplished as in the three-year
period examined, there will be about 5,000 abandoned dwelling units
standing in the City in the summer of 1975.

The full magnitude of the abandonment problem may be some
years away in Cleveland.

In a previous analysis of Cleveland's

housing market, changes in socio-economic characteristics such as
population, housing stock, vacancy rate, median income and rent,
and others

havs been examined by census tract over time.

It is

clear from these results that a significant deficiency in the demand
for standard housing in various neighborhoods has been the primary
reason for the deterioration and eventual abandonment of housing.
SpecJ fie changes in certain socio-econora- c characteristics which
appear t.. corrolaLe with L'^a collapse -?:;" rrea housing markets have
been examinee for census tracts throughout: the City.

During the
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last decade (1960-1970), changes in real incomes and rent (both
cruicial determinants of the health of the housing market) have
shown marked downward trends in some areas of the City, and particularly in those areas which are now experiencing substantial
abandonment.

If these downward trends continue, or if similar

changes lead to the same outcome in other areas of the City,
abandonment will increase and our estimate of abandonment for 1975
will be low.

Unfortunately, preliminary analysis indicates that

both of these occurrences are likely.

Therefore, it is probable

that/ without concerted and forceful public action, abandonment
will both continue to increase and become more widespread.

HOUSING ABANDONMENT —

NOT ONE, BUT TWO CHALLENGES

The survey results reported have convinced the Planning Commission that there are really two challenges to the City posed by
the abandonment of residential structures.

First, those units which

have been abandoned, vandalized, and finally left as eyesores at
best, and threats to health and security of the neighborhoods at
wc^'st, must be removed or returned to standard condition.

Inasmuch

as rehabilitation proves to be the route seldom taken (and for good
reasons usually), removal of these structures must be recognized as
the only real solution.

Second, the rate cf o'^ndonment Is !'• jh, and probably increas-

-13-

ing.

Reducing this rate must receive the attention and commitment

of the entire community.

DEMOLITION OF ABANDONED STRUCTURES NOW STANDING
The increase in abandonment in recent years has required an
increased response from the City of Cleveland.

Since the City is

responsible for enforcing the Municipal Housing Code, it has a
direct responsibility to deal with the abandonment problem. •
However, unlike code enforcement practices which are applied when
habitable or occupied dwelling units are dealt with, enforcement
practices directed toward abandoned units usually lead to much
greater costs for the City.

This is because the City must in many

cases condemn and demolish structures and incur the cost of the
demolition.

While the law provides that the owner of the property

be billed for the demolition, the bill is often ignored.

The

City's only alternative is then to place the demolition cost on
the tax duplicate as a lien against the owner's property, but this
in no was assures payment as in many cases the owner is not paying
taxes.

Since 1965, the Federal government has attempted to alleviate
this financial burden through demolition grants.

These grants,

authorized by Section 116 of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended,
provide up to two-thirds of the actual costs of demolition and are
given to cities in established amounts and for designated periods
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of time.

Cleveland began receiving this federal assistance in 1965

and has continued receiving it to the present time.

However, there

have been lapses in the funding and the amount provided does not
correspond to the actual need.

Consequently, the total demolition

fund has not been sufficient to demolish the increasing number of
abandoned units in the City.

Overriding this problem is the announcement by the Department
of Housing and Urban Development that effective next year, the
demolition grant program will be terminated.

Given the number of

abandoned units found in the 1972 survey and the forecasts of
increased abandonment in the future, the ramifications of a loss of
Federal demolition funds for the City should be quite apparent.
This is clearly the important issue in the abandonment problem.

Demolition of all existing abandoned structures in the City of
Cleveland will require approximately $2,000,000.

The Planning

Commission recommends that 3/4 of that amount ($1,500,000) be set
aside by the City from the first year revenues of the imminent general
revenue-sharing funds from the Federal government.

The remaining

$500,000 needed should be provided partially by the general fund of
the City ($200,000) and partially by private subscription

($300,000)

to a community-wide effort to remove abandoned structures from the
City.

The private sector of the Cleveland area must surely recognize
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that the spreading blight of abandoned housing is a challenge to
both the public and private sectors.

Obviously this alone will not be enough.

Substantial changes

in the conditions which promote abandonment are not realistically
to be expected in the short run.

Thus, continuing abandonment

will require continuing funds for demolition.

Therefore, the

Planning Commission further recommends that at least $500,000 per
year be allocated to the demolition of abandoned residential and
other structures.

The funds should be available from the Community

Development special revenue-sharing block grants which are now
expected to commence in July of next year.

Cleveland's share of

the national funds available is uncertain at this time, but the
amount recommended for demolition will in no case represent more
than 10% of the total funds available.

To further assure adequate funds for continuing demolition
needs, closer attention should be given to the "revolving fund"
for demolition established by City Council.

Responsibility for demolition of condemned and abandoned
structures rests with the property owner, not the City.

Only when

the owner refuses to demolish the abandoned structure does the City
use its demolition funds for that purpose.

Even then, however, the
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costs incurred by the City in the demolition remain an obligation
of the property owner.

If the City does spend money to demolish a

condemned structure, it can expect the cost to be repaid, either by
the property owner or through eventual foreclosure and sale ; of the
property.

In short, demolition funds should be considered as re-

volving funds rather than sunk costs.

But, in fact, the City's

demolition fund has not been replenished.*

Since 1965, the City has incurred costs of $1,344,300 in
demolition of condemned structures.**

In 1970 and 1971, $128,000

was returned by Cuyahoga County to the City as repayment of demolition
liens again properties which were foreclosed by the County.***

*

**

In fact, the City's special demolition fund, established by
City Ordinance 827-71 in October, 1971, has never been established. Such funds returning to the City continue to flow
into the General Fund.
Department of Community Development reports indicate the following expenditures for each demolition project:
Project
Cost
~M-L
$375,000
M-5
251,300
M-5(amendatory)
418,000
M-13
300,000
Total
$1,344,300
Of the M-13 grant, $122,000 is, at this writing, still in the
process of being spent. Thus, the total outstanding at this
point is $1,222,300.

**'•'•• The $128,000 is from an estimate by the Commissioner of Redevelopment, Department of Community Development. It is
possible that slightly more than r."'.- ••• amount has been returned
to the city, bur. accounting proc: 'r" .3 are such that it is
impossible ', r i- •• determine the exact amount.
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i"'-is.

lc s than 10% of the City's demolition costs have been

'• ^VGived" to the City.

Where is the remaining $1,200,000?

Part of the explanation is clear.

Time required for the

relatively length foreclosure process involved in repayment of
costs incurred with more recent demolitions has not passed, and
some of the M-13 funds have yet to be expended.

But this does

not explain why the more than $600,000 in demolition costs incurred
between 1965 and 1970 have not been returned to the City.

Since City Council has expressed great interest in the problems
inherent in the demolition of abandoned properties, and since various
members of Council seem unclear on the specific steps involved in
securing repayment of demolition costs to the City, the following
outline summarizes the process:
1.

Upon
sent
that
must

completion of the demolition, a statement is
to the owner of the structure notifying him
costs incurred by the City in the demolition
be paid within thirty days.

2.

If the bill is not paid within thirty days, the
director of the Department of Community Development certifies that amount to the Commissioner
of Licenses and Assessments. (Cleveland Ordinance
No. 2154-65)

3.

The Commissioner of Licenses and Assessments pi"ovides to the County Auditor of Cuyahoga County a
statement providing a description of the property
and specifying the cost incurred for demolition.
(Cleveland Ordinance No. 2154-65) (O.R.C. 715.261)
This certification to the County Auditor occurs
t w i ci-• <•',r< c h

year.
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4.

The County Auditor places the specified amount
upon the tax duplicate of the County and it
becomes a lien against the property in question.
(O.R.C. 715.261)

5.

The demolition lien is to be collected as other
taxes and the amount returned to the City.
(O.R.C. 715.261)

6.

If the demolition lien (as other taxes) remains
unpaid for two consecutive semi-annual tax
settlement periods, it is termed tax delinquent
and action is to be taken by the County Auditor
(as prescribed in Section 7, 8, and 9 below).
(O.R.C. 5721.01, 5721.03)

7.

Immediately after each Auyust tax settlement,
the county Auditor is to make and certify a
list of all tax delinquent lands in the County,
including, of course, those upon which a demolition lien is unpaid.
(O,R.C. 5721.03)

8.

The County Auditor is to deliver a duplicate of
the list to the County Treasurer and to publish
the list within sixty days after delivery to the
County Treasurer.
(O.R.C. 5721.03)

9.

If the demolition lien (as other taxes) remains
unpaid for one year after the County Auditor's
certification as delinquent, foreclosure actions
are initiated by the County Auditor by his preparation of a delinquent land tax certificate (providing
specific information regarding all tax delinquent
lands including, of course, those with unpaid liens)
and delivering such certification to the County
Prosecutor.
(O.R.C. 5721.13)

10.

Upon receiving from the County Auditor the delinquent
land tax certificate, the County Prosecuting Attorney
is to initiate in court a foreclosure proceeding.
This action is to be taken within six months after
receiving the certificate, except in the cases of
properties upon which the delinquent taxes, liens,
et. al., are paid.
(0.RoC. 5721.18)
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11.

The court (of Common Pleas) is to enter a finding
regarding the total value of all due and unpaid
taxes (including demolition liens), assessments,
penalties, costs and charges certified against the
delinquent properties;,, and order these properties
sold by the County Sheriff at public auction.
(O.R.C. 5721.18, 5721.19)

12.

The delinquent properties are to be offered for
sale at a price which Is not less than the court's
finding. If not sold at that price in the first
offering, they may be offered again and successively, and the court may order that they be sold .
to the highest bidder, or may set a minimum price.
(O.R.C. 5721.19)

13.

When the property is sold, the City's demolition
lien is equal in priority to general taxes which,
except for the cost of the sale, have highest
priority with regard to the proceeds from the sale.
(CMHA vs Lincoln Property Management Company, Inc.;
Ohio Court of Appeals) (O.R.C. 5721.19)

14.

The amount of the City's demolition lien, whether
paid by the property owner or collected through
foreclosure, is to be returned to the City by the
County.
(O.R.C. 715.261)

15.

When monies from demolition liens are returned to
the City, they are to be placed in a special fund
(rather than the General Fund) and expended only for
demolition of public nuisances. (Cleveland Ordinance
No. 827-71)

As must be clear from the outline of the process, there are
many ways in which the replenishment of the City's demolition fund
can be avoided.

The Planning Commission thus recornnenus that the Community
Develop-'.G..V':. Ccamittee of Cj.ty Council beg;.n immediate hearings in
orcl^r to -'vi-.r'SJish the reasons for th^ f a "' are of expended demolition
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^ds to be returned to the City.

The matter is of no small

c.".-.sequence for it is conceivable that between $500,000 and
I,: 00,000 —

funds that could be put to important use immediately

- are somehow tied up in the process outlined.

REDUCING THE RATE OF ABANDONMENT
In January, 1972, the Planning Commission published "Housing
for Low- and Moderate-Income Families," in which a summary of
previous housing market analysis led to the conclusion that a
strong trend of housing deterioration and subsequent abandonment
had seized certain market areas of the City and that unless
significant alterations in the form of existing public programs of
housing assistance took place, this trend would continue unavoidably throughout the decade.

Thus, the persistent increase in

abandonments measured by the survey was not unexpected, but rather
is symptomatic of a previously noted economic collapse of the housing
market in several areas of the City during the last decade (19601970).

As mentioned in the January report, the primary reason for
this market collapse is a deficiency in the demand for standard
housing.

This occurs primarily when low-income households are

unable or unwilling to pay rents which are great enough to generate
the level of revenue required by landlords to maintain units in
standard condition.

During past years, certain areas of the City
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lK"/e suffered the affects of widespread ineffective demand.

In

IK 3e areas, the supply of housing has increased relative to the
>p•• Lation due to the characteristic exodus of population.

This

produced a higher vacancy rai.••:: 2ind rents, already low, stabilized
or declined.

Additionally, the families remaining in these areas

were comparatively poorer than those leaving, thus prohibiting
the landlord from raising rents in an attempt to compensate for
the increased vacancies.

Consequently, the landlord of an apart-

ment building in the area is faced with declining revenues,
tenants who are unable to pay any additional amount for rent, and,
to make matters worse, increasing maintenance costs in terms of
labor, materials, utilities, etc.

The landlord, when confronted

with this dilemma, will generally reduce maintenance expenditures
accordingly and make no major investments in the building.

As the

situation worsens, the point is eventually reached at which the
landlord terminates all maintenance expenditures, including, for
example, payment of utility bills and property taxes.

Thus, the

dwelling unit has been abandoned by the landlord because there is
no longer any economic justification for its operation.

If tenants

happen to be remaining in the building they will generally be
subsequently forced out due to the absence of basic services.

Thio process of deterioration and Eventual abandonment is
jenexal.. y bl:?w, and its characteristic?; may vary somewhat, but the
result is 'cl.e -ame.
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Unless fundamental changes take place in public programs of
housing assistance which affect central City areas, there will be
no cessation in this process of abandonment in the foreseeable
future.

A long-term solution to the problem of ineffective demand

for housing must be sought before abandonment and the deterioration
which precedes it can be halted.

New emphasis must be placed on

the preservation and maintenance of the thousands of dwelling units
in the City which are presently in standard condition.

These

dwelling units and the neighborhoods in which they are located must
be the subject of new strategies of housing assistance if they are
to remain economically viable.

As argued in a previous paper,*

a new national program of housing allowances, aimed directly at the
demand side of the housing market, appears to have the greatest
potential of accomplishing these crucial tasks.

* Housing for .iow- and Moderate-Income Families, Cleveland City
Planning Co.: .ftission, City of Clevelrncl . ,/anuary, 1972.
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PREFACE

Cleveland, like other American central cities, suffers from something
that has generally been termed "the urban crisis". This affliction has a number of different faces - - rising crime, a declining tax base, racial conflict,
unemployment - - all of which are eroding the quality of urban life. One of
its most visible and alarming aspects has been the rapid deterioration of
formerly sound residential neighborhoods. Many areas of Cleveland that
provided decent housing ten or fifteen years ago are slums today. On
streets where people lived and shopped a short while ago, only rows of empty,
gutted buildings remain.
*
The fact that many urban dwellers live in substandard housing has been
recognised for decades. The United States Congress passed the first federal
public housing program in 1937 with the stated goal of decent homes for lowincome families. Thirty-five years and many programs later, millions of
American families and thousands of Cleveland families still live in housing
that falls far short of Congress1 goal. In fact, the situation appears to be
growing worse.
This paper represents an attempt to identify the causes of substandard
housing in Cleveland, to explain why and how a neighborhood with adequate
housing can become blighted and even abandoned within a relatively short time
span. Hopefully, a better understanding of the city's housing problem will
serve to suggest new policies and programs that could improve living conditions
for city residents.
A number of individuals have made important contributions to this paper.
Many of (he ideas thatform this paper's theoretical base were drawn from the
published work of Richard Muth, George Sternlieb, Ira Lowry, and Charles
Leven. Their efforts have provided new insights into the nature of America's
urban housing ills. Within the Cleveland City Planning Commission staff,
Susan Olson assisted in gathering information. James Mittlestadt and Himanshu
Patel performed the necessary computer programming. Nadine F. Lane typed
the final draft. Throughout this paper's development, Norman Krumholz, Director of Planning, Ernest R. Bonner, Chief of Comprehensive Planning, and
Douglas Wright have provided encouragement, criticism, and suggestions that
have made this task less difficult.
John Linner
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning and Research

1.

CLEVELAND'S HOUSING PROBLEM RESTATED

In basic terms, Cleveland's housing problem is this: there are not
enough standard housing units available at a price all families can afford.
Hence this problem has a supply dimension (the lack of standard housing)
and a demand dimension (the inability of residents to pay for it). As will
be shown, these two dimensions are inextricably linked. It will be argued
that the shortage in the supply of standard housing is due to ineffective
demand. Generally speaking, the private market will supply the kind of
housing that consumers can pay for. A great many Cleveland residents
not afford to pay the prices currently charged by private suppliers for
standard units. A substantial and growing proportion of Cleveland's population can afford only housing that more affluent members of the community
regard as undesirable - - poorly maintained, deteriorating dwellings located
in neighborhoods beset with a host of social and environmental problems.

Cleveland's Housing Stock
The 1970 Census of Housing counted 264, 100 housing-units in the City
of Cleveland - - a decline of 18, 814 units from the I960 total. Between I960
and 1970, 15, 150 new units were constructed in Cleveland. About 2,000 of
them were public housing, built by the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing
Authority. During the same period, nearly 34,000 units built before I960
were removed from the city's housing stock through demolition, mergers,
abandonment, and so forth.
Older, wood-frame, one- and two-family houses make up most of
Cleveland's housing. Approximately two-thirds of all units in 1970 were in
one- and two-unit buildings. Nearly three-fourths of all units were in
structures built before 1940. In some of the city's older neighborhoods, such
as Hough and the Near West Side, a substantial proportion was constructed
before 1900. 2
Unlike its predecessors, the 1970 Census of Housing did not evaluate
the condition of buildings. Hence no comparison can be made between the
condition of housing in I960 and 1970. In 1969 and 1970, however, Cleveland's
Community Development Improvement Program (CDIP) surveyed 3, 740 households in the city. In this study, 32% of all the occupied housing units sampled
were found to be substandard. 3
The proportion of deficient units varied
U. S. Census
2

Ibid
CDIP 2% Survey.

See Appendix Table IX for explanation of criteria.

2.

greatly from area to area - - from 71% in West Hough to 0% in Munn-Warren.
Of Cleveland's thirty-nine statistical areas, eight had less than ten pe.'cent
of their units classified substandard. All but two of these were on the West
Side. Ten statistical areas, in contrast, had over half of their units designated
substandard. All but one were on the East Side.
Applying the survey percentage of substandard units to the city as a
whole produces an estimate of 79,450 occupied substandard dwellings. Because
the city's 15, 773 vacant units were not included in the survey, no figures are
available on the number of substandard vacant units. Nevertheless, it is known
that vacancies were concentrated in the most blighted areas. For example,
West Hough had only 2. 9% of all the city's housing units but contained 9. 9% of
all vacancies.
It seems probable that vacant units were more likely to be
substandard than occupied units. Hence a reasonable estimate of the total
number of substandard occupied and vacant housing units would fall between
85, 000 and 90,000.
Abandonment
A rapidly growing problem for residents of some neighborhoods is the
presence of vacant and vandalized buildings that have been, abandoned by their
owners. These buildings are more than an esthetic burden on the neighborhood.
They depreciate the value of nearby homes. They catch fire and harbor criminal activity. In short, they pose a serious threat to the health and safety of
those who live near them.
A 1972 survey of eleven inner city statistical areas found 2, 200 abandoned housing units. It has been estimated that 3 dwelling units are newly
abandoned each day. Without a substantial increase in the city's demolition
effort, an estimated 5,000 abandoned units will be standing by 1975.
Low Incomes and the Price of Housing
The presence of 85,000 substandard dwelling units is the most visible
aspect of Cleveland's housing problem. Essentially, however, it is only a
physical manifestation of the second, more fundamental aspect - - the inability
of many city residents either to rent or buy a standard unit with a reasonable
portion of their income. For the poorest families, even the cost of substandard housing strains their budgets. Those who are above the bottom but below
the middle in terms of income must choose between obtaining a standard unit
by spending a high
proportion of their incomes on rent or spending a more
reasonable proportion but living in substandard housing. A generally accepted
4lbid
S. Census
"Cleveland City Planning Commission, Housing Abandonment ua Cleveland,
See Appendix Table VIII.

rule of the thumb says that a family should pay no more than 25% of its
earnings for rent. In 1970, over 40% of Cleveland's tenants devoted more
than one-quarter of their income for rent, and 27% spent over 35%. ' As
indicated in Table I, low-income tenants were much more likely to spend an
excessive proportion on rent than those in the middle- and upper-income
ranges.
TABLE I - Propensity to Spend More than 25% of
Earnings on Rent by Renter's Income
Income In
Thousands
0-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-6
6-7
7-10
10-15
15-25
25+

Percentage Spending
Over 25% On Rent

*

98.8
91.8
77.2
54.4
31.2
12.2
3.9
0.6
0.3
0.0
Source: U. S. Census

Of those making less than $5, 000 per year, 86% sp\ent more than a quarter of
their income while only 7.0% of those making more than $5, 000 did so.
This
indicates that many Cleveland residents; prjimarily/the poor, must forego
expenditures on food, clothing, health, deltal care, and other necessary items
because the price of housing requirejs then to spend a high percentage of their
income on shelter. The family tnat pays 40% of its monthly check to a landlord
in order to obtain decent housing is as muc'h a part of Cleveland's housing
problem as one with the same income paying 25% of its income for a substandard unit. The figure below illustrates the relationship between income
and substandard housing.

7 U. S. Census
8 Ibid.

4.

90
80

Standard

70

Y = 51.51 + 1.98 X

60

r = . 87

50
40
10

20

15

Income in thousands
Source: (CDIP 2% Survey)
Clearly, those who are poor are more likely to live in substandard housing
than those who are not.

THE PROCESS OF DETERIORATION

It is thus abundantly clear that poverty and substandard housing are
related and that those who are poor tend to occupy the worst housing. The
following evidence indicates that the relationship is a causal one, that low
incomes cause substandard housing. The observation that poor people tend to
live in bad housing will not be startling to most people. In a market economy
one receives what he can pay for. Since the poor can least afford decent
housing, they are least likely to get it. The crucial question is how is substandard housing created? Any solution to Cleveland's housing problem must
deal with this question. In the most basic terms, substandard housing is
created by allowing standard housing to decline in quality. As any observer
of urban areas known, neighborhoods that are now blighted were not always
so. Why is standard housing allowed to deteriorate? This study concludes,
as others have,
that declining revenues to landlords have necessarily led to
reduced maintenance and inevitable deterioration in many buildings. As
incomes of central city residents decline relative to metropolitan area residents
as a whole, landlords cannot recover maintenance costs from tenants. Hence
the primary agent of residential deterioration is poverty. Analysis of housing
market trends in Cleveland over the last twenty years reveals a process of
deterioration, a series of changes that take place in neighborhoods as they
decline. The following is an explanation of how poverty sets in motion the pro9 George Steinlieb, The Tenement Landlord; Charles Leven, et.al. , Urban
Decay in_S_t^. Louis; Ira Lowry, et. al. , Rental Housing in New York City.

cess of deterioration and a description of the changes that occur.
The first stage in the process is reached when middle-income homeowners and tenants leave an area. This may occur for a variety of reasons.
The kind of housing in the neighborhood may no longer reflect middle-class
tastes, and the residents may find suburban locations with greater space and
privacy more attractive. They may be dissatisfied with the quality of municipal services such as police protection or public schools in their area. Or,
they may be fleeing from the impending presence of the poor.

In an area where middle-income residents are leaving, property
owners find that the only demand for the area's housing comes from the inmigrating low-income households. In this situation, the landlord must
either rent his units to low-income tenants or let them stand empty. Since
'one's ability to pay rent is a function of his income, low-income families
generally cannot afford to pay as much for rent as middle-income families.
The landlord, therefore, must offer his apartments at somewhat lower
rents than those that middle-income people could pay. This, of course,
results in loss of revenue and a squeeze on his profits. In order to maintain the same margin of profit while lowering his rents, the landlord may
follow two courses of action. First, he may divide large units into small
ones and increase the total number of units available for rent. He can then
lower his rent per unit and still receive as much or more revenue from the
building as he did before. A building that undergoes this kind of conversion
will be used more intensively and require increased maintenance and repair.
When a landlord sees his building's tenants becoming poorer, however, he
is usually reluctant to invesbmore money in it. He knows, then, he cannot
recover increased maintenance of new investment by raising his rents. More
intensive use without in^raasekl maintenance eventually results in deterioration.
Without adequate maintenance, a sound building will eventually become substandard.
The second course of action open to the landlord is to reduce his
expenditures on maintenance and repair. This also enables him to maintain his margin of profit while receiving less revenue from the building.
But reduced maintenance, over a period of time, leads inevitably to
deterioration. As the building's quality declines, it becomes a less desirable
place to live. In order to attract tenants, who will increasingly tend to be
those who are too poor to afford standard housing, the landlord must further

reduce his rents. This implies another reduction in maintenance if profits
are to be protected, and deterioration proceeds at an accelerating rate. 10
There are limits to how far the landlord can lower his rents. He has
certain fixed costs that must be met. He must make mortgage payments,
pay taxes, and provide basic services such as electricity and water. When
revenues become insufficient to cover even these minimum costs, the owner
has great incentive simply to stop paying taxes, discontinue basic services,
and default on the mortgage. Abandonment represents the end of the deterioration process, the point at which a building is no longer an asset to the owner,
but a growing liability.
'•r

It should be noted that in the past, slum properties were operated for
years at minimum levels of maintenance without abandonment taking place.
The wholesale abandonment of parts of a city is a relatively recent phenomenon
and requires additional explanation. While poverty is the primary cause of
substandard housing, paradoxically, one of the major causes of abandonment
is affluence. Because the earnings of middle-income people have risen over
•that last twenty years, they can afford to move to the suburbs.
Those
moving to the suburbs have left behind substantial numbers of units for which
the only demand comes from lower-income households. This housing is
subsequently converted for low-income occupancy in the manner that has been
described. Hence the supply of low-income housing in many central cities
10 This analysis applies as well to owner-occupied units. Owner-occupants
are constrained by their incomes as to the amount of maintenance they
can undertake. Statistics for homeowners in the North Central region in
1969 show that those whose incomes were below $5,000 spent an average
of $102 on maintenance and repair. Those whose incomes were between
$5,000 and $10,000 averaged $266, and those with incomes over $10,000
spent an average of $35 9. (Source: 1971 HUD Statistical Yearbook)
Clearly, homeowners with low incomes spend less on maintenance than
those who are more affluent. If a homeowner is not able to maintain his
property, it will deteriorate in the same manner as renter-occupied units.
11 The Federal Housing Administration encouraged the suburban exodus
by providing more favorable mortgage terms for middle-income households, enabling millions of them to buy homes in the suburbs. Here is
an instance where a federal housing program actually contributed to the
deterioration of the central cities.

has increased substantially while the number of low-income households
has not. This has resulted in a situation in which the supply of substandard
housing is far in excess of the demand for it. Low-income households have
been presented with a choice of living in the older hard-core slums or
moving to an area where middle income people are leaving. The units
opening up to the poor are generally of a higher quality than the housing in
their old neighborhoods and are available at rents that are not much higher.
Offered a choice between the dilapidated units in the older slums and
significantly better housing in another area at a reasonably small price
differential, many of the poor have left the older slums. This movement
of low-income households has resulted in rising vacancy rates in the inner
city, reducing the revenues to landlords there. In many cases, revenues
have dropped below the level necessary to meet the costs of debt service,
taxes, and basic services. As demand for properties in these areas dropped
off, landlords responded by abandoning their units.
An example will serve to illustrate how the process of deterioration
has worked in Cleveland. Consider the twenty-year history of census tract
1124 in West Hough. The table below presents changes in key indicators
between 1950 and 1970.
TABLE II - Tract 1124

1950-1970

1950
Total Units
Vacancy Rate
Median Contract Rent (as
% of County Median)
% Overcrowded
Population
\
% Black
Median Income of Families
and Unrelated Individuals
(1957-59 Constant dollars) a
As % of County Median

I960

1970

3,014

2,921

2.6

6.0

2, 114
21.7

98
11.1
9, 157
1.6

107
32.7
11,785
91.3

82
16.2
6,139
98.7

3, 781
90.4

3,652
61.9

2,339
33.4

Source: U. S. Census

a.

Constant dollars are figured from the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) "All Items" category for the Cleveland SMSA. All
Items 1950 = . 825, 1957-59 = 1.000, I960 = 1.023, 1970 = 1.348.

In 1950, the demand fcnr housing in this area was relatively strong. The
median contract rent was only 2% below the median for Cuyahoga County,
and the vacancy rate was only 2.6%. Between 1950 and I960, middle-income
whites moved out and were replaced by lower-income blacks. The median
income for families and unrelated individuals declined (in 1957-59 constant
dollars) while the median income in the County as a whole rose from $4, 183
to $5, 902.12
During the same decade, the population of tract 1124 increased 28%,
and the number of overcrowded units jumped from 11. 1% of all units (slightly
above the 1950 citywide average) to 32.7% (over three times the I960
average).
At the same time, the vacancy rate increased substantially.
This peculiar phenomenon - - an increase in overcrowding and vacancies - can be noted in four of the five statistical areas where the median income
dropped below 80% of the county median between 1950 and I960. 1^ It becomes
less surprising when considered in relation to the change in population that
has taken place. The transition from middle-income to low-income occupancy
means that demand for housing there has weakened somewhat. A rise in
vacancies in a weaker market is not surprising. The tremendous increase
in population and overcrowding in tract 1124 is due to two characteristics of
the new residents - - their larger families and lower incomes. Their lower
incomes prevent them from purchasing adequate space for their larger
families. Hence we see an increase in overcrowding and vacancies.
The relative rise in rents between 1950 and I960 was due to a special
set of circumstances. Cleveland's black population increased 59% during the
1950's and the number of black renter-occupied units increased 84%.
The
large number of new black families seeking rental housing may have caused
a general rise in rents in black neighborhoods. The median gross rent for
blacks in Cleveland in I960 was five dollars higher than the median gross rent
for whites. 1 "
By 1970, the housing market in this tract had collapsed. Overcrowding
and under maintenance resulted in rapid, deterioration of the housing stock.
The total number of housing units dropped 27. 6%; population dropped 47. 9%.
Over one-fifth of all remaining units were vacant, and'.by 1972, 14% were
abandoned.
The rates of vacancy and abandonment were the highest in the
city. The median income of residents had dropped to $2, 339 (1957-59) constant dollars). 18
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

U. S. Census
Ibid.
See Appendix Tables
U. S. Census
Ibid.
U. S. Census and Housing Abandonment in Cleveland.
U, S, Census

During the 196O's, Cleveland's population fell from 876,050 to 750,903.
Large numbers of middle-income residents moved to the suburbs, opening
new areas of the city to low-income people. As the poor left the most
deteriorated parts of the city, such as tract 1124, no prospective tenants were
waiting to take their place. We appear to have reached the end of a long migration cycle. The waves of European immigration to Cleveland of the early
twentieth century are over, as is the massive rural - to - urban migration of
Southern blacks that peaked during the 1950's. Hence there is no new group
to occupy the oldest, most deteriorated areas of the city.
The impact of these changes on owners of rental housing were dramatic.
Landlords have seen their revenues shrink. In tract 1124, the average expected
revenue (mean rent times the occupancy rate) declined 43% between I960 and
1970 when adjusted for inflation. ' It is not surprising that landlords in this
area engaged in wholesale abandonment of their property.

Cleveland - - The Broader Picture

Tract 1124 is, admittedly, an extreme example of the condition of
housing in Cleveland. But the circumstances of that tract are repeated in
many other areas of the city. The position of the average Cleveland landlord
has changed markedly since 1950. In 1950, only 1.4% of the city's rental
units were vacant. By I960, the vacancy rate had risen to 5.6% - - a higher
but still acceptable figure. During the 1950's, the median contract rent in
Cleveland jumped from $35 to $67, an increase of 91%, while the general
level of prices in the Cleveland area rose only 24%.
From this we may
surmise that the landlord who purchased a building in the late 1940rs and
held it through the 1950's reaped tremendous profits. If he sold it in the late
1950's, its value should have appreciated considerably, since its revenueproducing potential was much higher. The decade of the 1960's, however,
tells a much different story. The vacancy rate for rental units climbed to 8. 4%
in 1970, and while the general level of prices rose 31.8%, the median contract
rent increased only 17. 9%.
The landlord who bought property during the
rental housing boom of the late 1950's must have paid premium prices, which
were justified by the soaring rents of past years. As rents failed to keep up
with inflation and vacancies became more frequent, however, he must have
encountered growing pressure on his profit margins. The average expected
revenue of rental units in Cleveland declined 10% when adjusted to constant
dollars.
This implies that many landlords had no recourse but to reduce
their expenditures on maintenance, particularly those who bought buildings
when their value was at a peak and consequently were saddled with largo
mortgages. The larger the mortgage payment, the less maintenance they
19 See Appendix Table X for explanation of method used to calculate this
indicator.
20 C . P . I , and II. S. Census
21 Ibid.
22 Sec Appendix Table X for an analysis of average expected revenues in 34
Cleveland census tracts.
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could undertake with a given rent and profit margin. Hence it seems reasonable to conclude that these landlords faced the greatest pressure to let their
property deteriorate and, in extreme cases, to abandon it.
Table III depicts the changing composition of Cleveland's residents
with regard to income. Although the number of Cleveland families in the
bottom three income deciles ofCuyahoga County has declined, the city is
losing middle- and upper-income families at a much faster rate. Hence,
despite the fact that the absolute number of low-income families in Cleveland
has declined, they now make up a larger proportion of all families than in
I960. The amount of housing available to low-income households is increasing through shift of formerly middle-income housing into the low-income
market. As shown in Table IV, the number of units with rents in the bottom
three deciles of Cuyahoga County is increasing. The implications for
Cleveland's housing market are clear.
The supply of housing available to
the poor is increasing while the number of low-income households is not.
The net result of this mismatch between supply and demand is the abandonment of the most deteriorated housing.
In the short run, this represents an increase in housing quality for
low-income residents. As middle-income households move to the suburbs,
the poor will continue to move into neighborhoods they have left. The housing
available there is often significantly better than slum apartments. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe that these areas will not eventually resemble
the older slums. The same economic forces that led to the decay of the older,
hard-core slums are at work in these newer areas. If residents are unable
(or unwilling) to pay rents that are high enough to support adequate maintenance,
then these areas will also deteriorate. At the end of this inevitable process is
large-scale abandonment of housing by tenants and owners alike.

Conclusions

Substandard housing exists because a large number of Cleveland households cannot pay sufficient rent to maintain standard units.
New areas of the city are experiencing rapid deterioration as owners
reduce their maintenance and repair expenditures to match the rents they
receive from in-coming lower-income households.
Residential abandonment has occurred in inner areas of the city as poor
households leave for better housing vacated by middle - income families, and
no households stand ready to occupy the housing left by the poor.

TABLE m CLEVELAND FAMILIES BY INCOME RANK
1

INCOME
RANGE

DECILE

1
INCOME
RANGE

9

7

0
CHANGE
IN NO. OF
FAMILIES

NO. IN
RANGE

% OF ALL
FAMILIES

0-3,727

30,833

16. 7

- 4. 4%

13.7

3,727-6,590

26,371

14. 3

- 1 3 . 0%

$

0-2,626

32,262

9th

2, 626-4,292

30,302

8th

4, 292-5, 328

27,970

12.7

6, 500-8, 405

24,574

13. 3

-12. 1%

7th

5, 328-6,133

25, 648

11.6

8,405-9, 890

21,738

11. 8

- 15,. 2%

6 th

6,133-6,943

23, 086

10.5

9, 890-11, 309

18,268

9. 9

-20. 9%

5 th

6,943-7,859

20, 544

9.3

11,309-12,908

16,601

9. 0

-19. 2%

4th

7, 859-8, 955

19, 187

8.7

12,908-14, 681

15,206

8. 2

-20.

3rd

8,955-10,856

16, 866

7.6

14, 681-18, 797

12, 076

6. 5

-28. 4%

2nd

10,856-14,070

14, 851

6.7

18, 797-23,428

11, 391

6. 2

-23. 3%

9,822

4.5

23,428 +

7, 587

4. 1

-22. 8%

Bottom

Top

$

9
6 0
NO. CLEVELAND
FAMILIES IN . ... % OF ALL
RANGE
FAMILIES

14, 070 +

Total No.
Families

14.6
•"

220,538

IS OTE:

SOURCE: Derived from U. S. Census

-16. 3%

184,645

Each decil e was calculated to include ten per cent of Cuyahoga Ccounty's fanlilie

7%

s.
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TABLE IV

1
RENT
RANGE

DECILE

9

6

CLEVELAND RENTAL UNITS RANKED BY GROSS RENT

0

NO. CLEVELAND
UNITS IN DECILE

1
% OF ALL
UNITS

RENT
RANGE

9

NO. CLEVELAND
UNITS IN DECILE

7

0
% OF ALL
UNITS

CHANGE
IN NO. OF
UNITS

0-48

17, 807

12.4

0-67

20,149

15.6

+

9th

48-62

17, 384

12. 1

67-82

19,211

14.9

+ 10.5%

8 th

62-70

16,359

11.4

82-93

17, 603

13.6

7. b%

7 th

70-77

16,359

11.4

93-103

16,205

12.5

0.9%

6 th

77-85

15,454

10.8

103-116

12,523

9.7

-

19.0%

5 th

85-92

14, 995

10.4

116-128

12, 523

9.7

-

16.5%

4th

92-99

14, 790

10.4

128-141

12,523

9.7

-

15.3%

3rd

99-119

11,416

8.0

141-157

10,616

8.2

2nd

119-140

10,916

7.6

157-189

4,656

3.6

-

5 7.3%

8,061

5.6

189 +

3, 353

2.6

-

58.2%

Bottom

Top
Total

$

140 +

143,541

SOURCE: Derived from U. S. Census

7. 0%

129,362

NOTE: Figures include only rental units for which cash rent was charged.
percent of all units renting for cash in Cuyahoga County.

1?.. 2%

9. 9%

Each decile includes ten
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Deterioration and abandonment will continue to occur in the wake of
the middle-income exodus as long as those households left behind are unable
to pay for standard housing.
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HOUSING MARKETS IN STATISTICAL AREAS

For purposes of data collection and analysis, the City of Cle\eland has
been divided into thirty-nine statistical areas listed below:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5j.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1Q.
11.
12.
13.
14.
13.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
2 9.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
3 7.
3 8.
3 9.

North Collinwood-Wildwood
South Collinwood
Euclid-Green
Forest Hills
Glenville
Norwood
Goodrich
We s t e r n Hough
E a s t e r n Hough
University Circle
East Central
West Central
Kinsman
Woodland Hills
Shaker Square
Paul Revere
Mount Pleasant
Harvard-Lee
Lee-Seville-Miles
Corlett

Miles-Warner
South Broadway
North Broadway
Industrial Valley
Downtown
Near West Side
Midwest North
Edgewater
Midwest South
Fulton-Train
Tremont
Denison
Clark-Fulton
Memphis-Fulton
Broadview-Schaaf
Jefferson
Munn—Warren
Puritas-Bellaire-Longmead
Riverside

A brief analysis of the housing markets in all statistical a r e a s except downtown
is included. Its purpose is to indicate a r e a s that have deteriorated and those
that could encounter serious problems in the future.

ii

HOUSING MARKETS - - EAST SIDE AREAS

The area of weakest housing demand on the East Side and in the city as
a whole includes West Central, East Central, West Hough, East Hough, and
Kinsman.

Each of these statistical areas shows the basic signs of market

collapse - - declining incomes and rents, a loss in total units, and high rates
of vacancy and abandonment.

With the exception of Kinsman, each of them lost

15% or more of its housing units between I960 and 1970.

They have the highest

percentage of vacancies and abandonments in the city, and all of them have high
concentrations of substandard housing.
The process of deterioration has proceeded furthest in West Central and
West Hough,

As private property owners have deserted West Central, the

public sector has intervened in an effort to preserve the area.

Since the late

1930's, more and more land has been cleared and redeveloped with low-income
housing.

At the present time, approximately 45% of all units in West Central

are in public housing projects.

Very few standard non-subsidized units remain.

Had not the public sector intervened in West Central's market, the incidence of
vacancies and abandonments would certainly be much higher.

The demand for

housing in West Central is the weakest in the city.
In West Hough the signs of market collapse may be identified more clearly
in the statistics, since less subsidized housing has been built there than in
West Central.

Between I960 and 1970, rents dropped from 100% of the county

median to only 80%.

The vacancy rate climbed to 20.3% in 1970, and abandonment

IV

completely.

While the market is currently sagging, it has not collapsed.

In South Collinwood, Mt. Pleasant, Paul Revere, North Broadway, South
Broadway, the Industrial Valley, Miles-Warner, and Corlett, the market situation is much better.

Little abandonment is occurring, and with the exception

of North Broadway, vacancy rates are below the city average.

Median rents

seem to be stable or declining slowly relative to the county median in all areas
but Mt. Pleasant.

The percentage of substandard units ranges from eight in the

Industrial Valley to thirty-four in Miles-Warner.
has taken place, demand remains fairly strong.
problems, they are still viable.

Although some deterioration
While all these areas have

People still want to live there.

The remaining five East Side areas - - Lee-Seville-Miles,

Lee-Harvard,

North Collinwood, Euclid-Green, and Shaker Square - - are the strongest on the
East Side in terms of the demand for housing.
Collinwood are vacancy rates above 3.0%.
are above the median for Cuyahoga.

Only in Shaker Square and North

The median rents in all these areas

The proportion of substandard units ranges

from 25% in North Collinwood to 8% in Shaker Square.

VI

HOUSING MARKETS - - WEST SIDE AREAS

The areas of weakest demand on the West Side are the Near West Side,
Fulton-Train, and Tremont.
West Side neighborhoods.

They have higher vacancy rates than any other

The Near West Side and Tremont are the only West

,Side areas with an appreciable amount of abandonment.
:

These areas still have

a much stronger demand for housing than Hough, Central, and Kinsman.

They

; do resemble, however, Norwood, Goodrich, Glenville, and others in that group.
j All three have substantial numbers of substandard units.
!
i
i
'

'

Midwest North, Denison, and Clark-Fulton also have significant proportions

of substandard units but have lower vacancy rates than the areas discussed above.

I
•
; Rents are below the county median but stable or declining slowly relative to
I
| the county. They have experienced a modest loss in total units but no abandon• ment.

Vacancy rates are below the city average but generally higher than in the

i
j areas of strong demand.
1

The remaining West Side neighborhoods have relatively few problems, - -

i

j Edgewater, Midwest South, Memphis-Fulton, Broadview-Schaaf,
j Munn-Warren,

Puritas -Bellaire- Longmead, and Riverside.

I of Edgewater, vacancy rates are below 2.5%.
;

With the exception

The strength of the market here is

at least equal to the strongest areas on the East Side.

VII

Jefferson,

TABLE I

HOUSING MARKETS
West Side

Market Condition

East Side

Collapsed or collapsing

West

Sharp declines in total
units; very high vacancy
rates; abandonment common;
median rents declining in
relation to county median

West Hough
East Hough
Kinsman
East Central

(48)
(39)
(43)
(31)

Very weak - -

Glenville
Norwood
Goodrich
Forest Hills
University Circle
Woodland Hills

(31)
(20)
(20)
(16)
(20)
(15)

N. Broadway
Industrial Valley
Mt. Pleasant
Paul Revere
S. Broadway
Miles -Warner
Corlett
S. Collinwood

(13)
(13)
(18)
(17)
(12)

Le e - Se ville - Mi le s
N. Collinwood
Shaker Square
Lee-Harvard
Euclid- Green

(10)
( 8)
( 8)
( 4)

Modest decline in total
units; vacancy rates above
city average; some abandonment; rents declining in
relation to county median

Weakening - Below average vacancy
rates; little or no abandonment; median rents below
county median, but steady
or declining slowly in relation to county.

Strong - Low vacancy rates; median
rents above county median.

Central

(47)

Tremont
Near West Side
Fulton- Train

• Midwest North
Denison
Clark-Fulton

(ID
(ID
( 9)

( 9)

(ID
( 9)

( 6)

Midwest South
B roadview- Schaaf
Edge water
Jefferson
P u r . -Bell. -Long.
Memphis -Fulton
Riverside
Munn-Warren

NOTE: Number in parentheses is the percentage of all families in 1970 below the
poverty level. (Source - - U. S. Census).

Vlll

(23)
(25)
(16)

( 6)
( 7)

( 6)
( 6)
( 5)

( 6)
( 5)

( 5)

TABLE II
Statistical
Area

TOTAL HOUSING UNITS - 1950, I960, 1970

1960

1970

8, 320
8, 162
2,059
8, 164
16,511
8, 556
4,669
11,319
11,794
5,473
13,029
16,088
4,245
6,008
7,293
4,280
10, 927
2,662
1,069
5, 520
3,849
9, 927
5, 751
1,610
3, 651
8, 878
9,312
3, 986
6, 810
7, 225
8,230
7,402
7,912
5,393
6,634
5,917
3,646
4, 844
3, 813

8,266
8,269
2, 828
8, 140
16,918
8,470
4, 150
10,674
12,280
5,218
12,848
15,173
4, 351
6, 105
7,959
4,412
11, 144
4,393
1, 330
6,276
4,092
9, 686
5, 578
1,085
5,149
8, 401
9,585
4,023
7, 128
7, 179
7, 753
7, 324
7, 969
6, 329
7, 736
6,263
4, 844
7, 641
6,079

8,968
8,068
3,685
8,030
16,098
8, 123
3, 237
7,724
9,432
4, 284
10,669
10,229
4, 208
5,729
8, 811
4, 520
11, 287
4, 595

City of Cleveland

270, 943

282, 914

264, 100

Cuyahoga County

414, 889

518,682

577,618

1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

1950

IX

1,669

6, 328
4, 038
9,097
4, 758
1,021
2, 998
8, 613
8,497
4, 671
7, 432
5, 159
5, 835
6,849
7, 412
6, 502
8, 881
6, 830
4, 391
8, 301
7, 210

TABLE III

Statistical
Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

VACANCY RATES - 1950, I960, 1970

1950
1.3
3. 1
6.7
0.9
1.5
1.5
2.7
3.5
3.0
3.4
1.9
2.9
1.6
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.0
3.3
1.7
1.2
0. 8
0. 9
2. 1
7. 1
2.6
2.4
1.6
1.5
1. 2
2. 3
1.8
1. 5
1.4
1.2
1.3
1. 1

I960

1970

3.4
3.4
2.2
2.5
3.0
7.5
7.5

3.3
5.0
2.3

8.9

20.3
12.1

6.0
6.3
8.8
8.0

9. 1

6.1
5.7
8.2
7.5
4. 1
2.7
2.3
2. 8
1.4
2.9
2.8
2.9
3.2
5.5
9.5
14.7
6.2
4. 5
4. 5
2.7
5.2
5. 8
4.3
3.4

8.6
9.8
13.0
11.8
7.5
4. 1
5.2
3.1
0.7

'

1.6

1. 9
2. 5

2.4
1. 9
2.0
2. 8
2.4

3.7
4.2
3.9
6.0
5.3
9. 1
8.3
4.4
5.2
2.3
7.4
8.7
4.4
4.7
1.5
2.4
1.9
1.4
1.2
1.2

City of Cleveland

1. 8

4.6

6.0

Cuyahoga County

2.0

3.5

4.0

2.6

1.6

-

TABLE IV

MEDIAN CONTRACT RENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE
COUNTY MEDIAN - - 1950, I960, 1970

Statistical
Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
City of Cleveland

1950

103
97
119
107
105
73

65
100
115
120
88
70
72
90
146
93
109

N.A.
94
94
94
68
64
65
97
87
102
132
109
72

66
86
80
100
102
117

165
115
120
93

I960

103

1970

103

96

86

118
102
105
77
70
101
104
100
89
78
82
88
131
95
106

125
90

N.A.
N.A,
98
94
76

76
75
71
88

97
115
107
80
73
92
87
108
103
116
140
111

1 10
94

86
70

68
80
86
88
75
70
72
79
115
89
89
120
121
93
88
74
73
75
80
80
92
116
100
82
73
92
85
113
103
110
129
110
123
87

NOTE: Medians for statistical areas are the weighted averages of the media-ns
for the census tracts that comprise them. Percentages were calculated
by dividing by the median contract rent for Cuyahoga County - -

TABLE V

Statistical
Area

PERCENTAGE

OF OCCUPIED UNITS OVERCROWDED
1950, I960, 1970

1950

I960

1970

5.8
8.4
3.7
4.4
8.5
7.3
12.6
14.4
8.4
10.2
17.1
27.1
24.9
6.5
3.3
7.3
7. 6
5.3
33.7
5.4
9.4
10.4
12.0
16.8
19.7
13.8
6.7
3.5
4.6
9.1
11.3
6.3
7.4
5.6
4.4
5.3
4.2
12.2
7.0

4.1
6.4
3.7
7.0
14.0
7.1
10.7
25.8
17.2
8.5
13.9
23.7
24.6
7.6
2.6
5.4
8. 8 '
6.6
16.3
5.4
5.5
8.4
11.6
15.0
8.5
13.4
5.7
3.2
4.9
11.8
13.8
6.1
6.2
4.5
3.8
5.6
3.6
11.2
9.4

2.8
6.1
2.8
10.3
9.4
7.8
6.9
14.6
10.8
3.9
8.0
12.8
14.0
5.7
2.2
8.7
7.0
7.1
11.9
8.7
7.0
6.2
8.2
8.7
4.6
10.7
6.1
3.2
4.7
11.5
10.8
6.1
6.3
3.1
3.6
4.3
4.3
8.7
8.2

City of Cleveland

10.1

10.3

7.4

Cuyahoga County

8. 3

7. 7

4. 5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

9

xii

"

TABLE VI
Statistical
Area
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

POPULATION -- 1950, I960, 1970

1950

I960

1970

27, 181

23,566
24,622
8, 143
24,787
61,221
24,826
11,941
35,192
36,383
16, 132
36,291
50, 134
15,714
17,907
19,066
13,789
36,410
15,271
5,022
19,465
15,680
29,957
17,319
3,664
9, 808
25,498
28, 786
10,089
22,157
22,171
24,587
22,895
23,689
19,362
23,335
19,516
14,020
26,578
20,887

22,439
22,359
9, 185
26,842
51,857
21,910
7,966
20,070
25,417
12, 804
25,663
25,347
11,855
14,626
18,496
14,648
33,613
15,964
5,987
21,034
13,272
25,455
13,424
3,150
6,530
23,802
24,274
10,772
21,964
15,655
16,393
20,057
21, 154
18,343
24, 896
19,409
12, 983
26,846
24, 392

26, 802
6, 164
25, 293
58, 797
28, 0 80
15, 393
32, 055
33, 639
18, 27,8
44, 636
64, 807
16, 853
19, 888
20, 684
15, 052
38, 247
9, 316
4, 874
18, 591
15, 952
34, 545
19, 601
5, 541
17, 534
28, 741
30, 612
11, 107
22, 169
23, 271
27, 162
24, 750
25, 706
17, 923
21, 918

19,927
11, 999
17, 515
13, 124

City of Cleveland

914,808

876,050

750,903

Cuyahoga County

1, 389, 532

1,647, 895

1, 721, 300

Xlll

TABLE VII-a

MEDIAN INCOME oF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED
INDIVIDUALS - - 1950, I960, 1970

Statistical
Area

1950

;_96.0

, -1970

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
' 27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

3,891
3, 587
4,098
3, 644
2,975
3,305
2, 983
2, 811
2, 852
2,3 87
2,318
1,849
2, 454
3,301
4, 107
3, 676
3,371
4,; 592
3, 110
3, 978
3, 503
3,369
3, 119
3,009
1, 822
2,666
3,393
3, 670
3, 766
3, 293
3,033
3,292
3, 601
4,032
3,915
3, 952
4, 715
3,951
3, 994

6,032
5,681
.6,516
5,330
4,666
5, 153
4,293
3,643
3, 837
2, 821
3, 144
2,487
3,903
5,473
6,067
5,808
5,346
6,993
5,854
6,010
5,946
5,482
4,916
5,129
2,063
3,319
5,437
5,638
6, 189
5, 171
4, 703
5,491
5,602
6, 768
6,357
6, 552
7,611
6, 869
6,923

8,757
7,844
8, 83Q

.

City of Cleveland
Cuyahoga County

7,629
6,245
6,252
5,762
3,377
3,862
2,502
3, 926
3,196
3, 928
6,528
7, 931
7,974
7,078
11,970
9, 844
.': 8,565
8, 521
7,906
7,554
8,481
3,849
5,387
8, 189
7, 560
9,269
7,214
6, 155
7,641
8, 125
9,396
9,085
9, 518
10,781
10, 157
9,929

3, 153

5,639

3,451

6,038
xiv

7, 129
9,432

TABLE Vll-b

MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED
INDIVIDUALS IN 1957-1959 CONSTANT DOLLARS
1950, 1960, 1970

Statistical
Area

1950

I960

1970

4, 716
4,348
4,967
4,416
3,606
3,616
3,408
3,457
2,894
2, 810
2,241
2,975
4,002
4,978
4,456
4,086
5,566
3, 770
4,821
4,246
4,083
3,781
3,648
2,209
3,232
4, 112
4,447
4,565
3,991
3,676
3,991
4,365
4,887
4,746
4,791
5,715
4, 788
4, 842

5,896
5, 533
6, 370
5,210
4,561
5,037
4, 197
3,561
3, 751
2,757
3,073
2,431
3,815
5,350
5,931
5,677
5,226
6, 836
5, 722
5,874
5, 811
5,359
4, 805
5,014
2,016
3,244
5,315
5,511
6,050
5,055
4,598
5,368
5,476
6,615
6,214
6,376
7,440
6, 715
6,768

6,496
5,819
6, 550
5,659
4,633
4,638
4, 274
2,505
2, 865

City of Cleveland

3,822

4,926

5,289

Cuyahoga County

4, 183

5, 902

6,997

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

4,006

XV

1, 856
2,912
2,372
2,914
4, 843
5, 883
5.-915
5,248
8, 879
7,302
6,354
6,321
5, 865
5,604
6,291
2, 855
3,996
6,075
5,608
6,876
5,352
4, 566
5,668
6,027
6,970
735
060
. 997
7,535
7,366

TABLE VII-c

MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED
INDIVIDUALS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE MEDIAN
FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY - 1950, I960, 1970

Statistical
Area
1
2
3
4

1950

I960

1970

112.7
103.9
118.7
105.6

99.9
93.8
107.9
88.3

92.8
83.2
93.6
77.7

77.3

-||-2

95.8
86.4
81.5
82.6
69.2
67.2
53.6
71.1
95.7
119.0
106.5
97.7
133.1
90. 1

85.3
71.1
60.3
63.5
46.7
52.1
41.2
64.6
90.6
100.5 .
96.2
88.5
115.8
97.0

66.3
61.1
35.8
40.9
26.5
41.6
33.9
41.6
69.2
84.1
84.5
75.0
126.9
104.4

20

115.3

99.5

90.8

21

101.5

98.5

90.3

5

86.2

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

•

22

97.6

90.8

83.8

23

90.4

81.4

80.1

24
25

87.2
52.8

84.9
34.2

26

77.3

55.0

57.1

98.3

90.0

86.8

27
28
29
30
31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
City of Cleveland

.

106.3
109.1
95.4
87.9

93.4
102.5
85.6
77.9

95.4

90.9

89.9
40.8

80.2
98.3
76.5
65.3

81.0

104.3
116.8
113.4
114.5
136..6
114.5
115.7

92.8
112. 1
105.3
108.0
126.1
113.8
114.7

86.1
99.6
96.3
100.9
114.3
107.7
105.3

91.4

83.5

75.6

xvi

TABLE VIII

ABANDONMENT - 1972

In the summer of 1972, eleven statistical areas which contained vacant
and vandalized structures in 1969 were surveyed completely for abandonment,
Only those that were vacant and showed obvious signs of abandonment such as
the absence of doors and windows, doors and windows boarded, fire damage
or vandalism were recorded as abandoned.

Hence, these figures are a

conservative statement of the abandonment problem.

Statistical
Area

No. of
Structures

4
5

24
75
26
220
91
177
132

6
8

9
11
12
13
14

26
31

Forest Hills
Glenville
Norwood
West Hough
East Hough
East Central
West Central
Kinsman
Woodland Hills
Near West Side
Tremont
TOTAL

No. of
Units
60
19.2

89
7
48
22

93
728
285
340
281
130
9
49
43

911

2, 214

Percent
of all Units
0.75
1.19
1.15
9.43
3.30
2.91
2.75
3.09

0. 16
0.57
0.74

Source: Cleveland City Planning Commission,
Housing Abandonment in Cleveland.

XVI1

TABLE IX

SUBSTANDARD HOUSING - 1970

Units classified as substandard had one or more of the following defects:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Structure not sound or not weathertight.
'•'"^
Incompletely equipped or shared bathroom.
Incompletely equipped or shared kitchen.
Inadequate heat.
Structural hazards on stairs, porches, entrances or
other public spaces.
Only one means of exit.
Rats or mice in structure.
Electric outlets and lighting facilities not in working
order.

6.
7.
8.

The percentage of occupied units found to be substandard in 1969-70 is
presented below for all statistical areas.
Statistical
Area

Percent
Substandard

1

• .

• 2

.

3

4
.

5

•'
•

.

'
. •

.

'

25.

•"H^u&;.-

31

' •' " : — ' • "

2

5

.

:

• •••

•.

57
•

. '

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

-53

53
60
71
66
67
47
59
51
16
8
25
27
14
19
33
34
16
10
8
17
39
36
32
15
xviii

.

<

Table IX (cont'd.)

Percent
Substandard

Statistical
Area

32
54
31
24
4
4
9
0
7
9

30
31

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

32

City of Cleveland

Source: CDIP 2% Survey

xix

TABLE X

AVERAGE EXPECTED REVENUE FOR 34 CENSUS
TRACTS - - 1950, I960, 1970

The term ''average expected revenue" refers to the average income
returned by rental units in a given area.

A landlord's income from a property

depends not only on the rents he charges t but also vacancies.

It would also

i

be helpful to know the rate of rent delinquency in different areas of the city
since it, too, affects a landlord's income.

Unfortunately, this kind of informa-

tion is not available.
The average expected revenue in an area is calculated by multiplying
the average (mean) contract rent by the occupancy rate.

The occupancy rate

equals the number of occupied rental units divided by the-sum of units classified as vacant, for rent, plus renter-occupied units
Average expected revenue .=
,

•••.•-,••• >

.• -v \

(average contract rent

renter-occupied

X )

unit

- • • • ' . , •
..
• J
vacant for rent +. renter-occupied

v

For the thirty-four census tracts analyzed here, the average expected revenue
has been adjusted to 195 7-59 constant dollars to account for inflation.

xx

AVERAGE EXPECTED REVENUE
(in 1957-59 Constant Dollars)

Census
Tract

Statistical
Area

1163
1166
1167
1168
1121
1123
1124
1127
1128
1131
1132
1133
1134
1135
1136
1139
1141
1144
1145
1087
1129
1137
1142
1031
1032
1034
1035
1036
1041
1042

1043
1044
1045
1048

4
4
4
4
8
8
8
8
8
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
12
12
12
12

26
26
26
26
26
•

31
31
31
31
31
31

City of Cleveland

1970

1950

I960

48

64

55

56
56

51

71

47

66

50
41
43
45

67
60
60
71
53

46

67

54
55
58
43
41
43

60

66
60
65
63
65
59
56
47
56

46
39
40
29
30
43
41
35
37
39
43
42
40
37
32

53
60
59
54
58
52

56
43
40
41
45
48
52
54
44
47
47
49
44
45
41
44
43
42
41
41

% Change
1960-1970
- 14
- 21
- 15
- 16
- 28
- 33
- 42
- 15
- 28
- 13
- 18
- 27
- 28
- 25
- 25
- 26
- 20
- 13
- 22

- 19

56

-

30
31
24
3

50

- 4

62

56

23
37
27
38

53
57
52
48
43
57
43
55

57
52
48
47
44

- 10
- 3

41
58

- 2
- 5
- 5

45

64

57

- 11

29

xxi

56

- 9
- 8
- 2
+ 2

P R E L I M I N A R Y

EVALUATION OF THE SECTION 2 36
HOUSING PROGRAM

March 1973

City Planning Commission
City of Cleveland

The preparation of this document was financed in part
through a Comprehensive Planning Grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under the provisions of Section 701 of the Housing Aot of 1954, as
amended. Cleveland City Planning Commission, Room 501,
City Hall, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.

PREFACE
Promoting choices in housing — particularly for those lowincome families which have few, if any, choices — is a major goal
of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. For several decades,
the primary source of assistance in housing efforts has been the
various housing programs of the federal government. While the
characteristics and purposes of these programs have varied greatly,
several have been specifically directed toward the needs of lowincome families. It is with these that the Planning Commission
is concerned.
This paper is one of several studies undertaken by the Planning Commission in an effort to examine and evaluate, in fairly
specific terms, those programs aimed at assisting low-income
families. It is hoped that this study will be a useful contribution to those concerned with re-evaluating federal programs during
the current national housing moratorium (declared by the Nixon
Administration in January, 1973). Additionally, findings here
will be used for subsequent proposals regarding local housing
policies.
With respect to this evaluatory purpose, one point should be
stressed in regard to the conclusions reached in this report.
This study, critical as it may be of the Section 2 36 Program, does
not represent an attempt to provide support for any move to abolish
either the Section 236 Program or federal housing assistance programs in general. Instead, it represents an attempt to realistically appraise one such program in terms of its impact and efficiency.
With a clearer understanding of the costs and benefits of Section
2 36 (and other programs*), it should be less difficult to suggest
modifications to improve program performance.
Several individuals contributed to this effort. Sue Olsen of
the Commission staff accomplished nearly all of the analysis in
Section C. Professor James Harris of the University of Iowa contributed both information about, and an understanding of, the Section
236 Program. The Cleveland FHA Office was very cooperative in
providing local Section 2 36 data. Typing was the responsibility
of Sandra Wilson. Finally, Ernest Bonner, Chief of Comprehensive
Planning and Research, provided considerable assistance as well as
over-all guidance.
Douglas G. Wright
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning and Research

*See "Comparative Analysis of Housing Programs," Cleveland City
Planning Commission.

INTRODUCTION
Section 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended in 1968, states
as its goal, "To provide good quality rental and cooperative housing for
persons of low- and moderate-income by providing interest reduction payments in order to lower their housing costs". In consideration of this
goal, it is possible to evaluate the success of Section 236 by an examination of the amount of housing produced through the Program. However, an
evaluation of this nature would only be partial since the amount of housing
produced under Section 236 has been largely determined by the limitations
of congressional appropriations, and additionally, fails to ask several
questions of nearly equal importance. Therefore, Section 236 will be evaluated according to three questions: 1) How successful has the Program been
in terms of the number of dwelling units produced? 2) How efficient has
the Program been in terms of the unit costs of the housing which is produced?
3) How effective is the Program in terms of widening housing choices for
those who have few (i.e., the Planning Commission's conceptual framework)?
The remainder of this paper, in addition to providing an explanation
of how Section 236 works, will attempt to answer these three questions.

- 1

A.

236 MECHANICS

Section 236 provides several forms of public assistance in order to
lower the costs on rental and cooperative housing intended for low- and
moderate-income families. First, Section 236 provides for federal insurance of private long-term (40 year) mortgage loans. The extent of the
federal insurance varies according to the nature of the financing. On projects sponsored by non-profit or cooperative groups*, federal insurance
covering up to 100% of the project's total replacement costs is available.
In the case of a "Limited Dividend" sponsor, insurance is available to
cover up to 90% of the total costs.
A second form of public assistance provided by Section 236 is an
interest subsidy made by the government directly to the mortgagee. This
monthly "Interest Reduction Payment" represents the most important "declared"
subsidy in Section 236 since it provides a subsidy which can be as great
as the difference between the mortgage payment which would be required at
market interest rates and the payment required at a 1% interest rate.
The purpose of this interest reduction is to produce a consequential
lowering of rents. Thus, the "Base Rental Charge" required from tenants
is based on operating the project with a 1% interest rate mortgage. However, if 25% of tenant's income (given several deductions) is greater than
the "Basic Rental Charge", the tenant is required to pay the former sum.
In no case can the rent charged exceed the "Fair Market Rental" value,
which is the rent which would be charged if the unit were developed without the federal interest subsidies.
Tenant eligibility for Section 236 projects is determined by income.
Maximum income limits are fixed for varying family sizes to determine eligibility. These income limits are adjusted by HUD to reflect price changes,
and tenants' income just be recertified every two years. Unlike Public
Housing, a tenant whose income rises and exceeds the maximum level may remain in the project. If a family's income is so low that it is unable to
meet the "Basic Rental Charge", it is possible for the family to obtain
additional assistance through the Rent Supplement Program. Although this
assistance is not always available, and is limited to 20% of the households
in any 236 project, it does pay the difference between 25% of the household's
income and the "Basic Rental Charge." The federal government provides this
payment, which may be as much as 70% of the unit rent, directly to the mortgagee. In practical terms, it is only through this combination of Section
236 and the Rent Supplement Program that households at lower-income levels
are able to participate in the Program. (See Appendix F)
Section 236 guidelines also regulate several physical characteristics
of the projects. Eligible projects must consist of five or more dwelling
units, although the type of dwelling unit may be detached, semi-detached,
row house, or within a larger multi-unit structure. Both new construction
and rehabilitation of such units are eligible for 236 assistance.
* Public bodies are not eligible as sponsors.
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Of the financing approaches available under Section 236, that employing the limited dividend sponsor is the most complicated, but also the
most interesting. As noted previously, limited dividend sponsors are not
eligible for 100% mortgage insurance, but can receive insurance covering
up to 90% of total costs. However, a limited dividend sponsor, created
solely for the purpose of housing development, is eligible for a maximum
of 6% return on initial equity (10% of replacement value) invested in the
project. In this way, investors are rewarded with a reasonable rate of
return (cash flow) for their investment, but the return is limited to
assure that lower rents be maintained in the housing produced.
In actuality, however, this prescribed 6% limit on return has failed
to serve as a brake on rate-of-return levels in limited dividend sponsorships because it only limits the amount of cash earnings which may flow
to the investors. There are other and far more important advantages to
be obtained through limited dividend investment in Section 236. These
advantages will be examined in detail in Part C of this paper.

_ 3 _

B. PROGRAM IMPACT
The first and most obvious method by which the Section 236 Housing
Program can be evaluated is through an examination of the magnitude of
unit production. This approach is fairly limited in its usefulness, however, because of the close relationship between the level of congressional
appropriations and the amount of housing which can be constructed. Nevertheless, such an examination can provide information of interest regarding
such items as level of Program funding, total housing production, and impact
of the Program in Cleveland.
Through 1971 (three years of operation), 215,336 new dwelling units
had been produced under Section 236, totaling $3,477,928,000 in insured
mortgages. -^ Mortgage insurance totaling $265,543,000 provided for the
rehabilitation of an additional 16,872 units. 2 Of course, as noted previously, this does not mean that this number of units have been provided
to low-income families through the Program. With entrance limits generally
ranging from $4,000 to $9,000 (family of four), an administrative limit
of 20% on the use of rent supplements in any individual project, and estimates of only 5% of all 236 units using rent supplements , it is clear
that most of this production does not provide direct assistance to lowincome families.
As of the end of 1972, a total of 3,505 dwelling units developed under
Section 236 were either completed or under construction in Cuyahoga County,
according to FHA records. In addition, another 1,556 units had received
commitments from F.H.A. Of the 3,505 units completed or under construction,
2,042, or 58% were located in the City of Cleveland, and all but 90 units
(one project) of the 2,042 were located on the east side of the City. The
3,505 total units were located in sixteen different projects, all but five
being new construction. Seven of the projects were designated for elderly
residents, and ten were planning to incorporate the use of the Rent Supplements Program in the project.1*
It is estimated that more than 60,000 households in the City of Cleveland are eligible for public housing. Clearly, the Section 236 Program is
not providing housing assistance to these families (except indirectly via
some filtering). Thus, while Section 236 is a relatively new Program and
its production is restrained by low levels of appropriations, it can be
concluded that the impact of the Program, when viewed in terms of the
housing needs of low-income households, is negligible. Furthermore, even
if the Program's funding level were increased substantially, there is
little to suggest that the benefits accruing to low-income households
would increase markedly.
1
2

1971 HUD Statistical Yearbook, pp. 163-164
Ibid.
Taggart, Low Income Housing; A Critique of Federal Aid, p. 67
These ten projects comprise 1,985 dwelling units. Since no more than
20% of these can empLoy rent supplements, this means that a maximum
of approximately 400 units can be under rent supplements.
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C.

PROGRAM EFFICIENCY

In order to obtain a reasonable estimate of Section 236 unit
costs, it is necessary to examine in detail the financing mechanisms
which may be employed. As mentioned earlier, the limited dividend
sponsorship approach, although complicated, offers substantial returns
to investors beyond the 6% return allowed by the program. To understand the nature of these returns, and to determine whether they, in
addition to the interest reduction subsidies and insurance costs,
should be included in an approximation of unit costs, limited dividend
financing methods will be examined in detail.
While the 6% rate-of-return allowed by Section 2 36 is not an unreasonable investment incentive, of much greater significance to investors are the tax shelters offered in the 2 36 financing mechanisms.
Of crucial importance is the Tax Reform Act of 1969 which, while
removing some of the tax advantages from investment in non-residential
and residential projects (various other federal housing programs
included), retained the tax advantages in Section 2 36. These advantages are primarily found in the regulations regarding depreciation
rate, depreciation recapture, and amortization requirements.
The 1969 Tax Reform Act restricted the use of the 200 percent
declining balance depreciation method to new, residential property.
The depreciation method may be applied to the entire project cost
(less land) in the Section 2 36 program despite the fact there is
only a 10% equity requirement. The over-all effect of this change in
the tax law is to make new residential construction the most advantageous tax shelter investment (instead of, for example, commercial or
industrial development).
The 1969 Act also provided additional incentives with regard to
depreciation recapture. Prior to the 1969 Act, all excess depreciation (over straight-line) was recaptured at regular income tax rates
when the property was disposed of, unless the property was held for
ten years, in which case all recapture was avoided. The 1969 Act
significantly negated these advantages by effectively extending to
sixteen years, eight months, the length of time which a property must
be held in order to avoid recapture. The only type of property which
escaped this new regulatory constraint is Section 2 36 property, which
retains the previous recapture characteristics, i.e., recapture may
be avoided when the property is held for only ten years. This characteristic of Section 2 36 adds considerably to its investment attractiveness .
While these taxation aspects provide distinct investment incentives for Section 2 36 developments, several additional incentives
^Also called double declining balance, this method allows depreciation
to be assumed at twice the corresponding straight-line method, and
generally exceeds the realistic estimate of the value loss on buildings during early years of their life.
Rehabilitation under Section 2 36 may also be viable but with less
advantageous depreciation features.
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are found in the limited dividend approach. These advantages can best
be examined through analysis of a hypothetical Section 2 36 project.
It is important to point out that these tax shelters benefit only
investors with very high incomes, i.e., those in the fifty percent
tax bracket and above. The advantage, therefore, lies not in the
potential cash flow from the 2 36 project itself, but from the tax
shelter it provides for income earned elsewhere.
To illustrate how these tax shelters are employed, a hypothetical 100-unit Section 236 project will be analyzed.' This project
is being developed by a limited dividend corporation which can obtain a 90% mortgage. Assuming the project has a total replacement
value (cost) of $1,500,000, the corporation can obtain a mortgage
for $1,350,000. This leaves an equity requirement of $150,000.
Mortgage (90%)
Equity
(10%)
Replacement Value

$1,350,000
150,000
$1,500,000

The developer can, of course, put up the full equity requirement of $150,000 in cash, but there are methods by which this can
be avoided. One such technique employs what is termed the "BuilderSponsor Profit and Risk Allowance" (BSPRA). This budget term refers
to an amount which is provided by Section 2 36 financing to the
Builder-Sponsor for risk taking. It is considered to be part of the
total replacement cost of the project, and is figured to be 10% of
the following cost items (using the example):
Total cost for improvements
Carrying charges & financing
Legal and Organizational expenses
Basis for computing BSPRA

$1,156,650
12 7,800
8,800
$1,293,250

Thus, the BSPRA is 10% of $1,293,250 in the example project, or
$129,325. When land cost for the project is added to these figures,
the total replacement value is reached:
Various costs
BSPRA
Land cost
Replacement value

$1,293,250
129,325
77,425
$1,500,000

If an identity of interest, or partnership, exists between the
builder and sponsor, the BSPRA can be contributed as part of the
equity, thus reducing the cash requirement accordingly.
Equity requirement
BSPRA contribution
Cash needed

$150,000
-129,325
$ 20,675

'See Appendix A for a description of the project.
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While this reduces considerably the mortgage equity requirement in terms of actual cash outlay, equity is not the only cash
requirement in the program. In addition to the equity required
(now reduced to $20,675), the Builder-Sponsor must also have a
working capital reserve equivalent to 2% of the mortgage ($1,350,000),
or $27,000. This money must be deposited in the lending institution and may earn interest if not withdrawn for necessary project
expenses. Cash is also needed to pay the lending institution its
discount rate, i.e., its charge for loaning funds at the FHA rate,
which is generally lower than the institution's interest rate. In
the project being examined, this discount cost is estimated at 5%
of the mortgage value, or $67,500. Thus,
Equity-cash needed
Working capital reserve
Discount cost
Total cash needed

$ 20,675
2 7,000
67,500
$115,175

It is possible, however, for the Builder-Sponsor to avoid incurring this cost (the required cash), itself, by selling limited
dividend interests in the project. These limited partners, or investors, are limited in liability to the extent of the cash which
they invest. In this transaction, the Builder-Sponsor acts as the
general partner and consequently assumes full project liability as
well as responsibility for the syndication process necessitated
by the selling of interests. The syndication process itself can
bring a profit as investors are sometimes willing to pay more than
par value of a share of the equity. 8 This is due, of course, to
the tax shelter advantages.
Depreciation is an important tax shelter found in Section 2 36,
Depreciation is based upon total replacement value exclusive of land
cost. Thus,
Replacement value
Less land cost
Base for depreciation

$1,500,000
77,425
$1,422,575

When the 200% declining balance method of depreciation, permitted for
use under Section 2 36, is applied to the 40-year life of the example
project, approximately $71,128 can be depreciated the first year.§
Another important tax shelter is found in deductions for interest paid on the mortgage.' As explained previously, Section 236
8

Generally contingent upon reliability, i.e., past performance of
the Builder-Sponsor.

^For a more detailed examination of project depreciation and interest
computation, see Appendix C.
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provides a direct subsidy to lower the effective mortgage interest
to 1% annually. However, while the investor has only to pay the 1%
annual rate, he is permitted to deduct both the amount which he
actually pays and the amount covered by the federal subsidy. In
the example, with an assumed 7% current FHA interest rate, the
annual interest is 7% of the mortgage, $1,350,000, or $94,500.
Noteworthy also is the amount of the annual federal interest subsidy,
which is the difference between the mortgage amount at 7% interest
and the amount at 1%, or $55,688 each year. -1Another item which serves as a tax shelter is the local property
tax. In the example project, the assessed valuation is estimated
to be $493,600. Applying the current local tax rate of 65.6 mills
produces an annual property tax liability of approximately $32,352.
With the amounts of these various tax shelters determined, it is
possible to determine the investor's over-all financial situation
in the project. The investor's after tax return can be estimated
through the following steps:
(1)

The annual effective gross income from the project,
assuming 9 5 % occupancy, is estimated to be $142,272.

(2)

The annual operating expenses are estimated to be $69,651.

(3)

Total expenses (annual) can be determined:
Taxes
Depreciation
Interest
Operating
Total expenses

(4)

Tax loss generated:
Total expense
Less income
Tax loss generated

(5)

$ 32,352
94,500
71,128
69,651
$267,631

$267,631
142,272
($125,359)

Thus, an investor in a 50% income tax bracket would
save during the first year:
Tax loss
Tax rate
Tax savings

$125,359
.50
$ 62,679

For a more detailed examination of project depreciation and interest
computation, see Appendix C..
H-The example project assumes a 30-year loan, and a 40-year project
life.
12
Appendix C provides a year-by-year description of the annual tax
situation. (Table C - I ) .
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In a 70% tax bracket, the investor would save $87,751
of his income earned elsewhere during the first year.
(6)

In terms of return on investment, the investor in the
50% bracket shows these returns:
Return on cash invested:

$ 62,679 _
$115,175 " 54.42%

Return on total equity:

$ 62,679 _
$244,500 ~

Z5 3/

- °

The 70% bracket investor would realize:
Return on cash invested:

$ 87,751 _
$115,175 ~ 7b/o
Return on total equity:
$ 87,751 _ u QO/
$244,500 " Jb * b/ °
These returns would, of course, decline somewhat in subsequent
years as depreciation and interest shelters taper off.13
The above example provides only one scenario of how the
financing could be accomplished to the benefit of the investors. The
partnership can be prescribed in various ways to suit various purposes. For example, since cash income is limited to 6% of equity,
and the high-income investors are not particularly interested in this
flow, it is possible for the syndicators to sell "shares" of the
cash income to lower tax bracket investors or to non-profit neighborhood organizations. ^
^.t the same time, the tax shelters, such
as depreciation, can be sold to high-income investors such as
described.
In order to examine the unit costs of Section 2 36, it is possible to carry the example project one step further. To determine
the amount of subsidy necessary in the example, the various costs
can be disaggregated on a unit basic over the 40-year term of the
mortgage. The full value of the mortgage can first be used to
determine the actual land development and construction cost. Since
the project comprises 100 units and has a replacement cost of
$.1,500,000, land and construction costs per unit can be set at
$15,000. This cost, of course, is not subsidized, but must be
covered by rents from the project. Of the same nature is the cost
of the 1% interest on the mortgage. This amount, determined to be
e Appendix E for detailed explanation.
This is-6% of the "paper" equity ($150,000), or $9,000 per year
in the example project.
•"•^A detailed explanation of the income flow in the project is
presented in Appendix B.
14
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$2,5 59 per unit in the example project, is also covered by rents.
The prominent subsidies in the project are the federal interest
subsidy and the tax revenue lost through the tax shelters. For the
example project, these costs have been determined to be $25,729 per
unit.I" A related cost can also be entered at this point. It is
required that an annual FHA Mortgage Insurance Payment of ig% (on
the declining loan balance) be made. This payment may also be used
to shelter other income from taxation. In the project, this would save
an investor in a 50% bracket $658 and one in a 70% tax bracket,
$922 (over a 40-year period).
These costs represent the basic subsidy cost to the federal
government, and total $26,651 per unit (using the 70% bracket FHA
Mortgage Insurance Payment). When added to the actual cost of
development ($17, 559), the total cost is $44,210 per unit in the
example project.
Several additional public subsidies can also be used to help
support the project. HUD guidelines allow that 20% of the units in
a 2 36 project may employ the Rent Supplements Program, in which the
federal government pays the difference between 25% of the resident's
(low-income families only) income and the "Basic Rent Charge."
Assuming the intention of providing housing to low-income families,
this would mean an additional subsidy of, for example, $33 per month,
or $396 per year (in 20% of the units). Over the course of 40 years
this would add approximately $16,000 to the per unit cost.
Another subsidy often used with Section 2 36 is an Urban Renewal
land write-down. This subsidy, of course, could only be used in
conjunction with a 2 36 project located in an Urban Renewal Project
Area. Assuming a land write-down of two-thirds of market price, '
this would result in a total subsidy of $154,850 in the example.
This produces a subsidy of $1,548 per unit.
Having determined the various unit costs of the Section 236
program, it is possible to find the total average unit cost and
reach some conclusions- regarding program efficiency.
It was found in the example project of 100 dwelling units that
the actual development and construction costs totaled $15,000 per
unit. Additionally, 1% interest paid by the developer would amount
to $2,559 per unit. These costs were to be absorbed by rent payments
from the project.
Thus,

Development and Construction
Interest (@ 1%)
Actual cost of 1 unit

16

$15,000
2,559
$17,559

A detailed explanation of these costs appears in Appendix D.
17This is probably conservative. For example see Netzer, Economics
and Urban Problems, pp. 82
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A second category of costs are those subsidies provided by the
federal government (via the limited-dividend approach). These include the direct interest subsidy and tax losses generated by the
program's shelter advantages, and the tax shelter losses produced
by the FHA Mortgage Insurance Payment. Thus, assuming an investor
in a 70% tax bracket:
Interest subsidy and tax loss*
FHA Mortgage Insurance Payment
236 Subsidies
*0ver 40-year period

$25,729
922
$26,651

Beyond these two categories of costs which could occur approximately as shown in any limited dividend Section 236 project (with
70% tax bracket assumption), there are additional subsidies possible,
as explained. Thus,
Rent Supplements Paid*
Urban Renewal Land Write-Down
Possible Additional Subsidies
*0ver 40-year period

$16,000
1,548
$17,548

The total unit cost of a Section 2 36 dwelling can thus be
summarized as:
Actual cost of unit
Federal Subsidies
Sub-Total costs/unit
Possible Additional Subsidies
Total costs/unit

' $17,559
26,651
$44,210
17,548
$61,758

It can be concluded that a reasonable estimate of total costs of one
Section 236 unit is in the $40-45,000 range (minimum) _if_ the advantages of the limited-dividend approach were used. Moreover, experience shows that if low-income rather than moderate-income families
are to be served, the rent supplements program is necessitated,
which can add well in excess of $10,000 to the cost of providing
the unit. Finally, if.all subsidies are applied, the total unit
cost can exceed $60,000.
Since $60,000 per unit is almost four times the actual construction cost of the unit, it can be concluded that Section 2 36, when
implemented with the most advantageous financing, does not produce
housing very efficiently. Even the minimum cost of $40-45,000 per
unit is excessive relative to the actual construction cost. As
noted in Section A of this writing, Section 2 36 appropriations have
been depleted in each year of the program's funding. It would
appear that one of the primary reasons for this maximum use of the
program is the financing advantages which are provided to investors
and developers in the limited dividend approach. In summary, therefore, if subsidies at these levels are necessary to attract private

- 11 -

housing industry participation in a program which provides most of
its housing to moderate-income families, it is not clear that the
product is worth the price.^°
(It should be noted that in Section 2 36, as in other programs,
the timing of federal expenditures makes a difference in terms of
cost. The analysis method generally applied to this problem is to
establish present values using discount rates. This analysis is
not undertaken here, but is included in a subsequent paper,
"Comparative Analysis of Housing Programs.")

18

It is important to note that these conclusions, and the unit cost
analysis upon which they are based, apply primarily to the limited
dividend 9 0 % mortgage approach to Section 2 36 financing. While
high per unit subsidies would appear to be characteristic of Section 2 36 in general, the excessive flow of benefits to high-income
investors is essentially tied to the limited dividend approach, and
would simply not be possible in, for example, a non-profit 100%
mortgage rehabilitation project.
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D. CHOICES
As noted in the introduction, Section 236 must also be evaluated in
terms of its effectiveness in providing a greater range of housing choices
for those households who have fewest choices in housing. While the basic
choice in housing is between a sub-standard and standard dwelling unit,
other choices, including principally housing location, price, type and size,
should also be considered important for purposes of evaluation. As determined in previous analysis, those households having the fewest choices in
housing are those with low incomes.^9 To many low-income households, even
the basic choice of a standard dwelling unit is beyond their means. Therefore, Section 236 should be evaluated in terms of first, its effectiveness
in providing the basic choice of a standard unit to low-income families,
and second, the extent to which it provides additional choices in housing
such as those mentioned.
As described in Section A, rent levels produced in the 236 Program are
not at levels which low-income families can afford (assuming a reasonable
expenditure for rent, e.g., less than 25% of household income). Generally,
the only method by which low-income families are assisted is when Section
236 housing is used in conjunction with the Rent Supplements Program. However, the use of rent supplements is not required and when it is used, it
is limited in its application to 20% of the units in the 236 projects.20
Thus, Section 236 does not, except in a maximum of 20% of the units produced, provide the choice of a standard dwelling unit to those households
with fewest housing choices.
Other housing choices for low-income families are not expanded greatly
under Section 236. Choice in location is limited, naturally, to where project sites are located, and furthermore, (for low-income families) is limited
by whether or not rent supplements are used in each project. Choice in
unit price for low-income families is not available since the Rent Supplements
Program applies a rent formula and requires a 25% (of income) expenditure
from low-income families. Additionally, choices in type and size of unit
are not afforded much expansion for low-income families in Section 236 as
both choices are inherent in the particular project, and additionally, unit
size is controlled with regard to appropriate family size.
Section 236 does not provide a significant widening of housing choice
for those households with fewest housing choices. With regard to the basic
choice of a standard unit, the Program is ineffective in providing rent
levels which are congruent with the budget abilities of low-income households -- without the aid of another federal program, Rent Supplements.
Thus, by itself, Section 236 is unable to provide the choice of a standard
unit. Beyond this basic failure, Section 236 also fails to widen secondary
housing choices significantly.
19
See, for example, "Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families",
Cleveland City Planning Commission, 1972; or Muth, Richard, Cities
and Housing. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1968, Ch. 13.
20
HUD Guideline
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CONCLUSION
The Section 236 Housing Program was examined and evaluated through
three questions regarding impact (effectiveness), efficiency, and housing
choices. These questions were asked in the context of the Program's stated
goal of providing standard housing for "...persons of low- and moderateincome...". By these criteria, the Program was not found to be very
successful.
In terms of efficiency, it was determined that subsidies can total
nearly $30,000 per unit. Additional subsidies, generally needed if the
units are to be afforded by low-income households, can add over $17,000
per unit, producing a possible total subsidy cost of over $45,000 per
unit. When the basic cost of the unit is added to these subsidy costs,
the total cost of unit can exceed $60,000. This is clearly excessive
and is not diminished by the fact that nearly all of the subsidy provided
by the federal government flows to high-income investors rather than to
those low- and moderate-income households for whom the Program was intended. ^
The possibility that many 236 units cost three times, and some four times,
the actual construction cost would seem to justify serious consideration of
the Program's continuance in its present form.
It is difficult to meaningfully comment on the impact, or effectiveness,
of Section 236. While all funds made available for the Program have been
regularly depleted (except those witheld by the administration), the level
of production has been a function of that funding and thus has not been
great, particularly when viewed in terms of the magnitude of the problem.
Perhaps the most significant point to be made concerning the Program's impact is closely related to the third criterion of evaluation -- choices.
It was determined that while the Program provides the basic choice of
a standard dwelling unit, it falls short of any meaningful provision of
secondary choices in housing. Moreover, it was noted that essentially the
only way in which low-income families can obtain 236 housing is when the
program of rent supplements is also used. However, estimates previously
cited placed at 5% the number of units employing the Rent Supplements Program. Thus, two conclusions appear reasonable: 1) the Section 236 Program
does not offer even the choice of a standard unit to many low-income households, i.e., those with fewest choices in housing; 2) the Section 236 Program
primarily offers only the basic choice of a standard unit to middle-income
families at an often excessively high subsidy cost.

21
It is important to again point out that those figures and conclusions
(derived from Section C) apply essentially to the limited-dividend
financing approach to 236. While subsidy per unit would appear to be
high throughout the 236 Program, the subsequent flow of subsidy to
high-income investors would simply not be present in, for example, a
non-profit 100% mortgage approach.
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APPENDIX A:

THE EXAMPLE PROJECT

In the Section C discussion of program efficiency, the figures
cited were taken from a hypothetical Section 236 project. For explanatory purposes, the Federal Housing Administration application for
mortgage insurance, which details the financing of a project, is
presented here for the example project (following two pages).
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APPENDIX B:

DISPOSITION OF INCOME - EXAMPLE PROJECT

For the purpose of providing a more detailed explanation of
the income flow in the example project, the disposition of annual
income for the project is presented beLow.

$

27,213
69,651
32.352
$ 129,216
9,000
$ 138,216

Mortgage payment (principal & interest © 1%) *
Operating Expenses
Property Taxes
TOTAL EXPENSES
6% Cash Return to Investors
TOTAL CASH NEEDS

$ 142,272
138,216

Effective Gross Income
Less cash needs

$

To cover excess expenses; if not
used, returned to FHA

4,056

* First year interest

Of note is the fact that in terms of cash flow in the project,
annual interest expense totals $13,500 of the $27,213 mortgage payment.
Appendix C details the tax breakdown, in which interest -- assumed for
tax purposes to be 1% -- totals $94,065 for the first year of project
life.

- 18 -

APPENDIX C:

EXAMINATION OF TAX ADVANTAGES -- EXAMPLE PROJECT

Tables C-I, C-II, and C-III provide a more detailed description of
the annual tax computation, the annual depreciation write-off, and the
annual interest payments, respectively, for the example project described
in Section C.
In regard to Table C-I, the $9,000 annual cash flow to investors is
not considered since the (assumed) high-income project investors are more
concerned with the tax shelters. Hence, it is assumed that shares in
the income generated would be sold via syndication to individuals in
lower income brackets.
Also in regard to Table C-I, operating expenses for tax purposes
include property tax liability plus total operating expenses, less
replacement reserve. This represents a more detailed breakdown than
presented in Section C, thus producing slight differences between the
first year figures presented here and those in Section C.
Depreciation is based on the use of the double (200%) declining
balance method. In the fifteenth year, it is assumed that the investors
would switch from double declining to the straight line method since
this would result in a higher depreciation deduction. Investors are permitted to switch once from any other method to straight line, and to continue using straight line until the depreciable base is depleted. This
change in depreciation method is presented in Table C-II, which provides
an explanation of the annual interest deductions presented in Table C-I.
The original base for depreciation is the replacement value less land,
or $1,422,57 5. Applying the straight line method to this amount, or
2.5% per year for the forty-year life, the annual straight line depreciation -- $35,565 -- is established.
Table C-III provides a breakdown of the annual mortgage payments
at 7% interest (the payments are shown in Table C-I). A closer examination of the annual interest payment is provided in Appendix D.
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TABLE C-I - COMPUTATION OF TAX (LOSS) OR GAIN

*0E & taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Less gross income
Tax (Loss) or Gain

OE & taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Less gross income
Tax (Loss) or Gain

Year 1

Year 2

Year 3

Year 4

Year 5

Year 6

96,220
94,065
71,128
261,413
142,272
(119,141)

96,220
93,074
67,527
256,821
142,272
(114,549)

96,220
92,011
64,194
252,425
142^272
(110,153)

96,220
90,871
60,984
248,07 5
142,272
(105,803)

96,220
89,647
57,934
243,801
142^272
(101,529)

96,220
88,338
55,038
239,596
142,272
( 97,324)

96,220
86,933
52,286
235,439
142,272
( 93,167)

Year 8

Year 9

Year 10

Year 11

Year 12

Year 13

Year 14

96,220
83,810
47,188
227,218
142,272
( 84,946)

96,220
82,078
44,829
223,127
142,272
( 80,855)

96,220
80,220
42,587
219,027
142,272
( 76,755)

96,220
78,227
40,458
214,905
142,272
( 72,633)

96,220
76,095
38,435
210,750
142,272
( 68,478)

96,220
73,800
36,513
206,533
142,272
( 64,261)

Year 16

Year 17

Year 18

Year 19

Year 20

Year 21

96,220
68,710
35,565
200,495
142,272
( 58,223)

96,220
65,886
35,565
197,671
142,272
( 55,399)

96,220
62,857
35,565
194,642
142.272
( 52,370)

96,220
59,609
35,565
191,394
142,272
( 49,122)

96,220
56,128
35,565
187,913
142,272
( 45,6«U)

96,220
52,394
35,565
184,179
142,272
( 41,907)

96,220
85,426
49,672
231,272
142,272
( 89,046)

Year 15**
OE & taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Less gross income
Tax (Loss) or Gain

96,220
71,343
35,565
203,128
142,272
( 60,856)

* 0.E. - Operating Expenses
* * Switch to Straight-Line Depreciation

Year 7

TABLE C-I - COMPUTATION OF TAX (LOSS) OR GAIN CONT'D

OE & taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Less gross income
Tax (Loss) or Gain

OE & taxes
Interest
Depreciation
Total Deductions
Less gross income
Tax (Loss) or Gain

Year 22

Year 23

Year 24

Year 25

Year 26

Year 27

Year 28

96, 220
48, 390
35, 565
180, 175
142, 272
( 37,903)

96,220
44,960
35,565
176,745
142,272
( 34,473)

96, 220
39, 493
35, 565
171, 278
142, 272
( 29,006)

96,220
34,557
35,565
166,342
142,272
( 24,070)

96, 220
29, 263
35, 565
161, 048
142, 272
( 18,776)

96,220
23,587
35,565
155,272
142,272
( 13,100)

96,220
17,507
35,565
149,286
142J272
( 7,014)

Year 29

Year 30

Year 31

Year 32

Year 33

Year 34

Year 35*

96, 220
10, 976
35, 565
142, 761
142, 272
499)
(

96,220
3,978
35,565
135,763
142,272
( 6,489)

96, 220

96,220

96, 220

96,220

96,220

35, 565
131, 585
142, 272
( io,687)

35,565
131,585
142,272
( 10,687)

35, 565
131, 585
142. 272
( io,687)

18.022
114,242
142.272
( 28,030)

96,220
142,272
( 46,052)

* After the 35th year figures will
remain similar until the property
begins to decline
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TABLE C-II - ANNUAL DEPRECIATION
YEAR

DEPRECIATION TAKEN

BASE

1
2
3
4

$ 71,128
67,572
64,194
60,984
57,934
55,038
52,286
49,672
47,188
44,829
42,587
40,458
38,435
36,513

$ 1,351,447
1,283,875
1,219,681
1,158,697
1,100,763
1,045,725
993,439
943,767
896,579
851,750
809,163
768,705
730,270
693,757

35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
35,565
18,022

658,192
622,627
587,062
551,497
515,932
480,367
444,802
409,237
373,672
338,107
302,542
266,977
231,412
195,847
160,282
124,717
89,152
53,587
18,022

S
6

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
SWITCH TO STRAIGHT LINE

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

_
_
_
_

-
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TABLE C - I I I
BREAKDOWN OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AT 7% INTEREST
YEAR

PRINCIPAL

INTEREST*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

$ 13,713
705
15, 768
16,907
18, 129
19,440
20, 845
22, 353
23,967
25, 701
27,559
29, 515
31, 687
33,978
36,434
39,069
41, 893
44, 921
48, 168
51, 651
55,384
59,388
63, 682
68, 285
73, 221
78, 575
84,191
92,977
96, 803
103,801

$ 94,065
93, 074
92, Oil
90, 871
89, 649
88, 338
86,933
85, 426
83, 810
82, 078
80, 220
78, 227
76,09 5
73, 800
71, 343
68, 710
65, 886
62, 857
59, 609
56,128
52,394
48,390
44, 960
39,493
34, 557
29,263
23,587
17, 501
10, 976
3,978

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

* At 7% interest, as used for tax purposes.
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APPENDIX D:

ANNUAL UNIT SUBSIDY COMPUTATION

Table D-I presents the annual subsidy cost over time of an
individual unit in the example project. The subsidy cost presented
is comprised of the interest subsidy (direct subsidy) and the lost
tax revenue (indirect subsidy). The figures were determined by
dividing each of these costs, as computed over time, by one hundredthe number of dwelling units in the project. Tax loss is based on
the assumption that an investor in a 70% tax bracket provided the
equity capital in the project. The additional subsidies noted in
Section C (rent supplements, Mortgage Insurance Payment, et al)are not included in the figures in Table D-I.
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TABLE D-I
ANNUAL COST OF AN INDIVIDUAL 2 36 UNIT TO THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(INTEREST SUBSIDY PLUS TAX LOSS OR GAIN () ONLY)
(ASSUMES 70% TAX BRACKET INVESTOR AND 30-YEAR LOAN)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

COST TO GOVERNMENT
$

'

TOTAL COST/UNIT - NET
- 25 -

1,391
1,359
1,328
1,298
1,268
1,238
1,209
1,180
1,151
1,123
1,095
1,065
1,037
1,007
983
964 •
945
924
901
876
850
822
799
760
726
689
655
606
560
511
(75)
(75)
(75)
(196)
(322)
(322)
(322)
(322)
(322)
(322)

$25,729

APPENDIX E:

AFTER TAX RETURN

The After Tax Return Chart presented in Table E-I illustrates the
rather substantial rates of return available to the high income investor.
These high rates hold out until approximately the fifteenth to twentieth
years.
At the point the investor felt that his money could earn a higher
rate elsewhere, he would sell out. As noted in Section C, investors in
Section 236 projects receive preferential treatment in tax law provisions
concerning recapture of excess depreciation. Excess depreciation is all
depreciation taken over the amount allowable under the straight line
method. Investors in residential property must hold their property for at
least 16 years and 8 months to avoid recapture, while 236 investors need
only hold it for 10 years. Recapture is the taxing of a portion of the
capital gain realized at the sale at regular income tax rates rather than
at the lower capital gains tax rate. (Capital gain would consist of the
sale price less the remaining base for depreciation - i.e., the portion
of the cost of the building not yet depreciated.)
The 1969 Tax Reform Act also states that no capital gains will be
recognized if the project is sold to the tenants and the proceeds from
the sale reinvested in the 236 Program.
The price cannot be greater than the amount of the mortgage remaining
plus equity. The new project takes on the depreciable base of the old,
to avoid repeated re-use of capital for depreciation purposes.

- 27 -

TABLE E-I: AFTER TAX RETURNS

50% TAX BRACKET

YEAR

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

AFTER TAX
RETURN

$ 59,570
57,274
55,076
52,901
50,764
48,662
46,583
44,523
42,473
40,427
38,377
36,165
34,239
32,130
30,280
29,115
27,699
26,185
24,561
22,820
20,9 53
18,951
17,236
14,503
12,035
9,388
6,550
3,507
249

3,244
5,343
5,343
5,343
14,015
23,026

70% TAX BRACKET

AFTER TAX
RETURN ON
EQUITY (CASH
PLUS BSPRA)
24.3%
23.4
22.5

21.6
20.

19.9
19.0
18.2
17.4
16.5
15.7
14.8
14.0
13.1
12.4
11.9
11.3
10.7
10.0
9.3
8.6
7.8

7. 1
5.9
4.9
3.8
2.7
1.4
0.1
1.3
2.2
2.2
2.2
5.7
9.

- 28 -

AFTER TAX
RETURN

$ 83,398
80,843
77,107
74,621
71,070
68,127
65,217
62,322
59,462
56,598
53,728
50,843
47,935
44,982
42,599
40,756
38,779
36,659
34,385
31,949
29,334
26,532
24,132
20,304
16,849
13,143
9,170
4,909
3,493
1,947
3,207
5,343
5,343
8,409
13,816

AFTER TAX
RETURN ON
EQUITY (CASH
PLUS BSPRA)
34.1%
33.1
31.53
30.5
29.

27.9
26.7
25.48
24.3
23.1
22.

20.8
19.6
18.3
17.4
16.7
15.9
15.

14.0
13.0
12.

10.8
9.9
8.3
6.9
5.3
3.7
2.0
1.4
0.8
1.3
2.1
2.1
3.4
5.7

APPENDIX F:

SECTION 2 36 RENT LEVELS

In 1970, 56% of all Section 236 units rented for $100-$140 per
month, and 71% for $100-$160 per month. Only 13% of the units rented
for less that $100 per month (Source: 1970 HUD Statistical Yearbook),
In Cleveland, monthly contract rents in 1970 averaged $83.88, with
over 100,000 units (out of a total of 264,000) renting for less
than $100 per month (Source: 1970 Census). Of the 39 statistical
areas (groupings of Cleveland Census Tracts which are used for
analysis), only 12 had average contract rents which were greater than
$100 per month. These areas were also characterized by average
household income levels above the City's average.
It is clear that the rent levels in Section 236 units are
substantially higher than the rents which a majority of Cleveland
families presently pay. For example, in the hypothetical project
described in Appendix A, the rent for a two-bedroom unit is $120.
Assuming a (maximum) expenditure for rent of 25% of income, a family
of four would be required to have a minimum annual income of approximately $5,500 before they could afford the 236 unit. There are
approximately 5,300 four-person families in Cleveland which have an
annual income of less than $5,000 (1970 Census). A comparable
situation exists, of course, for other family sizes and corresponding unit rents. Thus, the Section 2 36 Program does not produce
units at rent levels which can be afforded by the vast majority of
low-income families.
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PREFACE

Promoting choices in housing — particularly for those
low-income families which have few, if any, choices — is a
major goal of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. For
several decades, the primary source of assistance in housing
efforts has been the various housing programs of the Federal
government. While the characteristics and purposes of these
programs have varied greatly, several have been specifically
directed toward the needs of low-income families. It is with
these that the Planning Commission is concerned.
This paper is one of several studies undertaken by the
Planning Commission in an effort to examine and evaluate, in
fairly specific terms, those programs aimed at assisting lowincome families. It is hoped that this study will be a useful
contribution to those concerned with re-evaluating Federal
programs during the current national housing moratorium
(declared by the Nixon Administration in January, 1973) . Additionally, findings here will be used for subsequent proposals
regarding local (City of Cleveland) housing policies.
With this purpose of re-evaluation in mind, an important
clarification should be made with regard to the findings of
this study and their possible implications. The study does
not represent an attempt to condemn the low-rent public housing
program. Nor does it represent an attempt to provide support
for any move to abolish the public housing program or Federal
housing programs in general. As pointed out clearly in the
paper, the Public Housing Program is the sole public program
providing substantial housing assistance to low-income families.
Therefore, this study is, instead, an attempt to realistically
appraise the Program in the hope that it and other Federal
housing programs can be examined with greater clarity. It is
felt that this is essential if program modifications or alternative program proposals are to be properly considered during the
moratorium.

This study was completed with the assistance of several
Planning Commission staff members, including Sue Olsen and
John Linner, who provided various parts of the analysis,
Ora D. Thomas, who completed the typing, and Ernest Bonner,
under whose direction the effort was undertaken.

Douglas G. Wright
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning & Research

INTRODUCTION

The United States Housing Act of 1937 is prefaced by a
statement of objectives which read, in part, " ...provide financial assistance...for the elimination of unsafe and unsanitary
housing conditions, for the eradication of slums, for the provision of decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for families of
low income..." The Act went on to establish the Low-Rent Public
Housing Program, which has endured to become the most significant
(in terms of funding) Federal housing program directed toward the
needs of low-income families. Given the statement of objectives
as set forth in the original Act, it is possible to evaluate
public housing in terms of the number of dwellings which the
Program has produced. It is also important to ask two additional
questions concerning public housing:
1)

How efficient has the Program been in terms of the
unit costs of the housing which is produced?

2)

How effective is the Program in terms of widening
the housing choices of those who have few (i.e.,
the Planning Commission's conceptual framework)?

A.

MECHANICS

The Low-Rent Public Housing Program provides assistance in
developing low-income housing through methods which are fairly
unique when contrasted with other Federal programs of housing
assistance. In addition to the method of subsidy, the administrative organization employed in public housing is quite different from forms used in other programs.
The 1937 legislation established the key organizational
principle that each municipality should determine whether or not
it wants public housing units built in it. Responsibility for
local administration of the Public Housing Program lies not with
individual municipalities or the local FHA office, but with a
local public housing authority, established via state enabling
legislation. In the Cleveland area, for example, the Cuyahoga
Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), is the agency responsible
for public housing administration. This agency has the authority
to develop, given the approval of the participating municipality,
public housing in every municipality in Cuyahoga County except
one (hence its special government form). The approval of the
local municipality is accomplished through a cooperation agreement
between the municipality and the public housing authority. The
cooperation agreement stipulates how many public housing units
will be developed by the authority in the community during a
stated period of time.
The funding of the Public Housing Program involves subsidies
of several kinds emanating from several sources. The primary assistance is provided through direct payments from the Federal
government (Housing Assistance Administration) to the local housing authority. These annual payments are made to cover amortization and interest on long-term bonds which are issued by the
local authority to cover construction or acquisition costs .-=/
The 1937 legislation stipulated that the local housing authority
was responsible for all subsequent operating costs—to be paid
for out of rents collected. Any excess monies were to be remitted
to the Federal government. In recent years, however, this practice has been altered as many local authorities began experiencing

1/ There are maximum unit development cost levels which are
established by the Federal legislation.

severe difficulties in covering operating costs with rents (due
to rapidly increasing costs). Accordingly, Congress in 1969 and
1970 authorized specific expenditures to defray the soaring
operating costs of local authorities. At the same time, Congress
restricted the amount of rent which tenants could be charged to
a maximum of 25% of their income.
The Program receives additional subsidy at the local level
through property tax reductions. Instead of paying the appropriate property tax on project sites, the local authority makes
a payment in lieu of taxes which is equal to 10% of the gross
rental amount of each project. This cost is borne, in part, by
the municipality in which the project is located and is an oftcited reason for not permitting the construction of public housing
units in a municipality.
The local housing authority can employ several methods of
providing units. The most predominant form of unit development
is termed 'conventional'. In this method, the local authority
has responsibility for all phases of the project development,
including site selection, design, construction, and, of course,
continued maintenance and operation. A second method, created
to expedite the development process is termed 'turnkey'. In this
approach, private firms propose and subsequently construct projects, with the local authority taking control of the project after
completion of construction. A third approach, acquisition, is
similar to turnkey, but differs in that the local authority
acquires structures built previously and not originally intended
for public housing use. Although the type of structure most
predominant in public housing programs is the large multi-family
structure (due to the economies involved), there has been an
increasing emphasis upon structural types more consistent with
the desires and needs of tenants. Of particular interest is the
increasing use of scattered site public housing, which uses
single-family dwelling units. Through this approach, local
authorities can offer programs of home ownership to the recipient
family.
Eligibility for public housing is based on family income.
Maximum income limits are established by the local authority and
graduated according to family size. A second order of maximum
income levels is also established for continued occupancy in
public housing. These limits are considerably higher than those
established for initial occupancy, thus allowing the family to
increase its income somewhat before becoming ineligible for continued occupancy. Two problems related to the income criteria
have become increasingly apparent. First, since local authorities
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are dependent upon rents to cover practically all operating costs,
consideration must be given to the income levels of those admitted.
A serious consequence of this is that many authorities must exclude many of the poorest families in order to achieve solvency.
A second and related problem is that one group of needy families
is often greatly neglected due to cost considerations. As in
other assistance programs, low-income families with many family
members are not adequately served. For example, of the 10,987
dwelling units available under the C.M.H.A. in 1971, only 88 were
five bedroom units and only 16 were six-bedroom units,=J
While the development procedures and administrative organization of the low-rent public housing program, as described above,
appear to be fairly straight-forward, in actuality the program is
usually beset with problems which make the production of units
painstakingly slow and sometimes halt the program completely.
These problems usually occur on two levels, and evolve around the
issue of project location.
The location issue is first encountered at the area-wide or
local authority level where total resistance to accepting public
housing units is generally the position of most suburban municipalities. Citing the municipal costs involved, or claiming the
lack of any need for public housing, these municipalities refuse
to sign cooperation agreements. The location issue is confronted
once more within the few municipalities (or in many cases, only
in the central city) which are willing, i.e., where it is politically feasible, to sign cooperation agreements. Within these
municipalities, strong resistance is usually put forth by various
neighborhoods, the citizens of which generally consider the
presence of public housing tenants (low-income families) a threat
to their property, themselves, and a blight upon their neighborhood. One ramification of these location issues is that public
housing projects are generally concentrated, first, in the central
city, and second, in the low-income neighborhoods of the central
city.
In summary, the Public Housing Program, though not complicated
in terms of operation, is often frustrated by political conflicts
at the local level regarding the location of units. In addition,

2/

"Annual Report 1971", Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority,
Cleveland, Ohio.
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increasing costs of operations have resulted in service problems
at the local level as well as new and additional subsidy needs.

B.

IMPACT

The Low-Rent Public Housing Program has had by far the greatest
impact of any program directed toward the housing problems of lowincome families. As of June, 1970, 992,739 public housing units
were under management throughout the country..3-/ While this number is far short of production goals established at several points
in the history of the Program, it is many more than have been
produced by any other program for low-income households. This
level of production is reflected in the "annual contributions"
subsidy to local authorities. At the end of fiscal year 1971,
total cumulative contributions totaled $3,845,784,000.^/ Furthermore, both the funding level and production level have been increasing. In the five years from 1966 to 1971, the annual total
of unit construction and rehabilitation starts increased from
31,999 (1966) to 72,230 (1971) ,-^/ even though the average per
unit development cost increased from approximately $15,500 in
1966 to nearly $21,000 in 1971.^/
In the Cleveland area, public housing is found in four
municipalities, although the vast majority of the units are
located in the City of Cleveland.^/ As of the end of 1971, CMHA
managed 10,987 dwelling units (over 10,000 in Cleveland) with a
total tenant population of 25,403.^/ At that same time, an additional 1,076 units were in the planning or construction stage,
all located in Cleveland.

3/
4/
5/
6/
2/

8/

1971 HUD Statistical Yearbook, p. 144
Ibid., p. 120
HUD Statistical Yearbook 1971, p. 145. In 1970, starts
totaled 104,410.
Ibid., p. 155
Units exist in East Cleveland. Cooperation agreements have
been signed with Cleveland Heights and the Village of Oakwood
(CMHA Annual Report - 1971)
CMHA Annual Report, 1971, p. 23. Given present cooperation
agreements, the CMHA can build to a total of approximately
14,000 units.
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Set against this thirty-year total of approximately 12,000
units is the total number of families eligible for public housing
(by income criteria)—approximately 60,000 in the City of Cleveland, alone. It is clear that public housing has not provided
an adequate supply of standard units for the low-income and
elderly residents of Cleveland as well as the remainder of the
County. While this ineffectiveness is to a great extent a
function of Federal funding levels, it is also partially a function of local problems in program implementation. As mentioned
previously, the location issue in public housing often involves
a very obstructive political fight. In Cleveland, this has been
the case many times, often delaying unit development for many
months. Indeed, the prospects for positive change in this area
appear bleak. A 1972 Federal District Court decision halted additional public housing development in Cleveland, contingent upon
a drastic alteration in the location of new units.2/
The Low-Rent Public Housing Program has provided substantially more housing, both nationally and locally, than any other
Federal program directed toward low-income families. However, it
has fallen short of meeting the need. Just as important, the
Program has produced many additional serious problems. (These
are examined in Part D of this paper.)

C.

EFFICIENCY

The efficiency of the Public Housing Program can be examined
in terms of unit costs, with particular attention given to unit
subsidies. In contrast to other low-income housing programs, the
costs and subsidies in the Public Housing Program can be fairly
clearly identified.
As outlined previously, the Federal government subsidizes
the bulk of public housing development costs through annual payments to the local authority which are used to cover principal
and interest on bond retirements, the bonds previously being used
to cover development costs. The amount of these payments is, of

9/

Banks VA Perk (N.D. Ohio 1972). The district court issued
an injunction to restrain CMHA from developing any public
housing in Cleveland, except west of the Cuyahoga River.
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course, a function of the costs of construction of the particular
local projects involved. Locally, the costs of individual projects vary considerably (in terms of per unit costs) due to variations in the costs of site acquisition, land improvement, construction, and others. These costs also vary greatly throughout the
country, due primarily to wide differences in land costs. In
order to obtain an approximation of unit costs, data from recent
public housing projects in Cleveland will be used.
Based on CMHA information, the average per unit development
cost of units in conventional and turnkey projectsi2/ was found
to be $20,073.ii/ (As evidence of the variation in development
costs by area, it is noted that the national per unit development
cost average for comparable unit types in 1969 was approximately
$17,OOO.i2/) This $20,073 per unit cost represents the total
development cost and is entirely covered by Federal subsidy.
An additional cost subsidy directly related to the above
figure is the interest on the bonds issued by the local authority
to cover the development costs. These are serial bonds which
carry annual maturities of from one to forty years. They have
been generally issued in $1,000 denominations (although $5,000
denominations have recently come into use) and are guaranteed by
the Federal government. In order to determine the cost of the
interest on these bonds for the project being examined, an
average interest rate (per year) of 3.25-=-2/is assumed. While the
interest rate might appear low, the bonds are exempt from all
Federal income tax,.=4/ involve very little risk, and are issued
in several forms which increase their marketability. Using the
$20,073 unit development cost as the basis for interest computation, the unit interest cost is determined to be approximately
$26,095. Thus, unit costs at this point:
Total Development Cost
Bond Interest
Sub-Total

10/
11/
12/
13/

14/

$20,073
26,095
$46,168

Scattered site units were deleted.
Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority Annual Report - 1969.
Taggart, Low-Income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid,
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p. 31.
CMHA bond issues during the last twenty years ranged in
interest from 2.25% to 3.875%. More recent issues have
always exceeded 3.25%, so this is assumed as a conservative
approximation. (Source: Moody 1 s)
Generally, they are also exempt from similar state and local
taxes.
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A third cost which is also a subsidy is the loss incurred bylocal taxing agencies due to the adjustment in local property
taxes. Instead of collecting property taxes on each project, the
local taxing agency agrees to accept a payment in lieu of taxes
which is equal to ten per cent of project rents. Locally, three
governmental units are subject to the lost tax revenues: the
municipality, the county, and the school system. Based on C.M.H.A.
figures,JL5/ an examination to determine the difference between the
payment in lieu of taxes and the potential tax revenue produces
an average subsidy through tax revenue lost of $90 per unit. It
is argued that the total payment made by C.M.H.A. is greater than
the previous revenue flow through taxes on the project sites.
However, a substantial number of C.M.H.A. projects were constructed
on vacant sites, and thus not representative of the full amount
of tax revenue which might have been generated had they been
developed by private users.—/ Thus, adding the tax subsidy on
a per unit basis for the life of the unit (40 years):
Total Development Cost Bond Interest
Local Tax Loss
Sub-Total

$20,073
26,095
3,600
$49,768

The fourth cost subsidy — contributions from the Federal
government to local authorities to cover excessive operating
costs in order to maintain rent levels at or below 25% of tenant
income — is not included here because of difficulty in estimation. While the Federal government began making such payments
available in 1969, they are made from the general appropriation
for debt service contributions. Thus, it is impossible to determine, even at the national level, the amount of subsidy for
these purposes.

15/
16/

See Appendix A for full explanation.
It has been estimated that payment in lieu of taxes never
exceeds one-third of the total taxes which the local government could have otherwise received, and averages approximately
17.5%. ' (Taggart, Low-Income Housing, John Hopkins Press,
Baltimore, 1970, p. 22).
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Similarly, the fifth cost subsidy, the exemption of local
authorities from payment of Federal (and usually state and local)
income taxes, is impossible to determine and is excluded in terms
of a per unit estimate.
A sixth cost which can be estimated is the cost required for
administration of the local housing authority. This cost is not
a subsidy, but is considered an operating expense, and thus is
paid from rental revenues. However, it is an additional cost of
the housing directly affecting rent levels due to the necessity
of an administrative agency. Based on C.M.H.A. figures, this
cost is $107 per unit per year.i^Z/ When this is expanded to cover
the forty-year unit life and added to the previous costs, total
per unit costs reach approximately $54,048, or:
Total Development Costs Bond interest
Local Tax Loss
Administrative Costs
Total Costs/Unit—•

$20,073
26,095
3,600
4,280
$54,048*

*Does not include subsidies due to income tax exemptions, Federal payments to cover local operating
expenses and special costs, e.g., programs for the
elderly.

Of the total costs/unit approximation of $54,048, government
subsidies account for $49,768 of the total. This is due, of course,
to the nature of the Program — providing housing for low-income
households, and to the method of that provision — direct funding
for construction of such housing. While it appears that a per
unit cost of more than $50,000 is excessive, a clear conclusion
cannot be drawn until a comparison is made between these public
housing costs and the costs of other programs serving the same
goal. The comparative analysis appears in a subsequent report.

17/

Computation provided in Appendix B.

18/

Comparative Analysis of Housing Programs, Cleveland City
Planning Commission, 1973. Included in this analysis is
an attempt to discount Program costs (to present values)
in order to more precisely compare the programs.
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D.

CHOICES

The last criterion of evaluation, increasing the housing
choices of those who have few, is, in the case of the Public
Housing Program, particularly important. Public housing is exceptional amongst Federal programs in that generally it focuses
directly and exclusively upon providing the basic housing choice
of a standard unit to low-income families. However, an examination of public housing in terms of the secondary housing
choices — location, price, size and type — reveals severe
deficiencies and reflects various of the major problems confronting public housing in Cleveland and elsewhere.
Public housing offers little, if any, choice in location.
Eligible households are generally given the choice of moving into
a specific project or not, with no choice provided in regard to
other locations. To some extent, this is a function of the
general shortage of public housing units relative to the demand.
In broader terms, however, it is a function of the general location trends of public housing. In the City of Cleveland, there are
more than 10,000 public housing units, and over 200 census tracts.
However, approximately 7,788 of the units and over 18,461 of the
more than 25,000 residents are concentrated in eighteen tracts.
Nearly all of these tracts are further concentrated on the East
Side of the City, many in areas characterized by serious social
and environmental problems. The serious social problems resulting from perpetuating such concentrations of low-income households have long been recognized.—<
Recognition of this dilemma in Cleveland has been noted by
two actions. First, C.M.H.A. has determined in recent years to
make greater use of scattered-site type public housing and has
repeatedly attempted to develop units in areas where none exist.
Generally, these efforts have encountered stiff resistance,
culminating recently in the second form of recognition — the
court decision cited previously obstructing the further concentration of public housing units. But the point is evident.
Choice in location in public housing is very limited not only in
terms of municipality, but also in terms of neighborhood within
a municipality.
Similarly, the choice of unit price (rent) is not available
to recipients of the Public Housing Program. Rent levels are
established for units and are kept in conformance with the income
19/

See, for example, Behind Ghetto Walls by Lee Rainwater.
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of the tenant household, in terms of the percentage of income
expended for rent. For example, in the C.M.H.A. in 1972, maximum income levels for entrance ranged from $3,600 for a oneperson household to $7,000 for a family of ten. The authority
then charges a rent based on a certain percentage of income.
In the C.M.H.A., this has averaged approximately 23% of income..2-^/
As the above discussion implies, there is also very little
choice available in terms of unit size. Households are matched
with available units on the basis of number of bedrooms and family
size. As noted previously, the rent regulations and the need to
cover operating costs with rental revenues often lead to the exclusion of large family sizes from public housing.
In terms of the choice of type of housing, there has been a
marked improvement in the number of different types of housing
offered by public housing authorities, including C.M.H.A. In the
past, much of the public housing developed in central cities has
been of the conventional, highrise type. In recent years, more
of the new housing developed has been of the low-rise apartment
type and single-family homes. The latter have also been acquired
for the home ownership program. However, in spite of these diversities in housing type, little real choice is given to applicants due to the shortage of available units.
Public housing clearly offers the choice of a standard unit
to those families in the Program. However, choices in housing
location, price, size and type are limited, if available at all.

20/

Federal legislation prohibit it from exceeding 25%.
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CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Public Housing Program has been to assist in the housing needs of low-income households. The Program
has not diverted from this objective and has, in over thirty
years of activity, produced a substantial quantity of housing
for low-income families. Still, the Program has fallen far short
of the need. This ineffectiveness is greatly due to the lack of s
sufficient funding at the Federal level. However, in many cases,
even if additional funds had been available, it is likely that
local political problems would have obstructed the development
of significant amounts of additional housing.
In terms of efficiency, per unit costs were found to be in
excess of $50,000. While it is difficult, without comparative
data, to judge this cost,-=-=/ certain other mechanics of the
Program's operation have recently created problems. Many
authorities have encountered difficulties in maintaining operating costs within the level of rental revenues. Federal legislation now provides additional subsidies to cover such excess
costs.
Beyond the choice of a standard unit, the Public Housing
Program does not provide for any significant expansion of housing choice. However, in providing the basic choice of a standard
unit, the Program does generally attempt to provide it exclusively
to low-income families.

21/ Comparative Analysis of Housing Programs, Cleveland City
Planning Commission, 1973.
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APPENDIX A.

COMPUTATION OF TAX LOSS

The determination of the local subsidy to public housing
provided through the adjustment in property taxes is a conservative approximation. A 1964 survey reported that the "payment in
lieu of taxes" probably never exceeds one-third of normal tax
payments.* Based on this finding and data from ten C.M.H.A.
estates, a per unit estimate of the tax loss (subsidy) is possible.
Number
Dwelling
Units

1970 Payment
in lieu
of Taxes

Tax
Loss

329
2,310
548
434
1,047
592
217
615
363
779

$ 11,603.66
108,044.01
28,819.98
24,411.47
44,804.26
34,063.40
14,299.63
19,985.54
20,393.43
30,254.41

$ 23,208
216,088
57,640
48,822
89,608
68,126
28,600
39,972
40,786
60,508

TOTALS
7,434
AVERAGE LOSS/UNIT-

$331,679.79

$673,358

Project
Valleyview Homes
Outhwaite
Woodhill Homes
Riverside Park
Cedar Apartments
Garden Valley
Crestview
Lakeview Terrace
Wade-Springbrook
Riverview

Per
Unit
Subsidy
$

70
93
105
112
85
115
131
64
72

$90.00

This $90.00 per unit subsidy can be further disaggregated
to show the average subsidy provided by the local taxing units.
Since most of the public housing units are in the City of Cleveland, its tax rate is used.

Taxing Unit
City of Cleveland
Cleveland Schools
Cuyahoga County
TOTALS-

Rate in Mills
15.1
40.6
9.9
65.6

Rate as %
Of Total Tax

Unit
Subsidy

23%
61.9
15.9

$20.70
55.71
13.59
$90.00

100%

*Taggart, Low-Income Housing, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore,
1970, p. 22.
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APPENDIX B.

COMPUTATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

In 1970, administrative costs accounted for 16.85% of
C.M.H.A.'s total operating expenses. (Operating expenses equal
total expenditures less capital expenditures.) In 1970, C.M.H.A.
had 10,525 units in management and initial occupancy. A total
of $1,444,176 was spent on administration. This averages approximately $137 per unit for administrative costs. Adding
units acquired, under construction, and planned during 1970 to
the total dwelling unit count produces an average administrative
cost per unit of $107. This latter figure was used in the per
unit subsidy approximations.

- 14 -
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PREFACE

This paper is one of several studies undertaken by the
Planning Commission in an effort to examine and evaluate housing
programs aimed at assisting low-income households. Its purpose
is to provide a base for subsequent Planning Commission studies
centered on a comparative examination of the costs and benefits
of such programs, their impact on Cleveland, and the possible
need for modifications in design.
Commission staff assisting in this study included Peggy
Murphy, John Linner, and Ernest Bonner, Chief of the Comprehensive Planning and Research Section. Typing was completed by
Ora D. Thomas.

Douglas Wright
Comprehensive Planning & Research

INTRODUCTION

The Rent Supplement Program was created by the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965. The purpose of the Program was to
foster production of housing for low-income families through longterm rental guarantees. The Program was intended to overcome the
shortcomings of previous programs by shifting the ownership of
low-income housing to the private sector and creating a mixed
income environment. The early enthusiasm for the Program on the
part of its supporters is reflected in President Johnson's message
on housing, in which he stated, "The most crucial new instrument
in our effort to improve the American City is the Rent Supplement. 1 —'
Has the Program attained this significance? In order to answer
this question, the Rent Supplement Program will be evaluated according to three questions:

1/

1)

How effective has the Program been in terms of the number
of dwelling units produced?

2)

How efficient has the Program been in terms of the unit
costs of the housing which is produced?

3)

How effective is the Program in terms of widening the
housing choices of those who have few (i.e., the Planning
Commission's conceptual framework)?

U.S. Congressional Code, Volume I, p . 2617

A.

MECHANICS

When originally proposed by the Johnson Administration, the
Rent Supplement Program was intended to assist a population whose
incomes made them ineligible for public housing, but who were
unable to afford more conventional housing. However, Congress
revised the final Program eligibility requirements so that they
were equal to local public housing income limits. Thus, rent
supplement and public housing basically serve the same population
group — low-income households .-2/
The Rent Supplement Program requires that recipient households pay 25 percent of their adjusted gross income for rent.
Gross income is adjusted by deducting $300 from total income for
each minor in the family, and excluding any income earned by minors,
The rent paid by the household must be at least 30 percent of the
full market rent in the project. Thus, the Program provides a
potential subsidy of up to 70 percent of the full market rent.
This subsidy is paid monthly by H.U.D. directly to the owner of
the unit. A contract stipulates that H.U.D. will make such payments for a given number units for the 40-year life of the mortgage.
If, over time, the income of the tenant increases, that part of the
rent which the tenant is required to pay also increases. Accordingly, the amount of the Rent Supplement falls. Under the Rent
Supplement Program, the eligible tenant does not have to move from
the unit as income increases and if income exceeds the eligibility
maximum, the tenant may remain in the unit and pay full economic
rent.
The Rent Supplement Program can be applied to both new and
rehabilitated multi-family (minimum - 5 units) housing. The
housing can be sponsored by a private non-profit, cooperative, or
limited dividend corporation. Housing may also be developed by a
local public agency and then turned over to any of the above sponsors. While the Program is applicable to several H.U.D. housing

2/

The differences in the populations served are minor. Supplement households are smaller (mean size - 3.04) than public
housing households (mean size - 3.13) but have higher incomes
(supplement median income - $3,160; public housing median
income - $2,512).
(10-1-70 through 3-31-71).
Source: 1971 H.U.D. Statistical Yearbook.
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programs and state-aided housing, the legislation is specific
when the Program is used in conjunction with certain federal
housing programs. Prior to 1968, the legislation stipulated that
the Rent Supplement Program could be used in 100 percent of the
units in projects financed under Section 221 (d)(3) or Section
202. With the passage of Section 236 in 1968, a 20 percent
maximum was instituted.^/ The purpose of this regulation was to
permit the use of a double subsidy in such projects in order that
low-income households could be reached while, at the same time,
promoting an economic mix in the project.

B.

IMPACT

While an examination of the number of units affected by the
Rent Supplement Program has limited significance in an evaluatory
sense, it does provide an interesting perspective of the Program.
Such an examination has limited usefulness due to the close relationship between congressional appropriations and number of
units in the Program.
At the end of fiscal 1971, 154,000 units were under contract
in the Rent Supplement Program.-4-/ Annual payments to these units
total approximately $280 million annually.-5/ Contract commitments
to units presently under the Program tie the Federal government to
future expenditures totaling $11.2 billion.—/ Of the 154,000 units
completed, 54,000 units had been developed with the use of another

2/ In some cases, with the approval of the Secretary of H.U.D.,
the Rent Supplement Program may be used in up to 40 percent of
the units in a project subsidized with another housing program.
4/ Joint Economic Committee, The Economics of Federal Subsidy
Programs (Part 5 - Housing Subsidies), p. 620.
5/ Lilby and Clark, "Urban Report/immense Costs, Scandals, Social
Ills Place Low-Income Housing Programs," National Journal,
Vol. 27, July 1, 1972.
6/ Ibid.
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housing subsidy program.—' The use of rent supplements in conjunction with other subsidy programs appears to be increasing. H.U.D.
guidelines for fiscal 1973 indicated that approximately 50 percent
of the rent supplement funds were to be used in Section 236 units
and in units developed under state-aided programs .-§/
At the end of 1972, a total of 1,810 units in 29 projects
were receiving rent supplement assistance in Cuyahoga County,
according to PHA records.-?-/ Of the 1,810 units under contract
authority, 1,448, or 80 percent were located in the City of
Cleveland. The total contract authority of all units in the
County was $2,311,626 per year.
Approximately 60,000 households in the City of Cleveland are
eligible for public housing. While rent supplements are directed
toward these households, the Program's impact is not very significant relative to the need.

C.

EFFICIENCY

In order to evaluate the efficiency of the Rent Supplement
Program, an attempt will be made to determine the unit costs of
the Program, with particular attention given to unit subsidies.
Beyond the supplement subsidy itself, additional unit subsidies
are somewhat difficult to determine due to the considerable use
of the Program in conjunction with various other Federal (and
state) housing subsidy programs.
The primary subsidy in the Program, the Supplement itself,
is provided to the approved project under a forty-year contract.
Since eligibility is governed by local public housing income
limits, and rent levels somewhat reflect local development costs,
there is some variation in the unit costs of the Program by
location. Estimates made here are based upon Rent Supplement
data from the Cleveland area.

!_/ Joint Economic Committee, op.cit.
8/ Ibid.
9/ A closer examination of unit characteristics is found in
"Comparative Analysis of Federal Housing Programs," Cleveland
City Planning Commission, 1973.
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The average annual per unit supplement in units under contract authority in Cuyahoga County was (as of January, 1973)
$1,277.—' While the Supplement amounts will vary slightly over
time, this average annual Supplement implies a total unit cost,
given a forty-year life, of approximately $51,086.—/
Approximately 75 percent of the Supplement units in Cuyahoga
County are 'piggy-back' units, or units in which the Supplement
Program was applied to projects employing below-market-interestrate housing programs. In these projects, the rent levels reflect
the impact of the additional subsidies, and lower the Rent Supplement subsidy accordingly. In another study, it was found that
unit subsidies in Section 236 Housing in Cleveland can easily
approach $30,000 (over 40-year life) .-3L?/ if these subsidies are
included, the unit subsidies of units under Rent Supplements in
a 236 project could exceed $80,000 per unit (40 years). However,
since many Supplement units are applied to market interest rate
projects, and since the subsidy costs in those Section 221(d)(3)
and 2 36 projects employing some Supplement units vary greatly
(due to various financing techniques), no unit subsidies from such
programs will be assigned to the estimate of Supplement unit costs.
It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of the Rent
Supplement Program without a comparative analysis with other programs.—' while a forty-year unit subsidy cost in excess of $50,000
appears to be high, it is important to note that those receiving
the Program's benefits are exclusively low-income households.

10/ Based on 1,810 units with a total contract authority sum of
$2,311,626 per year.
11/ It is also probable that rents will increase, thus negating to
some extent the diminishing affect (upon the supplement) of
increases in income.
12/"Evaluation of the Section 236 Housing Program," Cleveland City
Planning Commission, Cleveland, 1973.
13/ This is provided in "Comparative Analysis of Federal Housing
Programs," Cleveland City Planning Commission, 1973. Included
is an analysis of Rent Supplement in which the costs are discounted to present value, a fairly important examination not
included here.
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D.

CHOICES

The Rent Supplement Program is only partially successful in
terms of the last criterion of evaluation — increasing the housing choices of those who have few. Due to the income eligibility
requirements of the Program, it does focus exclusively upon lowincome families. Thus, the Program is successful in providing
the choice of a standard dwelling unit to households with few
choices in housing. However, the Program is not as successful in
providing the important secondary choices in housing — location,
price, size, and type of unit.
Choice of housing location under rent supplements is constrained because of the necessity of tying the supplements to
specific housing developments. As noted previously, a substantial
proportion of the units using rent supplements are units developed
under Federal programs such as 221(d)(3) and 236. Of the 29
projects employing rent supplements in Cuyahoga County (as of
January, 1973), only five (361 units) were located outside of the
City of Cleveland. Furthermore, the 1,448 units in Cleveland were
generally concentrated on the east side of the City, many in
blighted areas .-i^y This geographic dispersion is comparable to
that found in other cities where, as of 1969, 31 percent of supplement units were located in blighted areas, 36 percent in other
central city areas, and only 9 percent in the suburbs .-il/ Thus,
while the locations of supplement projects are not as geographically
concentrated as some Federal programs, notably public housing, the
Program certainly does not offer a significant widening of choice
in housing location.
Choice in the price of the housing unit is not offered to
households receiving Rent Supplements since they must pay 25 percent of their adjusted income. Similarly, choices in size and
type of dwelling unit are not significantly increased since the
supplements are tied to specific units.

14/ For a description of Program locations in the Cleveland Area,
see "Comparative Analysis of Federal Housing Programs,"
Cleveland City Planning Commission, 1973.
15/ Taggart, Low Income Housing; A Critique of Federal Aid, John
Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970, p. 59.
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In summary, the Rent Supplement Program is successful in
providing the choice of a standard unit to low-income households.
The Program is less successful in providing any increase in choice
of housing location, and generally fails to provide any choices
in price, size, or type of housing.

CONCLUSION
This brief examination of the Rent Supplement Program has
attempted to evaluate the Program in terms of effectiveness,
efficiency, and housing choices. It is clear that the Program
has not had a significant impact on the housing problem of lowincome families, but this is a function of relatively low levels
of funding. Given this constraint, it is apparent that the
Program has focused on that group — low-income families -- who
face the most difficult housing problems, and when employed, has
been effective in providing them with the choice of a standard
unit.
The Program has not been nearly as successful in providing
choices in location, price, size, and type of housing unit. Less
clear are conclusions regarding the efficiency of supplements.
While forty-year unit costs exceed $70,000, and in some cases
require subsidies in the range of $50,000 - $80,000 per unit, the
Program does provide the benefits of these subsidies exclusively
to low-income families. Further judgement regarding efficiency
awaits a comparative analysis of rent supplements with other
Federal housing programs.
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-PREFACE
The Cleveland City Planning Commission has stated as a primary
goal the promotion of choices in housing, with highest priority
given to promoting choices for those low-income families who have
few, if any, choices.
In attempting to examine the housing dilemma of low-income
families, studies were undertaken on the basis of two basic questions:
1) What is the nature of the housing problem in the City of Cleveland
(and elsewhere)? 2) What has been the nature and success of the
public response to this problem? Previous Commission studies have
dealt with a close examination of the housing problem in Cleveland
(see Bibliography). The public response in housing has previously
been considered in several studies analyzing existing and proposed
programs directed toward low-income families. This paper attempts
to reach some final conclusions regarding those programs through a
comparative analysis of the earlier findings.
With respect to this objective, an important point should be
made regarding the conclusions reached. It is not the purpose of this
study to provide support for any move to abolish the federal housing
programs examined. Certainly, in an area of concern such as lowincome housing, where the problem is overwhelmingLy apparent and public expenditures clearly insufficient, any disparagement of existing
programs which might negate continued or additional assistance does
not make sense. Rather, the purpose here is not to disparage, but
to carefully examine and compare existing (and proposed) programs in
order that improvements and modifications in those programs might
be made which will lead to a more effective and efficient use of
public expenditures. Thus, it is hoped that this study will be a
useful contribution to those concerned with a re-evaluation of
federal programs in. housing.
Several individuals on the Commission staff made important contributions to this study. John Linner assisted a great deal in much
of the analysis and served in an important review capacity. Peggy
Murphy and Janice Cogger assisted considerably in research and review
efforts. The study was completed under the direction of Ernest R.
Bonner, Chief of the Comprehensive Planning and Research Section, who
also provided considerable assistance. Typing was completed by
Ora Thomas and Helen Jordan. Additionally, appreciation is extended
to Norman Krumholz, Planning Director, for providing an environment
in which studies of this nature may be undertaken.
Douglas G. Wright
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning and Research

INTRODUCTION

Public Housing, Section 236, and Rent Supplement are three
federal programs directed toward the housing problem of low-income
families. While other programs with a similar objective have
received federal funding, these three programs are particularly
interesting because they are currently receiving congressional
appropriations and they are representative of three contrasting
approaches to the problem. In previous studies completed by the
Cleveland City Planning Commission, each of these three programs
was examined and evaluated individually.-^ These studies examined
each of the programs in terms of effectiveness (number of units
produced relative to need), efficiency (unit costs), and expansion
of housing choices for those families in the program. While it
was possible, in each of the studies, to reach preliminary conclusions regarding each program, firmer conclusions can be drawn
by comparative examination of the previous findings.
A proposed housing allowance program^/ will be the fourth
program examined and compared to the three existing. All four
programs will be compared according to the same criteria by which
they were previously examined individually. Additionally,they
will be examined in terms of their impact upon the housing market
in the City of Cleveland.

1/

For complete titles, see Bibliography.

2/

See"Housing for Low-and Moderate-Income Families"
Cleveland City Planning Commission, Cleveland,
January, 1972.

I.

COMPARISON OF EFFICIENCY

In order to evaluate the four programs in terms of efficiency,
they can be compared in several ways. Based upon the analyses in
previous studies,^/ it is possible to compare the programs through
a straight-forward examination of the unit costs. An analysis of
this type will provide a comparative examination of unit costs and
subsidies, as well as an indication of who benefits from the subsidies. However, as will be explained, a straight-forward comparison of the previously determined unit costs does not provide
for a true comparison of the programs. Thus, in addition to the
comparison of the previously determined unit costs, new unit cost
figures will be presented. These new unit costs reflect adjustments in the analysis undertaken in order to make the programs as
nearly comparable as possible.

Program Review
In presenting the unit cost figures for the four programs,
the assumptions and methodology employed in arriving at the cost
estimates will be briefly reviewed..4/ The section 236 program was
examined through the analysis of a hypothetical 100-unit project
developed with the limited dividend financing approach. This
approach offers important incentives to high-income investors in
accordance with specific guidelines of the 1969 Tax Reform Act.
The major features of the section 236 program are 90 percent (in
limited dividend) federal mortgage insurance and a direct federal
interest subsidy to the mortgagee lowering the mortgage interest
rate to as little as one percent. While these subsidies are important, the limited dividend approach adds substantial indirect
subsidies through taxes lost to the federal government. Depreciation, mortgage interest and local property tax are the primary

3/

4/

Cleveland City Planning Commission reports on Section 236,
Public Housing, Rent Supplement and Housing Allowance. See
Bibliography for full titles.
For a detailed explanation of the assumptions, methodology,
and computations used in these cost estimates, see the
appropriate Planning Commission Research Report (see footnote 3)
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items which are deductible from the federal income tax. It is
the amount and tax status of these items which attract high-income
investors to the limited dividend Section 236 program.
In the example project, the 100 units had a total replacement
value of $1,500,000, or a total development and construction cost
per unit of $15,000. Mortgage interest was determined to be $2,559.
The total interest subsidy and tax loss per unit (over the entire
40-year life) was set at $25,729. An additional tax loss generated
by the FHA Mortgage Insurance Payment was $922 per unit. Two possible additional subsidies were also determined: $16,000 per
unit (40 years) for Rent Supplement, and $1,548 per unit for an
Urban Renewal write-down. Thus, the total 40-year cost of a unit
in the example project cippeared as:

4

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Total development and construction
Mortgage interest (@ 1%)
Interest subsidy and tax loss
FHA MIP tax shelter
Rent Supplement
Urban Renewal write-down
Total Costs/Unit

$15,000
2,559
25,729
922
16,000
1,548
'

$61,758

or:
Basic cost of unit (a + b)
Federal subsidies (c + d)
Sub-Total Costs/Unit
Possible additional subsidies (e + f)
Total Costs/Unit

$17,559
26,651
$44,210
17,548
$61,758

Since the purpose here is to compare the unit costs of four
programs as used to meet the housing needs of low-income families,
the unit cost to be used for initial comparison is $60,210. This
figure includes all costs and subsidies with the exception of the
Urban Renewal write-down. It includes the Rent Supplement payment
(assumed to be approximately $33 per month for 40 years) which is
necessary to insure the availability of the unit to a low-income
family. Of this total unit cost ($60,210) in the example project,
$17,559, or 28 percent is the actual cost of the unit, while the
remaining $42,651 represents the various subsidies.
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Unit cost estimates for the low-rent public housing program
were determined on the basis of cost information obtained from
.the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA). The principal
cost in the public housing program is the development cost. Development cost is assumed by the federal government through annual
payments to the local authority. These payments cover the retirement of bonds previously issued to obtain development funds.
(Operating costs are met, for the most part, by revenues from
local project rents.) Average unit development costs in projects
of recent date in Cleveland were found to be $20,073. Interest
(40-year bonds carrying an average annual interest rate of 3.25
percent) on the bonds issued to finance these projects w a s approximated at $26,095 per unit. Since these bonds are tax exempt, an
estimate of lost federal income taxes was made assuming an investor
in a 35 percent income tax bracket. This amount was set at $9,133
for the forty-year life of a unit. Since public housing authorities
do not pay full property taxes (instead, an amount based on 10 percent of rents), this indirect subsidy provided by the local
municipality was also estimated -- at $3,600 per unit (over the
40-year life). Finally, an estimate was made of the local
administrative cost which, while not a subsidy, is an operating
expense reflected in unit rent levels. This was set at $4,200
per unit (over 40 years). Thus, the 40-year cost of a public
housing unit was approximated as:
Total development costs
Bond interest
Lost income tax
Local tax loss
Administrative costs
Total costs/unit

$20,073
26,095
9,133
3,600
4,280
$63,181

93 percent of these costs, or $58,901, represent various
subsidies. Several other minor subsidy costs were not included
due to difficulty in estimation.
Estimates of unit costs of the Rent Supplement Program were
based on data from program operations in Cuyahoga County (January,
1973) . While a substantial proportion of the units receiving the
supplements are located in projects developed under Below-MarketInterest-Rate (BMIR) programs (e.g., 221 (d) (3) and 236), the
additional subsidies used in these programs (and subsequently
reflected in rent levels) have been deleted from the unit cost
estimates. Since these various and varying subsidies have been
excluded, the only cost included is the supplement.
- 4 -

Supplements distributed to 1,810 units in Cuyahoga County
totaled $2,311,626 per year, or an average of $1,277 per unit.
Applying this to the 40-year unit life (contract agreement)
produced an average per unit supplement of $51,086, resulting in
a total unit cost of the same.
As mentioned, possible supply subsidies in BMIR programs were
excluded.
(In the case of Section 236, inclusion could have added
approximately $30,000 to the total unit cost).
The last program which will be compared is not an existing
program, but rather a program proposal. Numerous designs for a
program of housing allowances have been proposed. The proposal
examined has been chosen primarily because of the comparatively
substantial amount of cost information available regarding its
implementation in Cleveland.-5/
As proposed, the housing allowance proposal provides a
direct housing subsidy to all households which qualify by income.
The allowance amount is graduated according to income and family
size, and is based upon Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) estimates
of housing budget costs in the Cleveland area. The allowance
amount is determined to be the difference between a certain percentage of household's income and an amount established as
necessary to obtain a standard dwelling unit of appropriate size.
Both the percentage of income expended for rent, and the amount
necessary to acquire a standard unit are obtained from the BLS
"moderate standard of living" budget.
In the City of Cleveland, previous analysis estimated the
average annual allowance to be $696 per family (or per unit).. For
purposes of comparability, these allowance costs will be examined
over a period of forty years. For this period, the allowance cost
per unit is approximately $27,840 (1970 dollars). The only other
program cost is that of local program administration. This has
been estimated to be approximately $200 per unit per year, or
$8,000 per unit for the assumed 40-year life.-/ Thus, the cost over
40 years of providing one unit under the housing allowance proposal
is:
5/ This proposal, originally discussed in "Housing for Low- and
Moderate-Income Families," has been further examined and revised
in " A Housing Allowance Program for Cleveland: Issues and
Implications."
(See Bibliography for full titles).
6/ This cost estimate is based, in part, upon the housing allowance
experiment conducted in Kansas City. See, Joe L. Mattox, "Rent
Allowances," Journal of Housing, No. 9, 1971.
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Average Allowance
Administration
Total Costs/Unit

$2 7,840
8,000
$35,840

An Initial Comparison

Having briefly reviewed the previous analyses and findings
regarding the unit costs of each of the four programs, it is possible to make an initial comparison. This is provided in Table I,

Table I.

Costs Per Unit - Four Programs - 40 Years
Program

All Subsidy Costs/Unit
All Other Costs/Unit
Total Costs/Unit

236

Public
Housing

Rent
Supplement

Housing
Allowance

$42,651

$58,901

$51,086

$27,840

17,559

4,280

$60,210

$63,181

8,000
$51,086

$35,840

The comparison provided in Table I presents cost figures derived
from four separate analyses. In these analyses an attempt was
made to make the programs comparable in terms of their objectives.
However, the comparison has several significant problems which
could make further comparison invalid.
First, the unit costs for each program are based upon estimates
derived from various average figures (from Cleveland and U.S.).
One result of this is that the cost shown for each program is defined
as a cost of providing the unit to a relatively undefined "low-income
family." Since certain of the costs vary according to recipient
family income and size, these two characteristics should be held
constant in order to obtain a more comparable examination of program
elements.
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A second problem is closely related to the first and regards
"hidden" subsidies to recipient families in the form of differences
in
required expenditures on housing. Each of the four programs
t
has an expenditure requirement (the allowance program has no requirement but uses percent of income as a base for the allowance)
set at a certain percentage of the household's income. To the
extent that these requirements vary, some programs provide additional
subsidies. In short, a comparison should not only account for the
direct and indirect unit subsidies provided by the public sector,
but also for differences in expenditures required of the recipient
household.
The third problem with the initial comparison of Table I is
related to differences in the program expenditures over time. There
is a difference between expending a specific amount of funds at
one point in time and expending the same amount over a period of
years. Presumably, money has a time value and money invested now
is worth more than an equal amount invested at some future date
since that invested now will appreciate in value. To adjust the
comparison of subsidy costs accordingly, expenditures will be
subjected to discounted cash flow analysis, in which costs incurred
during future years are converted to an amount which, if invested
during the initial, or base year, would at a selected rate of
interest return the amount to be expended in future years.
A fourth problem regarding Table I concerns the non-subsidy,
or "Other Costs." Since the purpose of the analysis is to compare
the per unit subsidies of the programs, these costs are essentially
unimportant in terms of the analysis. While subsidy costs are, of
course, a function of unit size, type, et. al., the question of
supplying equal levels of housing service is being dealt with
through the adjustment for family size and income. Furthermore,
the statement of these costs actually has no useful purpose in the
comparative analysis. Thus, non-subsidy costs, and any comparison
thereof, will be excluded from further examination.

Adjusted Comparison

The first adjustment necessary to obtain a more consistent
program comparison is to determine the subsidy costs of each progrom when family income and family size are held constant. Since
the programs are examined in their attempts to provide a standard
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unit to a low-income household, a household in this income category
will be used — a family of four persons with an annual gross income of $4,000.
The per unit subsidy cost of providing a standard unit to the
assumed household with the Section 2 36 Program can be determined
as follows. In the example 236 project, the median unit size was
a two-bedroom unit and the average unit size was a unit with 2.32
bedrooms. Thus, the average development and construction subsidy
costs determined for the entire project can be retained.-Z/ However,
the other major subsidy employed in the Section 236 analysis requires
adjustment. The use of rent supplements, necessitated if the program (236) were to serve low-income families, was previously assumed
to be $33 per month, or $16,000 for 40-year project life. For a
4-person household with a gross income of $4,000, the rent supplement program requires an annual supplement of $590 per year
($49 per month).—' This adjustment increases the supplement subsidy
in the unit from $16,000 to $23,600 (40-year life), and total
subsidy costs appear as;
Interest Subsidy and Tax Loss
FHA MIP Shelter
Rent Supplement
Total Subsidy/Unit

$25,729
• 922
23,600
$50,251

In the public housing analysis, subsidy costs were estimated
on the basis of data from the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority,
In terms of subsidies necessary to supply a unit of public housing,
no adjustments are required since the average unit size (upon which
the average unit cost-estimates are based) for CMHA estimates was
1.75 bedrooms and there are no supply subsidies directly tied to
the income of the family. Thus, the total subsidy costs remain,
as shown previously, at $58,901 per unit.

1/ It is important to note that these costs are probably quite
low. It would be difficult to develop section 236 multi-family
housing in Cleveland with an average unit cost of $15,000.
8/ This computation: $4,000 less 600 (2 x $300, the deduction for
each minor) times 25% = $850 (family expenditure required).
Rent for a 2-bedroom unit in the example project at $120/month =
$1,440 per year. Thus, $1,440 - $850 = $590, or the required
supplement.

- 8 -

Adjustment of the unit subsidy in the rent supplement program
is more difficult. The supplement subsidy previously determined -$51,086 (40 years) — was based on the average supplement payment
in Cuyahoga County. This amount, however, was derived from household
incomes averaging considerably less than the $4,000 assumed here.
Thus, to use this figure, would over-estimate the supplement cost.
However, since approximately 33 percent of the projects in Cuyahoga
County with rent supplement contracts were BMIR projects, there are
clearly additional supply-side subsidies (of the nature described
in "Evaluation of the Section 236 Housing Program"), which were
completely excluded in the rent supplement analysis. These
subsidies would effectively lower rent levels and directly influence the resulting supplement required. Thus, several
assumptions are necessitated.
First, a supply-side subsidy is assumed and added to the total
rent supplement subsidy costs. This is set at one-third of the
unit subsidy determined in the section 236 analysis, or $8,881.—'
•Second, the rent supplement cost in the section 236 cost estimate
(adjusted) was set for a family of four at $23,600 over 40 years
(see footnote 8/). However, this estimate was based on the
supplement required to meet the section 236 rent, schedule which
has the benefit of full section 236 supply subsidies, and required
a supplement of only $590 per year (compared to the County average
of $1,271 per year). It is assumed that this subsidy cost is also
increased one-third since the average supply subsidy (as assumed
above) would not affect such significant decreases in the rent
schedule of the contracted project.-iP-/ Thus, the adjusted subsidy
costs of the rent supplement program for a family of four with a
$4,000 income appear as:
Supplement
Supply-subsidy
Total subsidy/unit

$31,467
8,881
$40,348

9/ Computation: Section 236 subsidies over 40 years (excluding
rent supplements) were $26,651. Thus, $26,651 7 3 = $8,881.
10/ Thus, one-third of $23,600 = $7,866, and $23,600 plus $7,866 =
$31,467.
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The housing allowance proposal also requires a significant
but simple adjustment. The cost shown previously was for the
"average" recipient household and must be adjusted to the 4-person,
$4,000 household. Using the Bureau of Labor Statistics as explained in the housing allowance study,i=/ the annual allowance
appropriately adjusted is $1,030. Over the assumed forty-year
life, this becomes $41,200. Administrative costs remain the
same - $8,000 over the forty years. Thus, the adjusted housing
allowance subsidy cost is:
Housing allowance
Administration costs
Total costs/unit

$41,200
8,000
$49,299

Unlike the rent supplement program, which is similar in its
mechanics, the housing allowance unit cost estimate includes no
supply-side cost. This is due to the derivation of the allowance
# from BLS budgets which are set at a market rent level and which
should, therefore, be sufficient to induce rehabilitation and new
construction without substantial supply-side subsidy ,-±-?/
At this point it is possible to compare the adjusted unit
subsidy costs for the four programs. Table II provides this
information, showing total 40-year subsidies per unit for a family
of four with an annual gross income of $4,000. Table II also
shows the unit subsidies disaggregated to an annual cost.

11/ Cleveland City Planning Commission, "Housing for Low-and
Moderate-Income Families," 1972, p. 18.
12/ For further exploration of this question, see "Poverty and
Substandard Housing," Cleveland City Planning Commission,
1973.
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Table II.

Subsidy Costs Per Unit - Four Programs
(Costs for a 4-person household
with income of $4,000)
Proqram

Period

Section
236

Public
Housing

Rent
Supplements

Housing
Allowance

40-Years

$50,251

$58,901

$40,348

$49,200

1,468

1,009

1,230

1-Year

1, 256

However, as noted earlier, a second adjustment is necessary
due to the "hidden" subsidies contained in the programs' household
expenditure requirements. These adjustments are fairly straightforward since two of the programs, section 236 (using rent supplement) and rent supplement require expenditures of'25 percent of
household income (adjusted by $300 for each minor). Public housing
(using requirements in Cleveland), requires an expenditure of 23.1
percent of income less 10 percent for each minor. The housing
allowance program, while requiring no specific percentage expenditure, uses a base of approximately 16 percent of household income
(unadjusted), which will be assumed for the comparison. Table III
shows the additional annual and forty-year costs borne by the
hypothetical recipient household in public housing, rent supplements,
and section 236 (with rent supplements) when the allowance expenditure is used as the comparative base.
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Table III.

Added Rental Costs Due to program
Expenditure Requirement
(Family of 4, $4,000 income, Allowance as Base)

Program

Approximate Annual Household Expenditure Required
Additional Annual cost to
Household (Allowance-Base)
Additional 40-Year Cost
To Household

Section
236

Public
Housing

$

$

850

736

Rent
Supplement

$

850

210

96

210

8,400

3,840

8,400

Housing
Allowance

$ 640

These additional 'hidden' costs to households in the various
programs can be used to further adjust the subsidy costs in Table II
in order to made the programs more comparable. This is done in
Table IV.
Table IV.

(Subsidy) Costs Per Unit - Including Additional
Costs to Household (4-person family with
income of $4,000)
Program
Section
236

Public
Housing

Rent
Supplement

Housing
Allowance

40-Year Period
Subsidy Costs
Household Cost
Adjusted Costs

$50,251
8,400
$58,651

$58,901
3,840
$62,741

$40,348
8,400
$48,748

$49,200
0
$49,200

1-Year Period
Subsidy Costs
Household Cost
Adjusted Costs

$ 1,256
210
$ 1,466

$ 1,468
96
$ 1,564

$ 1,009
210
$ 1,219

$ 1,230
0
$ 1,230

- 12 -

Having adjusted the program costs for a constant family size
and income level, as well as for the variation in housing expenditure requirement, the programs can be discounted to present value.
The rate of discount that is used in the analysis is 6 percent, and
the discounted period is the forty-year life assumed for each of
the programs. The discounted subsidy costs of each program are
presented in Table V. This final adjustment alters the relative
efficiencies of the programs due to the varying expenditure patterns
of the programs over the 40-year period. Essentially, the discounting procedure lessens the subsidy cost differences between the
programs, and the housing allowance program becomes the least
expensive of the four programs.

Table V.

Program Subsidy Costs Per Unit:
(Family of 4, $4,000 income, adjusted for
Expenditure and Discounted at 6 percent)
Program

40-Year Period
Subsidy Costs
Household Costs
Total Costs

Section
236

Public
Housing

Rent
Supplement

Housing
Allowance

$23,650
3,160
$26,810

$22,088
1,447
$23,535

$17,240
3,160
$20,400

$18,503
$18,503

This comparison was made using the 16 percent expenditure
"requirement" in the allowance program as the base. The 16 percent
"requirement" is considerably lower than the expenditure requirements
of existing programs and is probably set at an unrealistically low
level. In order to assess the change in unit subsidy when the household expenditure base is higher, the same analysis was conducted for
the allowance proposal with the base set at 20 percent. In order to
maintain comparability with the previous comparison, the "hidden"
subsidy of household cost according to the expenditure base was
measured using 16 percent again as the base. With a 20 percent
expenditure basis, the allowance subsidy per year (family of four,
$4,000 income) is $870 (plus the $200 administration cost) and the
household cost is $160 per year. Discounting each at 6 percent,
these costs show the following for the forty-year period:
Subsidy Costs
Household Costs
Total Costs
- 13 -

$16,096
2,407
$18,503

Measured against the program costs provided in Table V, two
conclusions are clear (see Table V I ) . First, the housing allowance
program, as adjusted, is the least expensive (most efficient) of
fche programs in terms of total costs per unit. Thus, when the
direct and indirect subsidy costs of government are examined in
conjunction with the varying expenditure requirements (hidden
subsidies), the allowance program is the least costly (almost
$2,000 per unit difference from rent supplement and more than
$8,000 per unit difference from Section 236).

Table VI.

Program Subsidy Costs Per Unit - Revised*
(Family of four, $4,000 income, adjusted
for Expenditure and Discounted at 6 percent)
Program
Section
236

Public
Housing

Rent
Supplement

Housing
Allowance*

40-Year Period
$23,650
Subsidy Costs
Household Costs** 3,160
$26,810
Total Costs

$22,088
1,447
$23,535

$17/240
3,160
$20,400

$16,096
„ 2,407
$18,503

•Housing Allowance revised-uses 20 percent expenditure base.
**Continues to use 16 percent as basis for comparison.

Second, the actual subsidy ("Subsidy Costs" in Table VI) cost
to the public sector is considerably less per unit in the allowance
proposal ($16,096) than in any of the other programs. While the
differences appear slight on a unit basis, they assume greater
significance when tied to a unit production goal (see Section I I ) .
Two additional points should be made before summation. First,
the flow of the subsidy, i.e., who receives the subsidy, is not the
same in all the programs. In the allowance program, all of the
subsidy, except the administrative cost, flows directly to the
recipient household which, in turn, is required to spend it entirely
on housing. However, in section 236, and to a limited extent in
rent supplement and public housing, the subsidy -- in the form of
tax loss — flows not to low-income households but to higher-income
level investors.
- 14 -

Second, all of the programs except the allowance (under the
assumptions used here) employ the subsidy to directly develop a
new standard unit of housing for the recipient household. In contrast, the allowance proposal allows the household to purchase
housing in the market which may be either existing, rehabilitated,
or new. In short, it is clear that the allowance program does not
directly produce a supply of new housing. It is not clear, however,
to what extent such a program would in fact stimulate new construction or affect rehabilitation to standard condition. A further
consideration of this point is the focus of Section V. of this
writing and has been the subject of additional study elsewhere.—'
On the basis of previous analysis, the four programs were
examined in terms of efficiency, or unit costs. Adjustments were
made in the analysis for: 1) A constant family size and income
level; 2) The variation in household expenditure requirement; and
3) the variation in the timing of subsidy payments. The section
236 program, with unit costs set at $26,810 per unit (40 years),
was determined to be the most costly. While the differences in the
unit costs of the remaining three programs were not found to be
great, the allowance program was determined, at $18,503 per unit,
to be the most efficient.

An Alternative Method of Examination

As the numerous assumptions and computations in the preceding
analysis indicate, an accurate accounting of the full costs of
federal housing programs is a difficult task. Each one incorporates
its own set of subsidies, some of which are not clearly visible.
Although investors in section 236 housing developments are limited
to a six percent return on equity under program guidelines, they are
allowed to take accelerated depreciation. This effectively raises
their rate of return but does not appear as a direct subsidy.
Similarly, interest charges seem to be relatively small in the
low-rent public housing program because public housing projects are
financed through the sale of low-interest, tax-free bonds. Yet,
the return on a three percent tax-free bond to a purchaser in the
seventy percent income tax bracket equals that on a ten percent
bond on which income is taxable. These types of subsidy techniques
tend to obscure true program costs.
13/ See "A Housing Allowance Program for Cleveland: Issues and
Implications," Cleveland City Planning Commission, 1973.
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An alternative and more direct method of evaluating program
efficiency is represented by the figures in Table VII. This method,
employed by Ira Lowry to compare housing program costs in New York
City* does not attempt to consider all the specific factors that
influence the cost of financing and profit to investors, but rather
concentrates upon a single index — rate of return on capital.
Table VII.

Efficiency Comparison - Return On Capital
Total Cost

Annual Cost of Ownership
Unit
Type

Develop.
Cost!/

Return
on
Capital-?/

Real
Estate
Taxesi/

Maint.
and
Oper.i/

Annual

Monthly

New Section
236

$20,000

$18,000

$440

$570

$2,810

$234

New Public
Housing

$22,500

2,025

500

570

3,095

258

1/ These figures reflect typical development costs in recent years
for new section 236 and public housing units in the City of
Cleveland.
2/ Return on capital equal 9.0 percent of development cost. This
approximates the average net yield in the Cleveland area.
3/ In the City of Cleveland, property is assessed at one-third of
market value and taxed at the rate of 67.1 mills.
4/ This includes the cost of utilities, heating, repairs, maintenance, etc. estimates were made by the author from conversations
with managers of local 236 projects and annual CMHA report.'

Real estate taxes on public housing are figured at the full
rate for the City of Cleveland. Public housing projects currently
receive an implicit subsidy by being taxed under a different formula.
Since we are attempting to account for full economic costs, however,
their taxes are calculated at the rate used for other types of
housing.
The yearly subsidy needed to put a particular family in one of
these units is the annual cost minus a given percentage of income -costs minus revenues. The maximum housing allowance cost for a family
of four is $1,680,$1,130 less than under section 236 and $1,415 less
- 16 -

public housing. In the Cleveland SMSA, there are 137,000 families
and 85,000 unrelated individuals who need assistance and could
qualify for a housing allowance. They could receive a total of
$•119,939,000 in one year under the housing allowance program proposed in this paper. To assist all these persons through a combination of section 236 units and public housing would cost $400
million, over three times as much as through housing allowances.
Thus, though the two approaches to an estimate of subsidies
are different in important respects, the general conclusion is the
same. A program of housing allowances is significantly more efficient on a per unit basis than alternative section 236 or public
housing programs.
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II.

COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVENESS

It is difficult to compare, in a straight-forward manner, the
effectiveness of the four programs. This is due primarily to the
wide variation in the lives of the programs as well as variations
in the annual appropriations authorized by Congress. Thus, a comparison of how many units the public housing program has produced
in thirty-five years can hardly be usefully compared with the production total of section 236, which has been in use for only four
years.
A more reasonable and meaningful comparison of effectiveness
can be made by adding the element. of cost to the analysis and examining the programs in terms of an established production level. This
will be accomplished by using the unit subsidy costs determined in
Section I, and defining the production level in terms of the Cleveland housing market.
It has been estimated that approximately 60,000 Cleveland
households are eligible (according to income) for public housing.
While this definition excludes many households who face difficulties
in affording standard housing,-^/it does provide a quantifiable
population which is clearly in need of housing assistance. Thus,
each program will be examined in terms of providing a standard
housing unit to each of the 60,000 households requiring assistance
in Cleveland.
The total subsidy cost of providing 60,000 units under each of
the four programs is determined by simply applying the adjusted,
discounted, forty-year subsidies shown in Table V. Table III shows
the total subsidy costs, the total household costs, and the total
costs of providing 60,000 units through each of the four programs.
14/ The Housing Allowance Program recognizes this through its income
eligibility limits. A full estimation of program costs in
Cleveland can be found in Appendix A.
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Table VIII.

Total 40-Year Subsidy Costs of Providing
60,000 Units in Cleveland
(From Table VI)
Subsidy

Program
Section 236

Household

Costs

Costs

(Net)*

Total Costs**

$1,419,000,000

$102,780,000

$1,521,780,000

Public Housing

1,325,280,000

0

1,325,280,000

Rent Supplenent

1,034,400,000

102,780,000

1,137,180,000

Housing Allowance
965,760,000
57,600,000
1,023,360,000
*These are based upon the net differences in household costs shown
in Table VI, i.e., Section 236 = $l,713/unit, Rent Supplement - $l,713/unit, Housing Allowance = $960/unit, and Public Housing = 0,
or the comparative base.
**Subsidy costs plus household costs, or costs to the public sector
plus costs incurred by the household.

The subsidy costs per unit, as shown in Table V, do not show
great differences between the four programs. However, when the
total costs of providing 60,000 units under each are determined,
the differences become very significant. Naturally, the allowance
program, which was.found to be the least expensive on a per unit
basis, is the least expensive when total subsidy costs are compared.
However, the allowance program is approximately $488 million less
costly than the most costly program -- section 236. It is approximately $114 million less costly than rent supplements, the second
least costly program.
A hypothetical treatment of the effectiveness criterion, using
unit costs, provides an important indication of the variation in
subsidy requirements, but ignores many of the more pragmatic obstacles to program implementation. The evidence in Cleveland (as
elsewhere) does not support the probability of successfully
achieving an effective implementation of existing programs even
when given the assumption of adequate funding. Attempts to develop
sufficient housing through the public housing program have often
been obstructed by political disputes. The development of 60,000
public housing units in Cuyahoga County in the near future is clearly
beyond the realm of possibility. The probability of the rent supplement or section 236 programs achieving the 60,000 unit objective
is even less probable than public housing. This is due not only to
- 19 -

political disputes, but also to the past use of the programs in
Cleveland, which indicates a reluctance on the part of developers
using section 236 to provide units to low-income families via rent
supplements (given the inability to section 236 subsidies, alone,
to reach the rent levels necessary for low-income households to
afford 236 units).
In contrast, the housing allowance program appears to offer a
much stronger probability of achieving such an objective, due
primarily to the program's provision of the subsidies directly to
households rather than to units. Thus, the program avoids the
location issue and greatly negates the political problems. This
advantage in probable effectiveness, when coupled with the subsidy
cost differences, indicates that the housing allowance program has
the greatest potential of the four programs in terms of effectiveness
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III.

COMPARISON OF CHOICE FRAMEWORK

The third criterion of program evaluation and comparison —
provision of wider choices in housing for those households with few
choices — is fairly straight-forward. Each of the four programs
provides the basic choice of a standard unit to a low-income family.
As discussed in Section I, the price which the family must pay to
realize this choice varies from program to program, as do the
public subsidies required in providing the choice.
In regard to the secondary housing choices of location, price,
size and type of unit, the existing programs provide very little
choice to recipient households. In all three programs, choices in
price, size and type unit are carefully governed by program guidelines. While public housing has in recent years offered a greater
diversity of unit types (e.g., multi-family, garden apartments,
single-family, et.al.), the recipient household generally has little
choice in the unit type provided. In the matter of location choice,
the evidence in Cleveland is that the existing programs have likely
been contrary to the wishes of many recipient households and have
probably perpetuated many of social problems which the households
face. This is because the locations of the units have generally
been in the same areas which are characterized by substandard social,
economic and physical conditions.
The housing allowance program seemingly offers a considerable
widening of choice in all four areas. Since the subsidy is provided to
to the household and it in turn seeks the unit, a considerable range
of choices in location, size, and type of unit is immediately provided in the program reviewed here, although various other allowance
schemes continue to include expenditure requirements with regard to
household income. The primary ways in which these choices would be
constrained by the allowance program would be by the amount of the
allowance subsidy and the particular nature of the local housing
market. If the allowance amount is relatively small, the rent level
which the .family could afford would be less and choices in housing
would be narrowed accordingly. Similarly, short-run shortages in
the local housing market might constrain the household's choice in
a particular unit type, size, price and location.
A comparison of the four programs according to the choice criterion produces a fairly evident conclusion. The existing programs
provide little, if any, choice beyond that of a standard unit, while
the allowance program potentially provides a relatively full range
of choices in unit location, size, price and type, as well as the
standard unit.
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IV.

INITIAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Having compared the four programs according to efficiency, effectiveness, and household choice, it is possible to draw some
tentative conclusions.
The comparative analysis of program efficiency, or unit subsidy
costs, initially presented wide variations in the subsidies required
in the four programs. However, when adjustments were completed to
hold family size, income, and expenditure required constant, and the
subsidies were discounted over forty years, the variations diminished considerably. The analysis showed housing allowances to have the
lowest total subsidy costs per unit. Section 2 36 displayed unit
sugsidies considerably higher than the other programs.
The seemingly minor unit subsidy differences determined in the
efficiency analysis acquired significance when the programs were
compared on the basis of effectiveness. Since it was inappropriate
to compare the actual unit productions of the programs, the total
subsidy costs of meeting a hypothetical need were determined and the
feasibility of attaining such a goal with each program briefly discussed. In terms of total subsidy costs, the allowance program
naturally yielded the lowest total since the totals were derived
directly from the efficiency analysis. Additionally, the allowance
program appeared most promising in terms of production feasibility.
The existing programs have repeatedly met with delays, usually resulting from political disputes over location decisions. Such
disputes would probably continue to impede the production of units,
even assuming that an adequate level of funding were available.
The allowance program appears to be unencumbered with these problems
since the program's subsidies are tied to households rather than
units.
Similarly, the comparison of household choices conveyed in the
four programs demonstrated that the existing programs provide few
housing choices (beyond that of a standard unit), while the allowance
program offers a substantial widening of choices in unit location,
price, size and type.
Thus, the comparative analysis shows the allowance program to
be more efficient, potentially more effective, and offer a significantly
wider range of housing choices, than any of the three existing programs. However, there is an additional consideration which must enter
into the evaluation of these programs. This is the nature of the
local housing market. The economic impact (both real and potential)
of the four programs should be considered with regard to trends,
deficiencies, and subsidy needs of the housing market.
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V.

HOUSING MARKET CONSIDERATIONS
The Cleveland Housing Market

Papers providing detailed analyses of the housing market in
Cleveland have been previously published, so only a summary of
findings will be provided here.^ 5
During the last decade, the housing market in the City of
Cleveland has been characterized by an over-all decline in the number of units, a relative decline in rent levels, an increase in
costs, and little new construction (other than subsidized). The
result of these trends has been a significant deterioration in the
condition of residential property throughout large areas of the
City, and substantial abandonment of units in several neighborhoods.-'-"
The basic cause of these difficulties in the housing market is
the low income level of a large segment of Cleveland's population.
Relative to increasing household income levels in the metropolitan
area, as well as to the increasing prices of goods and services, the
incomes of many Cleveland households have not kept pace, i.e., they
have experienced a relative decline. In the cases of tens of
thousands of Cleveland families, their income level, and consequently,
the amount which they have been able to spend for housing has been
insufficient to obtain a dwelling unit in standard condition. At
the same time, private landlords, having experienced the exodus of
middle-income families, faced a declining demand for their units at
rent levels which would be sufficient to maintain the units in standard condition. Their response was generally to lower the rents
charged, thus supplying the only demand present — a demand for substandard housing.
Thus, many neighborhoods, comprising large areas of the City, have
suffered substantial residential deterioration. As the City experienced a substantial net loss in population (approximately 110,000
persons from 1960 to 1970), the housing market was affected by
increasing vacancy rates and relative declines in rent, as adjustments took place between the declining demand for and increasing
supply of, dwelling units. These changes offered opportunities for
those households in the most depressed housing market areas to move
into adjacent neighborhoods, pay nearly the same or slightly more for
rent, and obtain a comparatively better dwelling unit and environment.
^•5See "Poverty and Substandard Housing: An Analysis of Residential
Deterioration in Cleveland", Cleveland City Planning Commission,
March, 1973; "Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income Families",
Cleveland City Planning Commission, January, 1972; "Housing
Moratorium: A Choice for Planners", ASPO Magazine, May, 1973.
16

See "Housing Abandonment in Cleveland", Cleveland City Planning
Commission, October, 1972.
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There being little or no demand for the units in the areas largely
vacated, owners of many of the units, unable to operate them economically even as substandard units, abandoned them. Hence, the
final stage in the process of deterioration — abandonment —
occurred on a significant scale in several neighborhoods.!'''
This summary explanation of the market processes operating in
the Cleveland housing market results in two important conclusions
relevant to housing subsidy programs: 1) the primary cause of
housing deterioration is ineffective demand for housing, i.e., the
inability due to low incomes, of a large segment of Cleveland's
households to expend an amount for housing which is adequate to
maintain a unit in standard condition; 2) there is an adequate
supply of housing available for Cleveland households, i.e., there
is no housing shortage, but rather there is a shortage of standard
housing which low-income households can afford.
In terms of the housing subsidy programs, these conclusions
have two important implications: 1) housing subsidies should be
primarily directed at the basic problem — ineffective demand (lcwincome) — which requires subsidies directed toward the demand side
6f the market rather than the supply side; 2) housing subsidies
directed toward the supply side of the market should have as their
objectives the preservation and maintenance of the existing housing
stock. In the more than forty years of federal housing subsidies,
the market intervention has been almost exclusively supply-side
in nature, with the programs attempting to either directly construct
new housing or indirectly affect increased construction by offering subsidy incentives to the private market. While various programs have been directed toward housing rehabilitation, the primary
orientation (and product) has been new construction.
Given the definition of the housing market problem in Cleveland,
it could be hypothesized that the impact of the federal programs
has been injurious to the private housing market. In a market
characterized by ineffective demand and a relatively increasing
supply of units, particularly at low-income levels, the affect of
constructing new units (with subsidies) would be to further depress
rent levels and thus worsen the operating position of private
housing operators. in fact, this has probably not been the case,
at least on a wide scale, simply because of the relative failure of
federal programs to produce a significant amount of housing (relative
to the total market). However, it is probable that these affects
have occurred on a smaller, neighborhood scale. For example, public
housing units in Cleveland are located in eighteen different census
tracts. In seven of the tracts, the public housing units comprise
more than 50% of the dwelling units in the tract. Additionally, in
several of the tracts, a substantial proportion of the units not
'"Housing Abandonment in Cleveland", op. cit.
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developed through public housing are units which have been developed
with other subsidy programs. While no direct casual relationship
can be substantiated between the development of these concentrations
qf subsidized units and the concurrent trend of declining rents and
housing deterioration in the same areas, it is quite probable that
the impact of these developments on area housing operators in the
private market was negative. Thus, while the federal programs
provided new standard housing for low-income families, the affect was
likely detrimental to the operation of private housing units and
probably supported the deterioration process underway by further
lessening the already weakened demand for such units.
The Programs and the Market
An evaluation of the four housing programs in terms of the
Cleveland housing market leads to mixed conclusions. Public housing
and section 2 36 are clearly supply-side programs, having been predominantly directed in the past towards new construction. However,
both programs offer the opportunity of use which is in accordance
with the goal of preservation and maintenance of the existing stock.
Public housing units can be developed through the acquisition process,
which does not add to the total housing stock. Similarly, a major
provision of section 236 is rehabilitation of existing units. Thus
both programs have the capability of providing standard units to lowincome families without adding to the total housing stock and consequently increasing housing supply in the market.
However, at the same time, public housing, even when used in
this manner, removes from the private market households previously
purchasing housing within the private market. The affect of this
action is to further reduce demand in an already demand-weakened
market and thus generate additional demand problems for private
housing operators.
The situation is different when section 236 is used in a rehabilitation effort, particularly if it is used in conjunction with
rent supplements. In this case, dwelling units are not added to the
market, private owners are given the ability to improve their units
to standard condition, and low-income families are given the ability
to afford the rent levels required in such units. The total supply
of housing is affected only qualitatively while the ineffective
demand of low-income households is made effective, i.e., capable of
securing a standard unit with the rent supplement.
When the rent supplement program is considered alone, only the
demand-side of the market is affected. However, as was noted previously, the supplement program is generally tied to units receiving
supply-side subsidies (in accordance with HUD guidelines). Nevertheless, the rent supplement program, being demand-side in nature,
affects the Cleveland housing market in a beneficial manner.
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In a similar manner, the housing allowance program acts directly
only on the demand side of the market, by increasing the housing
budgets of low- and moderate-income households to levels at which
they will be able to effectively demand standard units in the
private market. Indirectly, of course, the allowance program would
markedly affect the supply side of the market by inducing housing
operators to improve units to standard condition.18 Thus, the
allowance program would deal directly with the demand deficiency
in the market and only indirectly affect any increase in the total
housing stock.

l°This remains a controversial question. For the results of market
impact analysis in Cleveland, see "A Housing Allowance for Cleveland: Issues and Implications", Cleveland City Planning Commission,
Cleveland, 1973.
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VI.

FINAL CONCLUSIONS

Having examined section 236, public housing, rent supplement,
and the housing allowance proposal in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, household choice, and the nature of the housing market in
Cleveland, it is possible to make some summary observations and
reach several conclusions.
The comparative analysis of the programs in terms of efficiency,
and in turn, effectiveness, determined the allowance program to have
the lowest unit costs. The allowance program which was examined
provided, when contrasted with various other allowance proposals,
relatively high allowance subsidies to recipient households. While
this allowance formula was originally developed in order to assure
that recipient households would have a wide choice in housing and
that the increased level of demand would be sufficient to both
generate rehabilitation and maintain units in standard condition,
the formula certainly produced unit costs considerably higher than
those in most other allowance proposals. At the same time, however,
the key difference between the allowance program and the other three
programs is that the other programs were examined under the assumption that they were providing new, rather than rehabilitated, housing.
This consideration would certainly account for some of the cost
differences due to the considerably greater unit cost associated
with new construction than with rehabilitation.
However, in light of the Cleveland housing market situation,
the contrasting orientation of the allowance program becomes more
significant. Analysis of the housing market indicates the importance of subsidy intervention in the market aimed at the demand
side in order to affect as much rehabilitation and preservation of
the existing housing stock as possible. While some proportion of the
existing stock has.deteriorated beyond the economic capabilities of
rehabilitation and thus requires replacement, efforts should first
be aimed at gaining maximum utility from units already available.
Two of the programs have this demand side approach — rent supplements and housing allowances.
While these two programs are very similar, there is an important difference which was examined through the household choice
criterium. The rent supplement program is tied to designated units
at a specific location. The allowance program is tied to families
who may use the subsidy at any location. In terms of the choice
framework, the allowance program clearly provides the greatest range
of choices. While it is possible that certain loan insurance programs might be required with the allowance program, i.e., similar
though not subsidized as heavily as the supply-side subsidies used
in conjunction with rent supplements, such programs would be used
by housing operators in response to demand in the market, and thus
at locations in the market responsive to the new effective demand.
19

See "A Housing Allowance for Cleveland: Issues and Implications",
op. cit.
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The housing allowance program offers a method of housing subsidy which appears to be clearly more efficient and more effective
than existing programs. The allowance program provides to lowincome households not only the choice of a standard dwelling, but
also important choices in location, price, size, and type — choices
not provided with existing programs. The allowance program is
directed at the demand side of the market which analysis has shown
to be an important characteristic of subsidy intervention if existing units are to be saved from deterioration. Finally, the subsidies in the allowance program go directly and almost totally to
those who most need the assistance — low-income families and the
market in which they seek housing.
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APPENDIX A
An income eligibility schedule for the housing allowance program proposal was included in "Housing for Low- and Moderate-Income
Families", but was revised slightly for use in this and other
writings. Table A - 1 provides information regarding income eligibility maximums for various family sizes in the Cleveland Area. The
rent figures are based on an assumed 20% (of income) expenditure
by households, which would be the basis of the allowance subsidy.

TABLE A - 1

HOUSING ALLOWANCE INCOME SCHEDULE

Family
Size

Income
Maximum

1
2
3

$ 3,600
6,000
7,200
8,400
9,600
10,800
12,000
13,200
14,400
15,600

4
5
6

7
8
9
10+

Monthly
Rent

Annual
Rent
$

720
1,200
1,440
1,680
1,920
2,160
2,400
2,640
2,880
3.120

$ 60
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260

For example, Table A - 2 illustrates the allowance computation for
a family of four at various income levels. It should be noted that
the 20% of income criterium represents a basis for determining the
amount of the allowance and does not represent an expenditure requirement for the household.

TABLE A - 2
2 0%

Annual
Income

Income

$1,000
3,000
5,000
7,000
8,000

$

2 00
600
1,000
1,400
1,600

ALLOWANCE - FAMILY OF FOUR
Annual
Rent Index
$1,680
1,680
1,680
1,680
1,680

- 1A -

Annual
Allowance
$1,480
1,080
680
280
80

Monthly
Allowance
$123
90
51
23

7

Revised estimates regarding impact and cost of the program in
Cleveland have also been accomplished. Given the program schedule
outlined above, it is estimated that the total annual cost of the
program in the Cleveland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area
(S.M.S.A.) would be approximately $119,930,000 (excludes administration costs). Given this schedule, the program would include 137,000
families and 85,043 unrelated individuals in the Cleveland S.M.S.A.
who receive annual subsidies averaging $621 per year and $408 per
year, respectively.

- 2A -

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aaron, Henry J. Shelter and Subsidies
Washington, D. C , 1972.

The Brookings Institution,

Beckham, Robert "The Experimental Housing Allowance Program"
Journal of Housing No. 1, January, 1973, pp. 12-17.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "A Housing Allowance for Cleveland: Issues and Implications." City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1973.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "Evaluation of the Low-Rent
Public Housing Program" City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1973.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "Evaluation of the Rent Supplement Program" City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1973.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "Evaluation of the Section 2 36
Housing Program" City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1973.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "Housing Abandonment in Cleveland" City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1972.
Cleveland City Planning Commission "Housing for Low- and ModerateIncome Families" City of Cleveland, Cleveland, 1972.
Cleveland City Planning Commission ""Poverty and Substandard Housing:
An Analysis of Residential Deterioration in Cleveland" City of
Cleveland, Cleveland, 1973.
Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority Annual Report (1968-6970-71-72) Cleveland Metropolitan Housing Authority, Cleveland.
Downs, Anthony "Federal Housing Subsidies: Their Nature and Effectiveness and What We Should Do About Them" (Summary Report),
Real Estate Research Corporation, 1972.
Lowry, Ira S., et. al. "Rental Housing in New York City" (Vol. I
and Vol. II) The New York City, Rand Institute, New York, 1970.
Mattox, Joe L. "Rent Allowances"
September, 1971, pp. 482-487.

Journal of Housing

No. 9,

Muth, Richard Cities and Housing
Chicago, 1970.

University of Chicago Press,

Pearson, Gregg "Low Income Housing: Section 2 36 of the National
Housing Act and the Tax Reform Act of 1969" University of
Pittsburgh Law Review, Vo1. 31:433, pp.
Taggart, Robert Low income Housing: A Critique of Federal Aid
John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970.

U. S. Department of Commerce 1970 Census of Population and Housing, Census Tracts: Cleveland, Ohio Government Printing Office,
1972.
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1971 HUD Statistical Yearbook Government Printing Office, 1972.
U. S. Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States The
Economics of Federal Subsidy Programs: A Compendium of Papers
Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee Government Printing
Office, 1972.

A HOUSING ALLOWANCE

V™?™?™01*™1*™'

ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS

Prepared by John Linner
May, 1973

City Planning Commission
City of Cleveland

The preparation of this document was financed in part
through a Comprehensive Planning Grant from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, under the provisions of Seotion 701 of the Housing l o t of 1954, as
amended. Cleveland City Planning Commission, Room 501,
City Hall, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.

PREFACE

Housing has become one of Cleveland's most pressing problems. Signs
of neglect and decay are appearing,in neighborhoods that were sound only a few
years ago. Parts of the inner city are experiencing wholesale abandonment. In
short, the supply of decent housing within the city is shrinking day by day. This
poses a serious threat to Cleveland's future and the well-being of its residents.
Although a variety of programs have been directed at the urban housing
problem, they have consistently fallen far short of solving it. The rows of
dilapidated and abandoned buildings lining many Cleveland streets are unavoidable evidence that traditional cures have been inadequate. A new approach,
however, has shown promise in its experimental stages and is being considered
as a possible means of providing decent housing for those who cannot afford it - a national system of housing allowances.
This paper's purpose is to examine some important issues that may
arise with regard to housing allowances. How should such a program be structured? How much would it cost? How many Cleveland residents would be
eligible? How much subsidy would they receive? What effect would a housing
allowance program have on the supply of standard housing? How far would it go
toward solving the city's housing problem? All of these questions must be
answered in the course of determining such a program's feasibility.
Important contributions to this paper came from a number of individuals.
Many of the ideas guiding our thinking about housing allowances were drawn from
the written work of Edgar Olsen and Ira Lowry. Within the Planning Commission
staff, Douglas Wright had a major role in initiating our wider investigation of
this area. Susan Olson and Himanshu I. Patel assisted in parts of the analysis.
Nadine F. Lane typed the final draft. Much of the credit must go to Norman
Krumholz, Director of Planning, and Ernest R. Bonner, Chief of Comprehensive
Planning and Research, whose encouragement and guidance were essential to the
completion of this effort.

John X'inner
City Planner
Comprehensive Planning and Research

THE NEED FOR HOUSING SUBSIDIES

The main impetus for granting housing assistance now, as in the past,
is the recognition that many families cannot afford a decent place to live.
America's poor occupy substandard housing not by choice, but of necessity. In
every major city in the country, a substantial proportion of the population cannot meet market prices for standard housing without spending an unreasonable
portion of their incomes. One outcome is that most low-income families must
devote a high percentage of their earnings to housing. An accepted rule of
thumb suggests that a family should spend no more than one-fourth of its income
on rent. In the City of Cleveland, forty percent of the renters exceeded this
maximum in 1970.
As indicated by the table below, this was almost exclusively a problem of households in the lower income levels.
TABLE I
Propensity to Spend More Than 25% of Earnings
On Rent by Renter's Income
Percentage
Spending Over
25% on Rent

Income In
Thousands
0
2
3
4
5

-

2
3
4
5

-

6

98.8
91. 8
77.2
54.4
31.2
12.2
2.9
0.6
0.3
0.0

6 - 7
7 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 25
25 +

Source: Derived from U. S. Census

Eighty-seven percent of the renters with incomes under $5,000 spent more than
one-fourth of their earnings on rent. In 1970, one of every three Cleveland
households had an income below this amount.

*U. S. Census
2lbid.
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The gap between the cost of decent housing and the price the poor can
pay has also meant accelerated depreciation of Cleveland's housing stock. In
many neighborhoods, the low incomes of residents have prevented landlords
from increasing rents to cover rising operating costs. As rental revenues
have.failed to keep pace with costs, property owners have tried to cut their
losses by reducing maintenance.', Older buildings, such as those typically
found in Cleveland, require relatively high levels of maintenance in order to
keep them in good condition. The reduced maintenance policy that many landlords have adoped has led to rapid deterioration in many areas and wholesale
abandonment in a few.
Nearly one-third of Cleveland's occupied housing
units are now substandard, and owners are abandoning their holdings at an
estimated rate of three units per day.
If all Cleveland families are to have the opportunity to live in decent
housing, some type of assistance must be provided. Our analysis of Cleveland,
and studies completed in other areas, convinces us that traditional housing
programs will not address the most critical aspect of the urban housing problem
.the need to conserve and maintain existing housing resources in the private
stock. Ninety percent of Cleveland's housing stock is now standard or in need
of only minor repairs. Conserving this housing resource is not expensive, nor
would it inconvenience present owners or tenants. A program of housing
allowances - - i n addition to assistance for households in need - - would accomplish the important objective of conserving our present standard stock, thus
assuring no further deterioration of City housing.
A PROPOSED HOUSING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM AND THE ISSUES
IT RAISES

A housing allowance program would provide assistance in the form
of certificates for specific amounts to households which now cannot afford
standard housing. These certificates could be used to rent or buy housing but
could be negotiated only by landlords or homeowners. Subsidies would be
restricted to those who occupy standard housing. No subsidies would be granted
to those who remain in substandard units.
The subsidy amount going to a particular family would depend on its
size and income. A family's allowance would make up the difference between

^This process is documented in another Planning Commission publication,
Poverty and Substandard Housing: An Analysis jof Residential Deterioration
in Cleveland.
Cleveland City Planning Commission, Housing Abandonment in Cleveland.
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a specified percentage of its income and the amount typicajly paid to rent
well-maintained standard housing in the Cleveland SMSA.
Table II shows a schedule of rents estimated to represent the cost
of standard housing in the Cleveland area in 1969 for different family sizes.
* TABLE II
Rents and Income Limits
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10

Monthly
Rent .

YearlyRent
$

$ 60
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
240
260

720
1,200
1,440
1,680
1,920
2, ]60
2,400
2, 640
2, 880
3, 120

Maximum
Income
$

3,600
6,000
7, 200
8, 400
9, 600
10,800
12,000
13,200
14,400
15, 600

Families are expected to spend twenty percent of their incomes on housing.
So, a family receives no subsidy if its income exceeds five times the annual
rent for standard housing. For example, we estimated that a family of four
had to spend about $140 per month, or $1, 680 per year in 1969, to rent standard
housing. A four person family earning $8,400 and spending twenty percent of
its income would be able to pay that amount. Any four-person family with an
income below $8,400 would be eligible for a housing allowance - - those above
would not. The allowance amount would equal the difference between $1, 680 and
twenty percent of its income. For example, a four-person family with an income
of $5, 000 would be eligible for an allowance of $680 ($1, 680 -$1, 000 = $680).
It could then seek housing anywhere within the private market and use the allowance to rent any unit that meets the municipal housing code. If it were able to

Housing for Low- and Mode rate-Income Families (Cleveland City Planning
Commission) for a complete and detailed account of the proposal. Initially it
was suggested that families be expected to pay about sixteen percent of income
for rent. In the current proposal, this has been changed to twenty percent.
°The allowance level for a four-person family represents the Bureau of Labor
Statistics estimate of the amount spent on rent by a family living at an intermediate level. Figures for other family sizes were derived from this.
-3 -

find a standard unit for only $1,000 per year, it would only have to pay $320
out of its own income. A family would not be required to spend twenty percent
of its income. It could choose to spend as much or as little as necessary to
rent a standard unit. Hence participants would have an incentive to bargain
with landlords in order to minimize their own costs.
In 1969, 137, 108 families and 85,043 unrelated individuals in the
Cleveland SMSA' would have been eligible under these guidelines. The program
would cost an estimated $119, 939,000 annually. Fifty-eight percent of this
total (approximately $70, 000, 000) would go to City of Cleveland residents. 8 The
table below shows the distribution of benefits by family size.
TABLE III
Distribution of Allowance Benefits by Family Size
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10 +

Total
Number

Numbe r
Eligible

166,113
180,564
110,010
100,694
65,857
36,711
20,595
5, 899
2, 832
2,464

85, 043
49, 888
21, 755
20,423
16, 714
12,442
9,647
2, 985
1, 642
1, 612

Percent
Eligible
51.2
27. 6
19. 8
20.3
25.4
33.9
46. 8
50.6
58.0
65.4

Subsidy
In Thousands
$

34, 706
25,598
12, 947
12,231
10,608
8,669
8, 799
2,794
1,719

1, 868

Note: One-person "families" represent those persons classified
as unrelated individuals in the U. S. Census.
Source: Derived from U.S. Census
Several salient points should be noted.
First, unrelated individuals receive a large share of the total subsidy -almost thirty percent. This is due largely to the age composition of this group.
Over one-third of all unrelated individuals in the Cleveland SMSA are sixty-five
years of age or older, and on the whole, the elderly tend to have low incomes,
In contrast, only three percent of the four-person families are headed by
persons over sixty-five. °
'Cuyahoga, Lake, Geauga, and Medina Counties.
^Derived from U. S. Census.
'U. S. Census

Second, three- and four-person families have low rates of eligibility in
comparison with both smaller and larger families. Nearly one of every five two"person families is headed by a person over sixty-five. Two-person families,
then, are less likely to have a wage-earner and more likely to have an income
that would qualify them for a housing allowance. Families with five or more
members have little more income than those with only four members, but their
needs in terms of housing costs are significantly greater. *-® Therefore, a
high proportion of the larger families are eligible under the proposed guidelines
of this program.
One important consideration in any subsidy program is its effect on
the incentive to work. Any program that seriously diminishes the incentive
to earn income will encounter strong political opposition. This housing allowance program would have some impact on work incentive as will any program
that graduates the amount of assistance with need. Nevertheless, the effects
would be minor. A participant would lose only twenty cents in subsidy for
each additional dollar of income. It should be noted that the higher the propor, tion of income to be spent on housing under an allowance program, the less
incentive there is to work. If participants were expected to contribute thirty
percent of their incomes toward the cost of housing, their subsidy would drop
ten cents more for each additional dollar earned. Instead of receiving eighty
cents on each additional dollar of income (up to the income limit), a participant
would receive seventy cents and, therefore, would benefit somewhat less from
working. The program, as spelled out, will be viewed by many as too expensive.
In fact, the national costs of such a program should be approximately $12 billion
annually - - fully 5 times the amount now spent in direct subsidies or various
low- and moderate-income household subsidies by the Federal government. In
spite of the knowledge that a successful assault on the problem will require no
less, there are are bound to be changes proposed to reduce costs.
Several possible changes will be considered here. One would be to include
only families. This would eliminate 85,043 unrelated individuals from eligibility
and reduce potential subsidies by $34. 7 million. This would, however, deny
assistance to many low-income elderly persons. Forty-seven percent of the
unrelated individuals eligible are sixty-five and over. This group comprises
twenty-one percent of all persons sixty-five and over in the entire SMSA. To
exclude unrelated individuals would work an unfair hardship on the elderly and
withhold help from a group that desperately needs it. This could also limit the
program's effectiveness. Elderly persons living alone make up eight percent
of all the homeowners in the City of Cleveland. Four out of five of these individuals have incomes that would qualify them for a housing allowance. ** Under
present conditions, we might expect these persons to have great difficulty maintaining their homes even if they have paid off mortgages. A housing allowance
program would insure that they are financially able to keep their homes in good
repair.
10
1

Ibid .

d e r i v e d from U. S. Census.

'
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Another means of reducing program costs would be to expect
participants to spend a higher proportion of their incomes on housing - twenty-five percent, for example - - and to lower the income limits accordingly. The effect of such a change on income limits is illustrated in the
table below.
TABLE IV
Income Limits
Family
Size
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
8

9
10

20% Program

25% Program

$

$

3, 600
6,000
7, 200
8, 400
9, 600
10,800
12,000
13,200
14,400
15,600

2, 880
4, 800
5, 760
6, 720
7,680
8, 640
9, 600
10,560
11,520
12,480

Switching to a twenty-five percent program would have the following consequences in the Cleveland SMSA. First, it would cut the total potential subsidy
by $29.7 million, a savings of one-fourth, from the original program.
Second, it would eliminate twelve percent of the unrelated individuals and
thirty-three percent of the families from eligibility. A change of this sort
would make most moderate-income families ineligible and make housing allowances almost exclusively a low-income program. A twenty-five percent program would also provide less incentive to work than a twenty percent program,
because the subsidy would decline more rapidly with increases in income.
Another change that might be considered to reduce costs would be to
require that a family spend twenty percent (or another given percentage) of
its income, Under such a program, the government would pay the difference
between the yearly rent for a particular unit (up to the maximum allowable )
and twenty percent of the recipient family's income. Since families might sometimes find units with rents below the maximum, the government would have to
pay less than if its gave allowances strictly on the basis of income. For example,
without an expenditure requirement, a family of four earning $5, 000 would
12

Ibid.
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receive a subsidy of $680 ($1,680 -$1,000 = $680) per year, providing that
it occupied standard housing. If it found a standard unit for less than this
* amount, the subsidy would not change. If an expenditure of twenty percent
were required, however, its subsidy would change with the cost of the unit
chosen. If the family of four earning $5,000 found a unit renting for $1, 680
per year, its subsidy would still be $680. If the rent were only $1,200, though,
its subsidy would drop to $200 ($1,200 -$1,000 = $200). On the surface, this
approach would appear to offer some savings to the government. This savings,
though, would probably not be realized. Participants would have no incentive
to bargain with landlords since their share of the rent would be fixed at twenty
percent of their income. They would be indifferent to the price as long as it
did not exceed the maximum for their family size. This would encourage
landlords to ask for the maximum rent allowed for a particular family with
the following consequences. First, any potential savings would be lost, for
the most part, since the government would still be paying the difference between the allowance level and twenty percent of family income. Second, this
would result in unnecessary inflation of rents, not only for program partici• pants, but also for those not in the program. In the interest of minimizing
the potential inflationary effects of housing allowances, it would seem advisable
to give participants as much incentive as possible to bargain with landlords.
In light of this important consideration, an expenditure requirement appears
to be unwise.
**

The program's cost could be reduced by lowering the allowance
levels. By lowering the amounts for all family sizes by $10 per month, the
total subsidy would be cut by eighteen percent. The number of eligible
unrelated individuals would decline by twenty percent and families by seventeen
percent.
This would have a less severe effect on the number of participants
than expecting a twenty-five percent expenditure, because fewer moderateincome families would be made ineligible. It should be noted, however, that
as in the case of other changes, by cutting the subsidy and eliminating participants, we restrict the potential benefits of the program. A very conservative
program - - say, one setting the allowance level for a family of four at $100
and requiring a twenty-five percent expenditure - - might effect little or no
improvement in housing conditions.
This important point cannot be emphasized enough. It is clearly
possible to reduce the costs of the program by setting allowances low or excluding eligible recipients. But the objective of maintaining and restoring
to standard condition the housing stock' of the City will surely suffer as a
direct result of program cost-cutting. Thousands of households in Cleveland
are not poor by present government standards but their ability to maintain
standard housing is just as doubtful as the very poor. Subsidies to a wide range
of households in Cleveland will be needed if our now standard housing stock is
13
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to be preserved. A program less wide-ranging will only superficially assist
the very poor and will clearly fail to accomplish the important objective of
maintaining and improving the City's present housing stock.
Undoubtedly, various administrative provisions will be added to
exclude those who have low incomes but do not "need" or "deserve" assistance
for one reason or another. For example, nearly all college students have
incomes below the maximum for eligibility. Yet, in many cases, they do not
need assistance because they can get financial help from their parents.
Should students be treated differently from other groups? If so, should all
students be excluded or just those who do not "need" assistance?
A limit on assets might also be imposed. Families with more than a
specified amount of assets or income from assets might be excluded.
Although these sorts of provisions could serve the goal of cutting
program costs by giving help only to those who clearly need it, they should.
be adopted with caution. If a great many complicated regulations are imposed,
administration costs will soar. Exclusionary rules should be adopted only
when the costs of doing so are clearly in line with the savings to be gained and
they do not withhold assistance from persons who need it.
Of course, the most direct way of reducing the costs of a housing
allowance program is to increase the incomes of those who now cannot afford
standard housing. If incomes increase faster than housing costs, as they did
between I960 and 1970, 14 (-he number of families who need housing assistance
should decrease. This would be a very gradual, long-run trend and offers
little hope for cutting costs in the short-run. An increase in income could
come about quickly if Cleveland's private sector were to provide more and
better-paying jobs for low-income people. This appears to be unlikely on a
large-scale basis. Any significant increase in the incomes of the poor must
come from government action - - in the form of either public service employment or direct transfers. For every additional dollar spent in this manner,
the cost of housing allowances will decrease by twenty cents. A determined
effort to raise the incomes of low- and moderate-income families will sharply
reduce the amount of money needed for housing allowances.
POTENTIAL IMPACT ON HOUSING CONDITIONS

The true measure of any housing program's effectiveness lies in its
impact on housing conditions. A successful housing program must result in
fewer households occupying substandard units than would otherwise be the
case. This sort of improvement may take three forms - - preservation, new
construction, and rehabilitation.

c o n s u m e r Price Index.
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The success of a housing allowance program can be measured partly
in terms of preventing further decay. As stated earlier, perhaps the most
• critical aspect of the housing problem in Cleveland and other central cities
is the rapid depletion of the housing stock occurring now. This is primarily
due to the shifting of housing resources from those who can afford wellmaintained, standard housing (the middle-income market) to those who cannot
(the low-income market). The number of Cleveland families with incomes
in the upper seventy percent of Cuyahoga County families dropped twenty-one
percent during the 1960's. Cleveland families in the lower thirty percent,
while declining in numbers by ten percent, make up an increasing proportion
of the City's households. 15 Under these conditions, deterioration is virtually
inevitable. A housing allowance program could halt the spread of do cay by
insuring that all future occupants of now-standard units would be able to pay
sufficient rent to provide for adequate maintenance. Housing allowances would
enable owners of standard housing to keep it standard. Without such assistance,
as many as 20, 000 standard units in Cleveland alone may fall into disrepair
during the 1970's. l 6
In order for all eligible households to participate in the program,
however, the supply of standard housing must be increased. Of Cleveland's
248,000 occupied housing units, an estimated 80,000 are substandard and could
not be used by allowance recipients, 17 More standard housing can be produced in two ways - - new construction and upgrading substandard units.
Presently the cost of newly constructed housing is too high for allowance
recipients to occupy it. For example, new two-bedroom apartments in the
Cleveland area generally rent for $60 more per month than a four-person
household receiving a housing allowance would be able to pay. Hence this
program would not stimulate the construction of new units for low- and
moderate-income families. This is not to say, however, that housing allowances would not encourage any new construction. Edgar Olsen has suggested
that if such a program were initiated, owners of housing priced above the
allowance level would find it profitable to allow their units to filter down to the
sector of the market affected by housing allowances. This would increase
the supply of moderate quality housing while decreasing the supply of higher
quality units. As the market for high quality units tightens, suppliers will
have greater incentive to construct new units to meet the demand in this sector of the market. Hence housing allowances could stimulate new construction
for higher income groups by encouraging filtering and thereby expand the
supply of standard housing. ' °
^Derived from U. S. Census.
*"This estimate was based on a projected loss of 30,000 households (75,000
persons) and the assumption that two-thirds of them are now supporting
standard housing.
17CDIP 2% Survey.
1 ft
lo

Edgar Olsen, "A Competitive Theory of the Housing Market", American
Economic Review, September 1969.
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More standard units may also be produced by upgrading existing
substandard units. A successful housing allowance program must spur
fairly extensive rehabilitation and repair of substandard housing. Improvement on a large-scale basis is likely only if landlords view it as a more
profitable course of action than the alternative - - allowing substandard
units to remain substandard. Let us examine this from the owner's perspective.
If a landlord refuses to bring his units up to standard condition, he
will not be able to rent them to allowance recipients. Most of the occupants
of substandard units will be eligible for a housing allowance and will have
a strong incentive to find standard housing. By doing so, they will not only
improve the quality of their housing, but frequently they will also be able to
reduce the amount of their income they must spend on rent. For example,
a hypothetical four-person family with an income of $3, 000 pays $90 per
month for a substandard apartment. Assume this family could find a
standard unit for $140 per month, the amount typically paid by a family
maintaining an intermediate standard of living. Their monthly housing
allowance would be $100, leaving them to pay only $40. In this instance, the
family could obtain better housing and spend $-50 less per month. The landlord who refuses to make necessary improvements on his substandard units
will run the risk of losing tenants and revenue. In this "situation, his options
are quite limited. He may hope to attract new tenants who do not wish to
participate in the allowance program and are willing to occupy substandard
housing. It is unlikely, however, that there will be much demand for substandard housing when families can get better units at a lower cost to them.
He might also try to convert his building to other uses, but opportunities
for profitable conversion to other uses are rare in most low-income neighborhoods, as evidenced by the many vacant commercial and industrial structures in Cleveland.' If an owner does not wish to bring his building up to code,
he will generally have to choose between abandoning it and selling it.
The price that a substandard building would command should be
approximately equal to its market value after rehabilitation minus the cost
of rehabilitation. For example, let us assume that the landlord above owns
a six-unit building that would be worth $50,000 as income property after
necessary improvements were made. If the cost of these improvements were
$40,000, the building would be worth $10,000 in its present state. In other
words, the value of a substandard residential building should settle at the
difference between its value after rehabilitation and the cost of rehabilitation.
In some cases, the cost of rehabilitation may be greater than a building's
value after repairs are made. This is probably true for much of the housing
in Cleveland's oldest slums. In such cases, rehabilitation is not feasible.
Owners would not be likely to spend $8, 000 or $9,000 to acquire and rehabilitate a dilapidated wood frame house in an undesirable location. Even if it
could be kept occupied for a few years due to a shortage of standard housing,
and the desire of low-income families to use their allowances, it is unlikely
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that there would be any demand for it ten or fifteen years hence. A substantial proportion of Cleveland's substandard housing, however, is not
thoroughly worn out and is located in viable neighborhoods.
Let us examine the position of an investor considering the acquisition and rehabilitation of a substandard building. Assume that this building
contains units large enough for a four-person family and that the owner
could charge $140 per month for each unit. A unit occupied for twelve months
at this rate would yield a possible gross income of $1, 680, Allowing a five
percent loss for vacancies, he would collect $1, 596. Assuming $800 for
operating expenses and taxes, he would derive $796 in net operating income.
If he determines that he needs a net yield (net operating income divided by
the total cost of acquisition and rehabilitation) of eleven percent to make the
investment worthwhile, he can spend $7,200 per unit for acquisition and
rehabilitation. If a net yield of nine percent were sufficient, he could spend
$8, 800 per unit. In general, investors should be able to spend between
$7, 000 and $9, 000 per unit for purchase and improvement of substandard
housing.

CAN HOUSING ALLOWANCES MEET CLEVELAND'S FUTURE HOUSING NEEDS
During the 1960 r s, Cleveland lost 14.6% of its population. Although
the rate of population decline appears to be slowing, the city will undoubtedly
continue to lose residents during the 1970's. *° A reasonable estimate of
Cleveland's population in 1980 would be near 675,000. Assuming a ratio of
one housing unit for every three residents and a vacancy rate of five percent,
Cleveland would need 237,000 units in 1980. Presently, the City has 176,000
standard units and 88,000 substandard ones. How much rehabilitation would
have to occur in order to provide 237,000 standard units in 1980?
If all units now standard are preserved and maintained, an additional
61, 000 standard units still must be added to the housing stock. Some of these
will come through new construction. Between I960 and 1970, 15,000 units
were built in Cleveland. ^0 Approximately twenty-five percent were subsidized
housing for low- and mode rate-income families. The amount of new construction undertaken during the 1970's will undoubtedly be smaller, due to the
scarcity of vacant land in good residential environments. If 8, 000 new units
are added to the housing stock between 1970 and 1980, 53,000 units will still
need to be rehabilitated in order to provide a total of 237, 000 standard units in
the city. This would mean that sixty percent of all existing substandard units
would have to be upgraded to meet the City housing code. According to a 1969
survey of 3, 740 Cleveland households, about eighty percent of the City's substandard housing is only marginally substandard and could be brought up to
code with relatively small investments. * Hence, rehabilitating 53,000 units
"U. S. Census.
20lbid.
21

CDIP 2% Survey.
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by 1980 appears to be a realistic goal under a housing allowance program.
Most of the units that would not be rehabilitated are in the City's older slums,
where much of the housing stock has simply been used up through years of
neglect.
One of the crucial determinants of improvement in the existing housing stock is the availability of. credit. Rehabilitation of the housing in any
area of Cleveland cannot succeed without the cooperation of the City's
lending institutions. If investors can secure mortgages on buildings for
seventy-five percent of the total cost of acquisition and rehabilitation at
eight percent interest over a period of twenty years, considerably more
rehabilitation would be expected than if fifty percent down payments, fifteen
percent interest, and very short terms are required. Much of the blame for
the central City's deterioration has been placed on banks, mortgage companies,
and savings and loan associations for adopting conservative lending policies
on central city property. Some of this criticism is justified. In some cases,
these institutions have been overly cautious in approving loans in the city and
have frustrated the efforts of individuals to improve their neighborhoods. Nevertheless, under present conditions, lenders have good reason to be circumspect.
As long as a large proportion of Cleveland's households cannot pay for decent
housing, deterioration of the city's housing stock will persist. By attacking
the root of the problem, ineffective demand, a housing allowance program
should partially remedy this situation. Deterioration would no longer be
inevitable. Lenders could provide funds to an investor without fearing that
depreciation of the property will outstrip amortization of the mortgage. By
halting the rapid advance of decay through neighborhoods, a housing allowance
program should make capital more accessible to investors and homeowners
and thereby help overcome one of the largest obstacles to improvement of the
housing stock.
CONCLUSIONS

Although any predictions of the future are at least partly speculative,
the following conclusions seem warranted:
A national system of housing allowances of the
kind described in this paper would annually cost
$12 billion in the nation, $120 million in the Cleveland
SMSA, and $70 million in the City itself. About thirty
percent of area residents and fifty percent of City
residents would be eligible.
This program should not be based on spending a
high proportion of income for rent, nor should any
specific proportion be required to be spent.
The least harmful way to reduce prografrj costs is
by lowering the allowance levels slightly.
-12-

For each additional five dollars spent in the area
of family assistance and public service employment, the
cost of a housing allowance program should decline by
one dollar,,
Housing allowances will prevent further deterioration of
City housing by providing funds for adequate maintenance
of existing standard housing and improvement of marginally
substandard buildings. This would enable all City residents
to occupy standard units by 1980, if not sooner.
Housing allowances, in short, offer a way to provide
decent housing for low- and moderate-income families, to
halt the wasteful depletion of the City's housing stock,
and to preserve the City as a decent residential environment.
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